A History of Recent Russian Politics

Vladimir Putin currently maintains the greatest popularity of any modern Russian leader, as evidenced by his winning seventy-one percent of the popular vote in the 2004 presidential election (Wikipedia, 2006). While Putin has taken action to help Russia move in a forward direction, he has done so at the cost of the freedom of his people. Putin has operated in blatant violation of the Russian constitution, and his push towards a restoration of centralized authority will lead Russia back down the hole it worked so hard to crawl out of if his current actions continue to be tolerated. Russia needs separation of powers, an independent judiciary, and a presidency accountable to the rule of law. Properly implementing these three factors will, in the short run, reduce crime, poverty, and civil instability in Russia, and in the long run, will restore Russia's status as one of the elite nations of the world. A truly independent judiciary must be established first, and only after this will a separation of powers, rule by law, and greater civil stability follow.

In August 1999, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin was appointed Prime Minister of Russia by President BorisYeltsin, making him the fifth prime minister of Russia in eighteen months. On December 31, 1999, Yeltsin surprisingly resigned, and according to the Russian constitution, Putin was promptly named the new president. Putin held elections right away, and promptly won the presidential election on March 26, 2000. Putin's election marked the first time in history that a Russian leadership change occurred via "free" elections (Wikipedia, 2006).

First, it is necessary to recognize the positive progress Putin has initiated. While the Russian economy still struggles and poverty is still widespread, it has improved due to high oil prices, and Moscow again resembles a flourishing capital city. Putin has also created a pension plan in order to aid retired citizens and has stabilized inflation. The bottom line is that, while the quality of life is not what it once was under communism, Putin has been able to create a sense of hope and trust in Russia's citizenry, which leads in part to his current popularity (Wheeler 2003, 48-9).

This popularity, however, has been a double-edged sword. While President Putin has been able to take several steps forward in regard to his country's development, he has taken many more steps backward in regard to personal freedom and human rights. Russia is continuing toward a centralized, authoritarian government, which in some ways resembles the Soviet Union. Putin has clearly abused his power, and his popularity with the citizenry has allowed him to do so.

Putin's abuse of presidential power falls into three main categories: (1) a significant reduction in freedom of the press, almost to the point of no freedom at all, (2) a significant reduction in freely run democratic elections, with a strong trend towards centralized authority, and (3) blatant human rights abuses.

First, how has the media been restricted under Putin? Putin himself controls the news media, as described by Smith (2006, 40), "When Russian journalists describe Vladimir Putin as the country's chief newsmaker, they're not exaggerating. It's not just that he's the president and attracts the expected attention--he also rules a Kremlin bureaucracy able to decide what is news." Prior to Putin's presidency, three large privately owned television networks existed-Channel One, Russiya, and NTV. In general, the stations showed "...hostile interviews with officials, merciless political satire shows, and investigations of what human-rights groups call Russia's dirty war in Chechnya" (Smith 2006, 40). Basically, these three stations were very much like the news media we experience in the United States. However, all three major networks are presently under Kremlin control. Now, according to "The Center for Journalism in Extreme Situations, a leading Russian press freedom group...91 percent of political news on Channel One was devoted to Putin and the 'ruling powers.' Nearly three quarters of that coverage was positive, a quarter neutral--none of it critical" (Smith 2006, 40). Controlling television gives Putin the ability to control what the 143 million people of Russia experience, as "90 percent" of all Russians have access to state-run channels (Smith 2006, 40).

Not only has Putin controlled television, he has also been able to significantly reduce the freedom of the two other significant Russian news media-radio and newspaper. Just this summer, Kremlin officials "...had forced scores of radio stations to stop broadcasting news from the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty" stations citing that "...the stations had violated their licenses by failing to get permission to broadcast news from other sources" (Page 2006, A17). The number of radio stations broadcasting Radio Liberty's news has fallen from thirty to just four in the last year, and Voice of America is now down from forty-two stations to five. Newspapers also do not stand a practical chance of making any negative impact on public approval of Putin. Although newspapers have relatively greater freedom than other forms of mass media, ".,.nontabloid newspapers rarely manage circulations of more than 100,000" (Smith 2006, 40). The Internet, while unregulated by Russia, is inaccessible to most Russians, largely due to the poor state of Russia's economy. At Russia's own official website, Article 29 of the Russian Constitution declares "[t]he freedom of the mass media shall be guaranteed. Censorship shall be prohibited" ("The Constitution of Russia"). There is no censorship occurring, but the examples given clearly demonstrate a lack of freedom in the mass media. Obviously, Putin is working in violation of the Russian Constitution.

