A Comparison of Peloponnesian War-Era Athens with Contemporary America

In reading Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War, one cannot help but recognize a recurring pattern in the events and attitudes of 6^th Century BCE Greece and contemporary world affairs. This pattern, or theme if you will, noted by Thucydides himself as well as many of us in IR 5551, is the cyclicality of historical events - how the mistakes of the past never seem to fully teach their lessons to future generations, either by virtue of our own historical ignorance or the sheer hubris of the modern era. We think ourselves above the pettiness that sparked the wars of old, enlightened in our modern worldview, but, in truth, we stumble over many of the same obstacles as our forebears from antiquity - over and over again, as history has shown us - and, as yet, it would seem we have not learned our collective lesson. Thucydides recognized the hubris of the Athenian empire in his own time, and recorded the events of the Peloponnesian War with the hope that future generations might not make the same mistakes. This paper seeks to illustrate how said generations have failed in that respect, as our global relations remain locked in a recursive loop of militarism. It will draw parallels to the events and attitudes of Peloponnesian War-era Athens and post-Cold War and post-9/11 America in an effort to recognize the recurrent theme of pre- and post-war aggression and military buildup.

The rise of Athenian power and Hellenic hegemony can be traced back to the outcome of the Greco-Persian Wars, c. 549-479 BCE. In these, the potential for Persian domination under Darius was so poignant that it forced unlikely Greek compatriots to ally themselves in order to meet the threat head on. What started as a Persian incursion into Ionia soon turned into full-scale imperial war, one where a united Greek front triumphed at the Battle of Marathon in 490 BCE. And although the Persians did later return in 480 BCE under Xerxes, they were swiftly beaten: first at Salamis and then at Platea a year later. (Hooker, Persian, 1-3)

Throughout the course of the Greco-Persian Wars, two key city-states emerged as the regional powerhouses: Athens and Sparta. Sparta maintained a fierce infantry while Athens provided the Greeks' with naval preeminence. The Persians, it would seem, were no match for the collective military strength of the Greeks. At war's end, though, with their common Eastern enemy removed from the equation, the Hellenic world found itself divided into two distinct camps: Athenian- or Spartan-aligned. Over time, the Athenians and their allies formed an imperial collective spanning clockwise around the Peloponnesus from Athens all the way to Crete, with a few island holdings west of the mainland. Meanwhile, Sparta and its allies ostensibly controlled the southern extent of the Greek peninsula south of Thebes. (OSSHE, Map 7)

Given what must have surely seemed to the Spartans like a pincer movement of imperial expansion on the part of Athens, the Athenians found themselves on the brink of war with their one-time allies. In Thucydides' account of the events leading up to the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians addressed this and other charges before the Spartan populace. (Note that this speech was not given at the behest of an official Athenian delegation, but rather by a group of everyday Athenian traders who found themselves, in this instance, the mouthpiece for the entire empire.) This address served two purposes. Firstly, it tackled the issue of Athenian expansion throughout the Peloponnesus and the potential threat this posed to its former allied city-states. Secondly, it served to remind the Spartan masses (if not warn them outright) as to the military power Athens possessed, outlining the many ways in which the Athenian fleet was pivotal to the defeat of the Persians at Marathon, Salamis and Platea.

In the first half of this speech, the Athenians account for their continued imperial expansion - both in power and scope - as follows. First, Athens claims to have built up strength during the Greco-Persian Wars as smaller city-states joined with them for protection. Second, they account for Athens' continued expansion after the war as preparatory should Persia or another equally powerful empire attack. Third, they insist that Athens has maintained this large and menacing empire in the face of alliances-turned-sour as a precautionary measure towards potential - perhaps inevitable - intra-Greek conflict. As for the latter half of this speech, while on the surface seemingly little more than grandstanding, it is indicative of a greater problem: the prevailing Athenian sentiment that might makes right. (Thucydides, 3.15-28)

