A Constructivist Analysis of Taiwanese-Chinese Relations

The formation of collective identities with directly affecting governmental structure is evident in the China-Taiwan relationship. The lack of structure found in their relationship is due to the inability of the governments to find a common identity between the two peoples. The general history of the relationship between mainland China and Taiwan is teeming with patriotism and dissent. The constructivist paradigm allows for a fresh analysis of the relationship and the "study of social reality," (Katznelson, 598).

Basic History

Taiwan was awarded to Japan in 1895, after the defeat of the Chinese in the Sino-Japanese war (Chang, 277-8). After the surrender of Japan in World War II the island of Taiwan was returned to China, and was fraught with rumors concerning the new place of Taiwan in China. The Nationalist party was greeted mostly with relief on the island, and until 1949 there was general satisfaction with the decolonization of Taiwan.

In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) defeated the Kuomintang in the Chinese civil war. Instead of dissolving upon their defeat, the nationalist government moved from Peking, China to Taipei, Taiwan, thus beginning the decades old conflict between the two bodies of government (Wang, 191). The constructivist paradigm leads to the assumption that the refusal to break up the old government is in part a reflection of the individual leaders, but also of the collective goals of the people. Not only was this a representation of common identity, but also a statement of elite interests.

Government officials who refused to give up their status were served by movement of the nationalist government to another location. Their ability to remain a stable government on the island of Taiwan reflects the cultural power of the government. If this cultural power did not exist, there would be no legitimacy in the Nationalist party rule and it would have essentially dissolved in the way of the CCP. Because this did not occur, the cultural power of the people of Taiwan has strengthened over the years and continues to hold authority. However, the same must be true for the CCP in regards to the mainland.

The CCP rules according to four cardinal principles. They honor "complete adherence to the communist party leadership," they call for "devotion to socialism," they are "guide[d] by Marxist/Leninist/Maoist thought," and govern by "rule by dictatorship of the proletariat," (Wang 191). The Republic of China follows what they call the three principles of the people. They are nationalism, democracy, and "the people's livelihood (social welfare)," (Wang 191).

Both the CCP and the newly founded nationalists in Taiwan, the Kuomintang (KMT), "claim to be the 'sole legal government of the country,'" and agree that there "is only one China," (Wang, 191). They disagree however, about which government in the legitimate source of power. The two clashing mindsets of the organizations have often led to mistrust and caution.

Over the course of the conflict, there have been a few measures provided by the KMT to lighten the burden of the conflict on its citizens. In early 1987 direct tourist travel to Hong Kong was legalized and the age-old ban on the publication of Chinese books was lifted (Long 207). The allowance of visiting rights to Hong Kong was a small step towards what the people wanted; rights to fly directly into China, not just the separate democratic Hong Kong. In October of the same year, Taiwan residents were finally allowed the rights to visit family members in China without having to fly into Hong Kong first (Long 208). The relaxation of these restrictions was in part because of the elite interests they served. Loosening the laws concerning travel allowed for a "thriving economic relationship," where "economic exchange is matched by social interaction," and where the elites and the government reap the monetary benefits of such dealings (Crane 705).

Major Events

Despite their differences, Taiwan and the mainland initiated the peace process several times, and all thus far have ended without attaining the goals. The bodies attempted two cooperations, both which ended in deception, and in 1981 mainland China also proposed a peaceful strategy for reunification referred to as the nine-point plan.

Before the civil war erupted in China, there were high tensions between the KMT and the CCP. In 1920, the KMT made an agreement with Soviet Union that communism was inappropriate for China, and then issued a public statement. The CCP backed this statement and began working closely with KMT on a peaceful basis. They "infiltrated" the KMT system and "subverted its various organizations," (Wang 192).

