A Deserved Legacy?

It is curious how certain figures come to represent the successes, failings, prides and shames of a nation. Such is the case with Lyndon B. Johnson, whose role in the war in Vietnam, though significant, may not comprise all the facts applied to it through popular belief. Detractors of the Vietnam War are present on the spectrum from left to right. The right-wing critics say that Johnson never resolved to win the war, while critics from the center say the cost in money and resources of the war was against national self-interest¹. In the leftist camps, where the criticism originated, the arguments range from a suspicion of American military action overseas to an outright sympathy for the Communist Party². What's important to note is that these viewpoints, regardless of their validity, are used as yardsticks for the assessment of Lyndon Johnson's career in office and his character as a man. With this in mind, this essay will examine the Vietnam War as it was when Johnson inherited it, with a short detailing of its origins, the decisions Johnson actually made concerning Vietnam and why he made them, a brief discussion of how Johnson was received in the polls and public opinion, and what kind of war his successors were left with.

The discussion begins with Harry S. Truman and Dwight. D. Eisenhower. In the 1940's, Indochina had been vying for independence from colonial France, and the then president Harry S. Truman was funneling large amounts of money to France through the Marshall Plan. Truman did this for the very reason the Marshall Plan was adopted in 1947: to stop the spread of communism economically³. France had threatened America with the prospect of pulling out of Indochina, and as a kneejerk reaction, the U.S.A increased its financial aid from $10 million to $400 million between 1950 and 1952⁴.

¹. Guttmann, Allen. "Protest against the War in Vietnam." Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 382 (1969): 56-63, pp. 56.

². Ibid, p. 56.

^3. Taylor, Sandra C. "Tracing the Origins of U.S. Involvement in Vietnam." OAH Magazine of History 1, no. 1 (1985): 19-23, pp. 19.

⁴. Ibid, p. 19.

On the other hand, Ho Chi Minh, leader of the Viet Minh had asked the US for loans for its war effort. Minh was encouraged by American officials to believe he would get it, and assumed the USA would be sympathetic to his cause for independence¹. However, one effect that World War Two had on the United States was the coming of the Cold War with the Soviet Union, and a stronger paranoia of communism, and so Ho Chi Minh never got that loan². Despite the lack of aid, the Viet Minh managed to defeat the French in a fifty-five day siege on the French fortress at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. The same year, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia were granted independence at an international conference in Geneva. This is where Vietnam was also cleft at the seventeenth parallel, in part by Eisenhower, who had come into office in 1953³. A democratic regime was set up in South Vietnam and the president Ngo Dinh Diem was installed there. Because Diem and Eisenhower both agreed that, if there were a free election in Vietnam, the popular Minh would win, they forewent one⁴. This action was seen as a slight to Ho Chi Minh, who sought to unify an independent Vietnam under a communist umbrella, and was willing to agitate the South either politically or militarily to achieve that⁵.

Now, when Diem asked Eisenhower for support, he complied, believing in the "domino theory" that once one nation is defeated, the rest will follow, and having taken an active role in combating communism⁶. By 1959, the Viet Minh decided to move southward in a determined "armed phase of revolution⁷."

^1. Sandra C. Taylor, Tracing the Origins of U.S. Involvement, p. 19.

^2. Ibid, p. 19.

^3. Ibid, p. 19.

⁴. Ibid, p. 21.

^5. Ibid, p. 21.

^6. Ibid, p. 21.

^7. Ibid, p. 22.

This was because Diem enforced a military suppression of communist sympathizers¹. One year later, the National Liberation Front (comprised mainly of communists) was founded in the North, and the cadres of ex-Viet Minh who made up the party were renamed the Viet Cong². Before the U.S.A even really entered the war, it had broken out between the North and South in 1959. When John F. Kennedy succeeded Eisenhower in 1960, one of his duties would be to deal with the situation in the Pacific. Kennedy, despite his momentous domestic program, was more interested in foreign affairs, and had a lot on his plate in this arena at the time³. Not only was the Soviet Union deemed a legitimate concern to America: Cuba, Algeria, The Congo and Southeast Asia were also experiencing crises of their own.

Pertinent to this discussion is the Laotian Crisis in Southeast Asia. Before Kennedy was elected in 1960, he was told by Eisenhower's Secretary of State, Christian Herter, that though the Geneva Treaty signed in 1954 banned outside forces from Laos, the United States had a MAG (Military Assistance Group) ready for intervention only if the Laotian government asked for protection⁴. This would not be a violation of the treaty, and Kennedy kept this in mind⁵. Kennedy's approach to Southeast Asia, for the short three years of his presidency, was marked by an attitude of relative deliberation and restraint⁶. Kennedy's approach was practical, but his intent was idealistic; he ultimately dreamed of the creation of a peaceful, democratic Southeast Asia via international diplomacy⁷.