Naturally, there are many takes on this speech and its content. The Corinthians point out that Sparta should have heeded their warnings and dealt with Athens long before it ever attained such power. (Thucydides, 3.4-14) The Spartan Archidamus urges restraint, warning his people not to rush headlong into a potentially long and protracted war against a people they have all witnessed in battle and know the military prowess of. (Thucydides, 3.29-39) Meanwhile, Sthenalaidas, another Spartan, gives a call to action on the grounds that Athens have broken faith with them, as the Athenians never once denied the allegations of mistreatment brought against them by their former allied city-states. (Thucydides, 3.40-44)

Though a thirty-year truce had been in place to preempt all-out war, the Spartans did inevitably agree to action on the grounds that Athens had broken their treaty by interfering in Spartan affairs, i.e. Epidamnus and Corcyra. This three-part war, later dubbed the Peloponnesian War, dragged on over the course of nearly sixty years, from c. 461-405 BCE, eventually resulting in the destruction of Athens and the establishment of newfound Spartan hegemony in Greece. (Hooker, Peloponnesian, 1-2)

In relating this history, this paper seeks to now draw parallels to the United States and its foreign policy and international relations post-Cold War and post-9/11 as a contemporary example of the Athenian hubristic mindset.

First, to the question of hostile foreign governments as a justification for sustained military buildup both pre- and post-war, it would seem the United States has readily subscribed to this rationale since the early 1900s. From the onset of World War II, with the fear of German world domination, the United States began preparing for worst case scenarios. When the first strike came not from Germany but from Japan, American fervor was already at a fever pitch; the Japanese attack on the Pearl Harbor Naval Base in Hawaii only served to give the US greater validation. The American media even recycled a piece of Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg Address to send that message home: "... We here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain ..." (Pearl, 11) The United Sates used this attack as validation - although presumably not an excuse - for the development of nuclear ballistic technology, a technology developed in secret unbeknownst to America's allies in Europe and, specifically, the United Soviet Socialist Republic. It would seem that World War II was the first point at which contemporary America took on a very Athenian air, with the fierce Soviet Red Army counterbalancing as its Sparta. The United States' political relations with the Soviets at this point in history were much the same as Athens' and Sparta's were at the time of the Greco-Persian Wars: a greater threat united them in common cause, though the underlying diplomatic tensions still remained. And much as was the case with Athens and Sparta following the Greco-Persian Wars, with the common enemy removed from the equation, peace between the Americans and Russians was haphazard at best. The demonstration of American military power via the atomic bomb sent shockwaves through the world community, not just in the USSR but in Europe as well. Such unparalleled power was the cause for much alarm and, inevitably, an arms race between the democratic West and the communist East, with MADD (mutually assured self-destruction) the only system of checks-and-balances. (The Nuclear, 1-3)

Throughout the Cold War, as it was later called, the Russians, in their own way, and even some of America's own fellows in the Western community, expressed dismay at this perpetual arms race. And, much as the Athenians did, the United States offered similar rationales for their maintained military buildup: wartime remnants, post-war anxiety, and newfound Cold War fears. Soviet ire over America's incursion into their domain - ballistic missiles the United States had placed in Turkey - prompted an escalation in tensions with the events of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, where a Russian-backed military coup in Cuba almost sparked a third World War, this time nuclear. Though (nuclear) tensions were eased somewhat through backdoor channels over the course of eleven days, October 18-29, 1962, the "American problem" still persisted in the minds of many. (Kornbluh, 1-9)

Flash forward to America post-9/11 and one sees a recurrence of that self-same Athenian theme. Prior the September 11^th attacks, America was, like many Western nations, enjoying relative calm and stability, resting comfortably on the cushion of its own military superiority. The threat posed by militant Islamism, as it was later dubbed, had been marginalized even in light of a 1995 CIA warning to the FBI regarding a potential plot by Al-Qaeda to hijack American passenger planes; although Osama bin-Laden himself was not directly named in connection with this terror plot, he was noted as an "emerging threat." (CIA, 1)

When the attacks finally did occur, UN support for the United States was almost immediate; the world community banded together to bolster its ally. The 9/11 attacks were themselves viewed as an attack on the democratic world as a whole - much in the same way that Pericles viewed the threat to Athens and her democracy-loving allies (Thucydides, 6:24-26) - under Article IV of the UN Charter, which states "that an armed attack... on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." (Security, 3) Backed by the international community, the United States flexed its military muscles in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, wherein the 9/11 plot originated.