The second major deception was carried out only seven years later. The CCP called for "joint resistance with the KMT against Japan after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war (Wang 193). They set terms for the cooperation and each amended and agreed. During the united front the CCP armed forces heavily expanded "in preparation for the seizure of political power at an opportune movement," (Wang 194). After eight years of dedication to the unification, the Japanese were defeated, and the CCP ended the cooperation. They then seized power in 1949.

These two failed attempts at peaceful unity are roadblocks in the way of future attempts at unification and they are also the reflection of the individual leaders whom made these decisions. It is to be noted that these incidents created an air of distrust among the KMT and among Taiwanese in regards to the CCP. This distrust serves as one joint identity amid the island. Constructivism proposes that in order to overcome these suspicions the people of Taiwan must be given a reason to suspect profound evolutionary change in the social identities of the Chinese mainlanders, as it is noted that identities and interests can change due to learning (Mingst 75).

After years of dispute over the relations and after letting tumultuous relations settle, mainland China decided to give reunification another shot and drafted a plan. The nine point plan was a strategy for peaceful reunification of Mainland and Taiwan. It was a long term proposal to emulate the "one Nation, two Systems" model already in place for Hong Kong (Wang 196). The Taiwanese were skeptical of the agreement (and for good reason given the history of the behaviors of the CCP), but they were willing to negotiate at first. However, when the plan went before the CCP congress they amended it to include ruling of Taiwan under the four cardinal principles. After this revision the Taiwanese government refused to accept the terms of the reunification because the "CCP would have the central government and Taiwanese would have the local government," (Wang 197).

In December 1978 the US formally recognized the CCP as the sole government of China (Chai 1309). Not only did they recognize the Chinese government, they also 'severe[d] the diplomatic relations with the ROC [Republic of China] on Taiwan," (Wang195). From a constructivist stance, this move by the United States thoroughly hindered the unification efforts. The US effectively dissolved any beginnings of a collective identity that the two bodies were forming by immediately alienating the Taiwanese with their decision.

In 1996, Taiwan held it's first ever direct presidential election. One week prior to this historical event, mainland China launched missiles "dangerously close to Taiwan's two main key harbors," (Yu, "Taiwanese" 7). This coincidence holds symbolic importance for many in Taiwan, because it only furthers the suspicions of the mainland's intentions.

Most recently, in March of this year (2005) the government of mainland China installed the Anti-Secession Law. The law "was overwhelmingly condemned in Taiwan," and according to the constructivist school of thought this as a provocative tactic that will ultimately backfire (Olesen 2). The law explicitly states in article eight that, "in the event that the 'Taiwan independence' secessionist forces should... by any means cause the fact of Taiwan's secession from China...or that possibilities for peaceful re-unification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means... to protect China's sovereignty," (Text 2). This attempt to control Taiwanese nationalism by the mainland government may not go as planned, and instead strengthen the nationalist/separatist platform. The plan has the possibility of intensifying the identity of the separatists by dividing the two peoples and installing even more resentment towards the CCP.

Every twist in the dramatic relationship between the two governments is consistent with the constructivist view that the world is dynamic and is in a constant state of change. These changing relations are directly affected by the changing leaders and individual actors making critical decisions regarding relationships.

Current Trends

Today, the separate bodies remain unyielding on both sides of the argument on Taiwan-China relations. The mainland China has been said to feel that "Taiwan's independence is unacceptable," as it is the last piece of land left that serves as a constant reminder of the humiliation thrust upon China due to loss of territory (Shulong 98-99). The major driving force behind this general attitude in China is the idea of nationalism. The sense of nationalism and pride in the territories of China leads to the idea of unity for the two bodies and the mentality that Taiwan is the only remaining territory yet to be 'won back'. Not only does this mentality hinder relations, but the thought of Taiwan independence "aggravates the legitimacy crisis that is currently confronting the leaders in Beijing and undermines its national security," (Yu, "Relations" 39). This collective identity works in favor of the CCP as it strengthens their ideas among the people. The power of ideas is a potent form of control over citizens.

