A Comparison of Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan and John Locke in His Second Treatise of Government

In Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes uses a precise line of deductive reasoning, modeled after the scientific method, to support his vision of powerful, unlimited government. He argues that only an all-powerful sovereign with the authority to command absolute obedience from its subjects can prevent civilization from dissolving into violence and chaos.

To prove the necessity of such a power, Hobbes proposes a hypothetical environment in which mankind lives completely free from institutional regulation: the state of nature. In order to hypothesize on the conditions of an imaginary environment, Hobbes must first examine the basic psychology and motivations of the human race. He proposes a desire-aversion principle as the underlying impetus behind all human behavior. People have either natural or acquired perceptions of the objects and conditions around them; these perceptions are reduced to feelings of either desire or aversion; every human action is a self-serving response to one of these two feelings.

A second psychological principle Hobbes proposes is man's insatiable appetite for power. Power essentially is a measure of a person's ability to successfully act on his desires and aversions, so constantly building one's power is the only way to provide for the unforeseen obstacles to achieving future goals. Using these two principles as guidelines for human behavior, Hobbes proceeds to describe the state of nature. If there is no single ultimate power, then mankind exists in a state of equality: all possess equal expectations to fulfilled desires, equally vulnerable bodies, and an equal ability to kill. Hobbes reasons that under these conditions, the only possible result is a "war of every man against every man." (p. 185) In a state of equality and an environment of limited resources, the endless human pursuit of acquisition will eventually bring people into competition for resources which cannot be shared, and their common vulnerability will cause them to resort to the logic of the first strike. Each person reasons that he is bound to come under attack eventually, and therefore must initiate violence as an act of self-preservation. He assumes that he must eliminate any person he meets in competition, before they do the same to him. Even if he were content with the resources he had, he would recognize that he was vulnerable to a group assault, and so reason that he must attack and plunder in order to increase his power. Since there is no limit to how large a coalition of enemies can grow, the defensive man can never be satisfied with his level of power, and must continually initiate violence. Therefore, the state of nature is a state of perpetual warfare, where every person lives in constant fear for his life, and there is no place for civilization.

Hobbes suggests that all people have the natural right to self preservation; in the state of nature this becomes the right to everything, because without effective standards to judge what the actions of other people will be, a person can reasonably justify any action of his own as self preservation. In order to escape the all-consuming violence of the state of nature, people would have to enter into a contract of mutual respect, agreeing to give up their right to everything in exchange for assurance that others would do the same.

The problem, Hobbes argues, is that in the state of nature this contract would have to be based on trust, since no authority more powerful than the signers of the contract would exist to enforce its terms. The incentive to break the contract - putting one in the greatest possible position of exploitative power - and the cost of keeping the contract while another breaks it - putting one in the greatest possible position of vulnerability - together would undermine the confidence needed to hold the covenant together. Presumably, mankind is either too shortsighted to pass up extraordinary short-term advantages in the name of even the most valuable long-term goal, or it is too distrustful to believe that others will, or both. But ultimately, the condition that creates warfare in the state of nature - uncertainty about the actions of others - cannot be solved by a contract based on trust.

Natural man recognizes that to protect his life, he must work for peace; to this end, he must enter a covenant of limited rights with his fellow men; for this to be effective, every man must keep the covenant. Hobbes lists these principles as the crucial first three laws of nature - the basic guidelines that can be reasoned by all of humanity as necessary for self-preservation. The other sixteen natural laws outline standards for peaceful human interaction, but none can be implemented until the third condition - that which frees humanity from the war of all against all - has been met. It is power struggles that make the third law impossible for natural men to keep, and equality that facilitates power struggles, so logic leads men to remove themselves from the state of nature by forming a different kind of contract. Rather than making conditional promises not to exercise their rights, they actually transfer their rights to a single power, thereby creating an institution. This power becomes the sovereign, and represents the will of all those who signed the contract, who now constitute the commonwealth. Subjects retain only the right to self-preservation- the sovereign holds all other discretion and power, and cannot be challenged or opposed. It is the sovereign's responsibility to wield this power forcefully, because it is through fear of punishment that it can compel men to keep their social contract and comply with the laws of nature. This government directed by the sovereign remains legitimate as long as it provides the structure that protects its subjects' lives, and as long as this condition is met, subjects owe their sovereign absolute loyalty and obedience. Thus the constant fear of other people present in the state of nature is replaced by the constant fear of the sovereign in the commonwealth. The crucial difference, however, is that fear in the state of nature breeds chaos and violence, while fear of the sovereign ensures stability, peace, and civilization.

In his Second Treatise of Government, John Locke challenges Hobbes' argument for unlimited government, beginning with his claims about the state of nature. Locke agrees that natural man would exist in equality and possess the natural right to self-preservation, but argues that it does not follow that the state of nature gives man the right to everything, causes him to come to the logic of the first strike, or makes the state of war unavoidable. Hobbes and Locke agree that there are a set of natural laws which reasoning men can independently identify as the necessary guidelines for peaceful coexistence. Locke describes the law of nature as man's responsibility to preserve his own life, and to never deliberately threaten another's "life, health, liberty, or possessions." (p.9). The critical divergence in the two men's line of reasoning comes with their conceptions of human psychology, Hobbes' leading to the conclusion that man's innate selfishness and greed makes the law of nature meaningless without a single power of enforcement, and Locke's leading to the conclusion that man's innate sense of community makes the law of nature powerful enough to stand on its own. Locke argues that man is driven by a need to live in the company of his fellow men, and places an exceedingly high value on their opinion of him. If a man acts to advance his own good at the expense of the rights of another man, he does not do so with impunity in the state of nature. He invites immediate vengeful action from his victim, who he is likely to encounter shortly thereafter, and he forfeits the respect of the rest of his community. These consequences would cause most men to naturally comply with the laws of nature.