^1. Sandra C. Taylor, Tracing the Origins of U.S. Involvement, p. 22.

^2.Ibid, p. 22.

^3. Kaiser, David E. American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson and the Origins of the Vietnam War. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000, pp. 37.

^4. Langguth, A.J. Our Vietnam: The War 1954-1975. New York: Touchstone, 2002, pp. 49.

^5. Ibid, p. 49.

^6. David E.Kaiser, American Tragedy, p. 37.

⁷ Ibid, p. 57.

In 1961, Kennedy resisted bureaucratic admonitions to intervention, knowing fully that Ho Chi Minh's Viet Minh could crush Laos in a matter of days¹. He and his cabinet did prepare for war, even looking into training American guerillas to fight the Viet Minh². However, regarding Laos, where the monarchy was threatened by a Soviet backed Communist party, Kennedy was able to negotiate with the Laotian prince and with the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev to come to terms found in the Laotian Accord. Partly because of this, and because of tensions in Cuba and the Congo, the struggle in Southeast Asia was eclipsed in the media³.

On the matter of Vietnam, diplomacy could not stop the war. Due to Eisenhower's anti-communist regime, ruled by Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam, the Viet Minh met with tension in uniting the country. Kennedy backed Diem, and since neither the warring Diem nor the Viet Minh wanted to negotiate, nor did the State Department listen to Kennedy's plea for talks with the Soviets on South Vietnam, Kennedy found himself in a position to increase American military effort⁴. Between 1962 and 1963, the conflict escalated into a counterinsurgency effort, and Kennedy still hoped for a détente which wouldn't come⁵.

On the one hand, the CIA wanted to expand its effort in Vietnam, and expected that America would take over the fight against the Viet Minh and Viet Cong as a proxy war against the Soviets⁶. Diem, on the other hand, was fighting a civil war, personalizing it to the point of demanding complete American support and obedience of his decisions and efforts⁷.

^1.David E.Kaiser, American Tragedy, p. 58.

^2.Ibid, p. 67.

^3.Ibid, p. 122.

^4.Ibid, p. 122.

^5.Ibid, p. 148-149.

^6.Ibid, p. 70.

^7.Ibid, p. 184.

The conflict was beginning to show itself as intractable, and Kennedy's hope of avoiding war to achieve desired ends was becoming impractical. In 1963, John F. Kennedy was assassinated, and the problems of an inexorable war with foreign terrain, guerilla fighters, the failure of the Geneva Accords and difficult justifiability to an American public, would only come to light with the next president, Lyndon B. Johnson¹. From the beginning, this was a war America was unprepared for, and the members of the Democratic Senate, who were GI victors of World War II, thought they could fight this war with the World War II strategy². Officers of a younger generation like John Paul Vann saw this was failing and could do nothing to stop it³.And journalists, like The New York Times' David Halberstam could have a chance to criticize it, and help bring it into the public consciousness⁴.

From 1963 to the end of 1967, Lyndon B. Johnson built up an image of the "arch-villain" and "warmonger" as a result of how his foreign policy was received by the American public and the important policy decisions he made during the war⁵. Between 1964 and 1965 four operations were undertaken which heightened American activity in Vietnam to full scale military assault. These were: Oplan 34 A, which entailed a "series of covert attacks on North Vietnam", the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution which gave the president much more "war-making" control, Operation "Rolling Thunder", a March 1965 air war against North Vietnam which followed the commitment of hundreds of thousands of U.S. combat troops to Vietnam six days after the operation⁶.

^1. David E.Kaiser, American Tragedy, p. 122.

^2.Ibid, p. 185.

^3.Ibid, p. 185.

^4.Ibid, p. 185.

^5. Cuddy, Edward. "Vietnam: Mr. Johnson's War or Mr. Eisenhower's?" The Review of Politics 65, no. 4 (2003): 351-374, pp. 352.

^6. Edward Cuddy, Vietnam: Mr. Johnson's War, p. 352.

These decisions, which turned out to be quite fatal, were made with Johnson's understanding that the war was tenuous upon his arrival, and his pride in not wanting to be the first recognized president to lose a war overseas¹. It was these actions which solidified Johnson's reputation as the main blame holder for America's commitment to the war, and its ultimate failings, and what helped his ratings go from favourable in 1964 to consistently low in 1967². Part of the reason this took place is because the precedent for Johnson's decision making was put into place before he got into office. The Southeast Asian Treaty Organization, or SEATO, founded by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles during the Eisenhower Administration, which was put together to contain Communism, embodied the sense of obligation of the United States government to intervene in world affairs concerning Communism, and the impetus to increase military action if deemed necessary³.