On the other hand, the Taiwanese people have proved to encompass mixed feelings. Whereas the mainland wants to reunite due to national pride, polls in Taiwan show, "that over seventy per cent of Taiwanese people are still in favour of the status quo across the Taiwan Straits," (Separatism 6). Some Taiwanese see Taiwan as a colony of China, and insist that "it [Taiwan] is not 'part of China' anymore than the United States is a part of Britain," (Long 227). Several public opinion polls provide evidence that over sixty percent of Taiwan's people would support unification only if the CCP began to practice democracy and freedom (Tsang 204). There are also those who say that, "many Taiwan people indeed have some doubts about an immediate reunification of the mainland and Taiwan," but, "most people believe that eventually the mainland and Taiwan will reunify," (Qimao 1164).

Constructivists argue that a main reason for the continuation of the conflict is owed to maintaining elite interests. The CCP can use anti-secession sentiment and nationalism to maintain order and compliance with their government, while the Taiwanese government must carry on their independence for the sake of retaining power. The constructivist school argues that this upkeep of governmental power in Taiwan directly benefits the elites economically. Legal trade was enacted between the two bodies and allows for attainment of wealth by the government and by extension the elites, thus giving no real incentives for reunification on Taiwan's part.

Future Prospects

The conflict between China and Taiwan is so dynamic that people around the world continue to make predictions about what will happen in the future between the two opposing governments. Henry Kissinger predicted in 1996 that, "whatever the cost, China will fight rather than give up what it considers Chinese territory," (Kissinger C7).

There are in general five main predictions for the future of Taiwan (Long 227-8). The first of these future outcomes is simply the status quo. There are many who would like to think and who do feel that the current relationship will be sustained indefinitely. Another valid option is that of Taiwan secession. There is always the possibility of Taiwan separatist thought to dominate the country, and for a leader to act on the general opinion. This radical decision would be difficult to employ and likely lead to military involvement.

The next bracket of thought pertains to reunification, which could occur in one of three ways. There is reunification on "Peking's terms," which would involve the 'one country, two systems' approach, or reunification on "Taipei's terms," which would mean governing by the three principles of the people (Long 227). Another less favorable, but more realistic approach to reunification is unity by force. This would involve military force by the mainland against Taiwan, and is more likely, especially due to the recent passage of the anti-secession law.

A main cause for this uncompromising nature is owed to the fact that the two sets of people relate to separate bodies of ideas. This deters the two peoples from creating a collective identity which would unify them. Because of this constructivism suggests that the most likely of outcomes would not involve reunification on peaceful terms unless drastic changes in policy, leadership, or ideas were to change.

Constructivists would put confidence in either the status quo or reunification by force. The prevailing sentiment of the Taiwanese is yet to drastically change and the leaders they have installed continue to represent this attitude. Without a shift in agenda, the Taiwanese will remain adamant in continuing in their current state. Therefore, the most realistic outcome is reunification by force. The mainland government has sent a clear signal with the anti-secession law that the CCP has formed a rigid identity in the prevention of Taiwan from becoming a separate state. The desire to acquire Taiwan is of significance to the mainland elite. The gain of Taiwan to "labour abundant China" would mean the acquisition of a "capital rich Taiwan," where each nation's assets would compliment the other's, strengthening the already thriving economy which the elites have a stake in (Crane 723).

According to constructivists, in order to unify the country peacefully as many mainland citizens would like, the CCP would have to effectively bring the people of both governments together under a common identity. Perhaps this identity could be a collective front of the deteriorating relationship between China and Japan. An article in the New York Times describes the anti-Japanese protests and notes, "public antipathy for Japan has made it easier to mobilize people," (Yardley 1). Without this common social identity the chances of peaceful reunification are small, especially due to the recent hostile stance the mainland government has taken with the passage of the anti-secession law.