Therefore, Locke argues, the state of nature is a state of freedom, insofar as no man is bound to obey any other, but it is not a state of "licence," because most men are bound by the law of nature. Locke believes that the law of nature provides sufficient governance to allow men to coexist, but he allows that, for two reasons, this existence would not be completely without conflict. First, because the law of nature is interpreted individually by every man, disputes over its specific applications might arise even between two logical and well-meaning people. Second, not every person is rational, and a minority of "degenerate" men would inevitably ignore the law of nature, and put the lives and property of the rest in danger. Because all are equal in the state of nature, every man holds the right to judge violations of natural law, and to punish the transgressor in proportion to the violation, at a level sufficient to provide compensation for harm caused, and incentive against future transgression. Unfortunately, men are not perfect, and they are motivated by both reason and emotion, making them poorly suited to act as judges and executioners in their own cases. They are likely to be biased in their own favor, and overzealous in punishment, causing a lack of justice, which Locke identifies as the great problem with the state of nature

Hobbes and Locke came to very different conclusions about what would cause problems in the state of nature, and about the severity of the conflict that would result from them. Hobbes envisioned such widespread violence that the only answer was to create order through a single authority whom all would fear. Locke believed that most men would work together for their common good, but that controversies would arise because there were no established laws, and injustice would follow because there was no impartial judge to settle these disputes. Locke vehemently believes that Hobbes' solution of a single power for all to fear would not only fail to remedy the problems of the state of nature, it would make them far more dangerous. The problem of a lack of established law would not be remedied, because when a man holds the power to command absolute obedience, his decisions carry the weight of law, so he creates, amends, and applies the law at his discretion, which cannot be determined by any other person beforehand. The problem of injustice will not be solved, because if men cannot be trusted to fairly judge and execute the law of nature in their own cases, then giving one man the power to do so while taking it away from all the rest makes injustice just as inevitable, for "absolute monarchs are but men," (p.12) but the consequences of it far more destructive. In the state of nature, a man who lets emotion cloud his reason can expect his equals to question his judgment, and act to remedy any injustice he causes. If one can expect natural man to misjudge even with this check on his power, one can expect an absolute ruler to be carried away by his power and use it to exploit the rest of mankind, who are bound to obey his decisions without question.

Locke argues that a commonwealth under Hobbes' design would constitute not civil society, but a state of war. He claims that according to natural law, man has a responsibility to preserve his own life. He therefore has an obligation to preserve his liberty, because no man desires absolute and arbitrary power over another unless he means to do that man harm. When one man determines to gain absolute and arbitrary power over another, he is initiating war, and when the other man has no higher authority to turn to in appeal, he must respond in defense, and the two enter a state of war. If the aggressor succeeds, he becomes an absolute ruler and the other man becomes his slave, yet no man can voluntarily submit to enslavement, so the state of war continues.

Locke argues that the state of nature is preferable to the state of war which would exist under Hobbes' sovereign, but he proposes that man need not choose between the two. He has a third option, which is to assemble in a commonwealth and agreeing to act together as a single body, with a single will determined by the majority of that body. Members consent to give up their right to determine which actions fall within the bounds of the law of nature, and instead agree to allow the majority, or representatives of the majority, to create a standard law to uphold the law of nature. Members give up their rights of judgment and execution, and allow a majority to appoint people to these positions, so that these tasks are carried out fairly. The law of nature forbids a man to voluntarily submit to the arbitrary will of another. A legitimate government must comply with the law of nature, so an absolute standard for legitimate government is that it exists with the consent of the governed. Furthermore, it must give it's citizens better protection of their natural rights than they could provide on their own under the state of nature. It's power must not be arbitrary, so laws must be known by all, and they must apply to all. The judges who interpret this law must be indifferent, and ensure that every member of society is held equally accountable under it. Those that execute the law must be equally indifferent, imposing only the law as it was established by the majority, and issuing punishment in equal measure to all. In this way, each of the three arms of government is held in check by the others, and is ultimately accountable to the people it governs, giving it the authority to legitimately require their obedience. If, however, the government at any time fails to meet one of these conditions, its citizens are freed from their obligation to it, because they gave up their rights only to improve upon their condition under the state of nature, which would no longer be provided by an illegitimate government.

Locke convincingly argues that Hobbes miscalculated in his evaluation of human beings' character and motivations. This undermines his conclusions about the state of nature, and therefore his argument for unlimited government. Locke's theory that men would respect one another's rights in order to gain the benefits of living in a community seems more logical than Hobbes prediction that they would be so quickly consumed by greed and suspicion. If the state of nature will not cause mankind to turn on one another in unrestrained violence, then there is no need for the fearsome power of Hobbes' sovereign. Under Hobbes' plan, men would live in such fear of their sovereign that they would not dare to break the law. But Locke points out that Hobbes makes no provision for the fact that no one can know what actions to take when the law is simply the sum total of the whims of one powerful man. Neither does Hobbes take into account that a sovereign is subject to the same temptations as all other men, so those who have taken an oath of absolute obedience may be just as likely to face violence and abuse as men in the state of nature, only they have forfeited their right to defend against it. In this light, it seems that by distributing government's power between separate institutions, Locke's form of commonwealth would better provide the order that Hobbes so desperately sought.