This sense of duty was taken up Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and unsurprisingly, Johnson as well. Another part of the problem was an ignorance concerning the history of Southeast Asia. Sadly for Johnson, many of the Asian experts had been purged from the State Department during the McCarthy Era and had never been replaced or rehired⁴. The paranoia Johnson had about winning the war had long been ingrained since Eisenhower, who made it clear that the American president shouldered the responsibility for Vietnam when he said that "he did not want to critics asking 'Who lost Vietnam?...if we...let Indochina be sold down the river to the Communists⁵.'"

^1. Edward Cuddy, Vietnam: Mr. Johnson's War, p. 353, 361-362.

^2. Altschuler, Bruce E. "Lyndon Johnson and the Public Polls." The Public Opinion Quarterly 50, no. 3 (1986): 285-299, pp. 290-291.

^3. Edward Cuddy, Vietnam: Mr. Johnson's War, p. 354-355.

^4.Ibid, p. 357.

^5.Ibid, p. 358.

Another factor was that even by the time of Kennedy, Diem was never thought to survive the war, and the pressure was on the U.S. military not to solve the crisis in Vietnam but to defeat Communism in Asia first via the "domino theory" ¹. Johnson not only believed in the anti-communist sentiment of the late 1940's onward, but he felt like he had his manhood to save in winning this war, and felt certain that abandonment would lead to World War III². However, most notable here are the predicaments Johnson inherited which stand apart from the aforementioned presidents. When he discovered that that South Vietnam was swarming with political and military troubles, the Viet Cong was increasing its control over the land, and Ho Chi Minh's factions were receiving more and more troops and supplies from the North, the decision came down on him to either abandon the cause or send in American support to the South³. Johnson was at a crossroads here, because Eisenhower's legacy left the imprint that winning South Vietnam was vital to the anti-communist cause, and Kennedy's legacy left Johnson with contradictory statement which discouraged American military intervention in the conflict⁴.

During this time, before the fatal decisions were made in 1965, Johnson allegedly spent several months weighing his options, agonizing over the possibilities and their alternatives⁵. On the other hand, it has been purported that Johnson, despite his deliberation, failed to receive a properly detailed canvas of the situation from his advisors, who themselves were ignorant of much of the tensions in Southeast Asia, and it is to these advisors that Johnson ultimately trusted much of his decision making⁶.

¹ EdwardCuddy, Vietnam: Mr. Johnson's War, p. 359-360, 362.

^2.Ibid, p. 359, 362.

^3.Ibid, p. 361-362.

^4.Ibid, p. 361-364.

^5.Ibid, p. 363.

^6. Barrett, David M. "The Mythology Surrounding Lyndon Johnson, His Advisers, and the 1965 Decision to Escalate the Vietnam War." Political Science Quarterly 103, no. 4 (1988): 637-663, pp. 637-638.

The Vietnam War, which began in 1959 and only ended in 1975, after the end of Richard Nixon's only term, has been referred to as a "national tragedy"¹, and has been pinned primarily on Johnson for his 1965 decision, which launched the U.S.A into Asia in a full scale military effort. An effect of the decision is that not only did thousands of Americans die, but protests which rattled the solidarity of the American people with their government took place². However, one must bear in mind that Vietnam was not the result of one president alone, but of five presidents over more than twenty years. When Johnson made his decision, he made it in the light of the precedents left by Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy, and when he left the war, Nixon would pick it up again in Vietnam, Laos, and attack Cambodia with a B-52 bombing³. Regardless of what one thinks of Johnson's character, the Vietnam War is not the fault of one scapegoat, but an eruption of pride, single-mindedness, historical precedent and paranoia in the midst of the Cold War.

^1. David M. Barrett, The Mythology, p. 637.

^2. Allen Guttmann, Protest against the War in Vietnam, p. 58, 60-61.

^3. A.J.Langguth, Our Vietnam, p. 541-542

Bibliography

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Quarterly 50, no. 3 (1986): 285-299.

2. Barrett, David M. "The Mythology Surrounding Lyndon Johnson, His Advisers, and

the 1965 Decision to Escalate the Vietnam War." Political Science Quarterly 103, no. 4 (1988): 637-663.

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Politics 65, no. 4 (2003): 351-374.

5. Guttmann, Allen. "Protest against the War in Vietnam." Annals of the American

Academy of Political and Social Science 382 (1969): 56-63.

6. Kaiser, David E. American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson and the Origins of the Vietnam

War. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000.

7. Langguth, A.J. Our Vietnam: The War 1954-1975. New York: Touchstone, 2002.

8. Taylor, Sandra C. "Tracing the Origins of U.S. Involvement in Vietnam." OAH

Magazine of History 1, no. 1 (1985): 19-23.