Once this threat was neutralized, though, - the Taliban disbanded and a transitional democratic government under Hamid Karzai put in place - the United States was unwilling to dial back the military rhetoric or the troop strength it had amassed during that conflict. In continued escalation of military action within the Middle East at large, in what became known as the "War on Terror," the US stepped up its offensive, taking on the Baathist dictatorship of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Backing for this measure, however, was not as vehemently supported by the international community this time around; in fact, many longtime supporters of the United States and its wartime efforts (i.e. France, Germany, Russia, et al) found themselves at odds with this latest policy. In their view, it had been justifiable for the United States to counterstrike Afghanistan after September 11^th; however, to preemptively strike at a non-aggressing, sovereign nation such as Iraq for the sake of heading off future conflict was deemed by many as overambitious. Thus the US found itself at odds with its one-time allies, just as the Athenians found themselves at odds with Sparta. But, like the Athenians, the US had maintained a standing alliance with many other nations since the "War on Terror" began: the "Coalition of the Willing" as they became known - some forty-eight countries who, ostensibly, pledged their support for the United States and its actions in Iraq (Coalition, 1-3), thus setting themselves at odds with the rest of the world community (especially those nations with predominantly Muslim populations, i.e. Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kuwait, the Philippines, Turkey and Uzbekistan, who were, resultantly, viewed by many in the Islamic world as heretical.)

The problem with such unilateral action as was taken in Iraq is that the United States has seemingly set itself above the reproach of the international community, much in the same way that the Athenians set themselves apart from the other Hellenistic city-states. And, just as was the case with Athens, the United States has found itself standing alone in the face of greater threats and with increasingly colder international ties.

Thus, some three thousand years hence from the Peloponnesian War, it is easy to see how such hubristic scenarios as Thucydides warned of are still playing out in the modern era. Though a noble intent, Thucydides himself realized the potential for future generations to overlook the lessons presented in his chronicle:
"The absence of romance in my history will, I fear, detract somewhat from its interest; but if it be judged useful by those inquirers who desire an exact knowledge of the past as an aid to the interpretation of the future, which in the course of human things must resemble if it does not reflect it, I shall be content." (Thucydides, 1:31)

It is unfortunate that mankind has not paid better attention to history.

WORKS CITED

CIA Warned of Attack in '95. CBS News, Associated Press. http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/03/21/terror/main607659.shtml 2004.

Coalition Members. Operation Iraqi Freedom. The White House. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030325-9.html March 25, 2003.

Kornbluh, Peter. Chang, Laurence.The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962. The National

Security Archive. The George Washington University. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/declass.htm 1 October, 1998.

Hooker, Richard.Ancient Greece: The Peloponnesian War. Washington State University. http://www.wsu.edu/~dee/GREECE/PELOWARS.HTM 1996.

Hooker, Richard.Ancient Greece: The Persian Wars. Washington State University. http://www.wsu.edu/~dee/GREECE/PERSIAN.HTM 1996.

The Nuclear Arms Race. Cold War Policies 1945-1991. University of San Diego. http://history.acusd.edu/gen/20th/coldwar2.html 15 December, 2005.

OSSHE Historical and Cultural Atlas Resource. Mapping History. University of Oregon. http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/~atlas/europe/maps.html 1996.

Pearl Harbor Raid, 7 December, 1941 �â'¬" Overview and Special Image Selection. Naval Historical Center. http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/pearlhbr.htm 2000.

Security Treaty Between the United States, Australia, and New Zealand (ANZUS); September 1^st, 1951. The Avalon Project at Yale Law School. http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/intdip/usmulti/usmu002.htm 2005.

Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Penguin Classics. 1954.