Concluding Remarks

The ever changing relations between China and Taiwan are a reflection of constructivist ideals. Their relationship exemplifies the stance that the world is in a constant state of change. China and Taiwan are proof that the structure in the international realm is a result of identity and nothing else. The two bodies of people undoubtedly do not identify with each other in their political views and have stratified themselves and the structure of their country accordingly.

Over the course of time the ties between Taiwan and mainland China have not significantly changed. The two governments have successfully operated independently and without any major violent conflict. While the collective desires of the mainlanders are becoming more of a forceful front, the Taiwanese continue to hold the same pacifistic desires to remain at the status quo and to avoid creating adverse conditions for their people.

In order to remedy the torn relationship between the two bodies, the leaders of each government would have to successfully create a social identity that would encompass both peoples. This in large part would depend on the leaders of the country and on the interests of the elites on each side of the straits. Today, there is little confidence that the reunification can happen on peaceful terms, and the possibility for violence between the two bodies is widely increasing.

Works Cited

Chai, Trong R. The Future of Taiwan. Asian Survey, Vol. 26, No. 12. (Dec., 1986), pp. 1309-1323.

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0004- 4687%28198612%2926%3A12%3C1309%3ATFOT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-J>

Chang, Sung-sheng Yvonne. Murray A. Rubinstein, ed. Taiwanese New Literature and the Colonial Context: A Historical Survey. Taiwan: A New History. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999.

Chen, King C. Peking's Attitude toward Taiwan.Asian Survey, Vol. 17, No. 10. (Oct., 1977), pp. 903-918.

Crane, George T. China and Taiwan: Not Yet 'Greater China.' International Affairs

(Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 69, No. 4. (Oct., 1993), pp. 705-723.

< http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-5850%28199310%2969%3A4%3C705%3ACATNY%27%3E2.0.CO%3B2-O>

Katznelson, Ira, Helen V. Milner. Political Science: The State of Discipline. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2002.

Kissinger, Henry. The Stakes With China. The Washington Post. 31 March 1996. pp. C7

Long, Simon. Taiwan: China's Last Frontier. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991.

Olesen, Alexa. Taiwan Nationalist's Leader Visits China. Guardian Unlimited. 30 March 2005. 30 March 2005.

Qimao, Chen. The Taiwan Issue and Sino-U.S. Relations: A PRC View. Asian Survey, Vol. 27, No. 11. (Nov., 1987), pp. 1161-1175.

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0004-4687%28198711%2927%3A11%3C1161%3ATTIASR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-%23>

Separatism is Not Key to Taiwan's Future.China Daily 18 April 2005. 18 April 2005.

Shulong, Chu. National Unity, Sovereigty and Territorial Integration.The China Journal, No. 36. (Jul., 1996), pp. 98-102.

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1324-9347%28199607%290%3A36%3C98%3ANUSATI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F>

Text of China's Anti-Secession Law. BBCNews. 14 March 2005. 24 March 2005.

Tsang, Steve. In the Shadow of China: Political Developments in Taiwan since 1949. Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1993.

United States. Central Intelligence Agency. World Fact Book. 10 February 2005. 8 April 2005.

http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/fields/2119.html>

Wang, Yu San. Yu San Wang, ed. The Mainland-Taiwan Issue: A Challenge for China's Reunification.Foreign Policy of the Republic of China on Taiwan: AnUnorthodox Approach. New York: Praeger, 1990.

Yardley, Jim. A Hundred Cellphones Bloom, and Chinese Take to the Streets. New YorkTimes. 25 April 2005. 25 April 2005.

Yu. Taifa. Taiwanese Democracy Under Threat: Impact and Limit of Chinese Military Coercion.Pacific Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 1. (Spring, 1997), pp. 7-36

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0030-851X%28199721%2970%3A1%3C7%3ATDUTIA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-6>

---Relations Between Taiwan and China After the Missile Crisis: Towards Reconcilliation? Pacific Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 1. (Spring, 1999), pp. 39-55.

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0030-851X%28199921%2972%3A1%3C39%3ARBTACA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F>