The next category of Putin's movement away from democracy is a significant reduction in democratic election and representation. The first problem is that Putin has control of every major form of mass media. If nothing negative can ever be freely said against Putin, just how free can presidential elections, or any others where Putin stands to lose influence, be? Putin's single most prominent change occurred in 2004, when he changed the electoral process of Russia's eighty-nine regional governors. Previously, the regional governors were elected via popular vote, but now they are chosen by local legislatures and only after personal nomination by Putin himself. Also, the lower house of parliament, called the Duma, would now be elected based on the national slates only, ending any previously held district races for the Duma. The list of freedoms Putin has removed continues: regions can no longer appoint individuals to the upper house of parliament, the Federation Council; he created seven regional districts headed by persons he appointed himself; he has used his power over the media and other government resources to reward loyal governors and punish disloyal ones; finally, regions no longer have the power to send their own deputies to Moscow (Myers 2004). Article 32 of the Russian Constitution explicitly states "[c]itizens of the Russian Federation shall have the right to elect and be elected to State government bodies and local self-government bodies, as well as to participate in referendums" ("The Constitution of Russia"). Putin is clearly taking away the right of the citizens to be involved in the electoral process and placing it in his own hands, thereby showing he is openly violating the Russian Constitution (Myers 2004, A1).

The third and final area of Putin's presidential power misuse concerns human rights. One of the most startling human rights violations occurred very recently. On October 7, 2006, "Anna Politkovskaya, one of the last journalists to regularly criticize the Kremlin...," who most recently had written "...about the continuing atrocities in Chechnya...," was murdered (Smith 2006, 45). Politkovskaya was one of the last remaining proponents of a Western-style democracy and also exposed human rights abuses occurring in Chechnya, of which she asserted Putin had knowledge. Putin's personal reaction to the murder was very peculiar: "For two days he was silent, and when he finally spoke, it was to belittle the dead woman as 'extremely insignificant.' He said she was not even the main victim of the horrible murder, asserting it was aimed 'against Russia, against the current authorities in Russia'" (Smith 2006, 45). While the truth remains hidden, most probably forever, it is rather strange that Putin would be so unconcerned about a seemingly significant Russian figure. Perhaps Putin did not order the murder himself, but it would seem he would be more concerned about a significant cultural icon. Politkovskaya was an outspoken political opponenet, and Putin only used her death to further his own popularity (Smith 2006, 45).

Thus far, it has been clearly demonstrated that Putin is using his power to move Russia farther away from the semi-democratic system proposed by its constitution. Putin has used his power to reduce freedom of the media and expression of one's opinion, reduce the freedom of the electoral process, and has allowed blatant human rights abuses both in Chechnya and Russia. How can this trend towards totalitarianism be reversed? The solution is a truly independent judiciary, and the notion the president must be held accountable for his actions, without the ability to run amok and do as Putin is doing now.

While the notion of judicial independence and government accountability would inevitably lead to a more democratic system in Russia, the most prominent problem is the people of Russia are not overly concerned about judicial independence and government accountability. Russian businesses have set up a system to go around courts they believe lack independence. When court rulings do take place, they are not taken seriously, and Russians have invented the phrase "court auctions," to describe the process that the highest bidder wins the court case (Pipes 2006, 12). While the people do adore Putin as the leader of Russia, they are rather skeptical of government as a whole. A survey conducted in 2000 asked the citizens if they felt the current Russian Federation or the prior Soviet Union could be described as "legitimate, popular, and their own" (Pipes 2006, 12). "Fully one-third applied these adjectives to the Soviet Union, a regime that had ceased to exist nine years earlier. Only 12 percent regarded the post-communist regime as 'legitimate,' and only 2 percent called it 'their own'" (Pipes 2006, 12). Undoubtedly, it is difficult to establish an independent judiciary if the public sees no need for one. In order for an independent judiciary to come about, Russian citizens must first have respect for the court system.

Therefore, the starting point must be to educate the public and create appreciation for the value of a strong, independent court. Without the credibility of a concerned public, no court can have any authentic power. How could the benefits of an independent judiciary be clearly demonstrated to the Russian public? The best way to accomplish this would be to follow the example of the First Constitutional Court, which convened from 199l to 1993. This court was able to make a few decisions which brought about a positive impact, and that society regarded as valid and worthwhile. One such decision was to resolve a dispute between parliament and President Yeltsin. Yeltsin issued a decree that the KGB, which ran the Russian secret police, and the Ministry of the Interior, which ran the regular police, should be merged into one institution. The public was very upset about the merger because the last time such a merger occurred was under Joseph Stalin, who used the police to murder and wrongly imprison his opponents. Parliament held that this move should not be allowed. The Supreme Soviet, the legislative branch at the time, had also issued a public statement directing Yeltsin to withdraw his decree. The Court agreed and unanimously declared Yeltsin's merger unconstitutional, holding it was not the executive's power to merge such institutions. Though Yeltsin was hesitant to obey the Court, he eventually complied. The bottom line is that the Court had successfully restrained the power of a popular president (Schwartz 2000, 118-21).

The previous example has shown that the Russian Constitutional Court could make a decision affecting the people and have it respected by other government authorities. The current court needs to follow this example. Much like the previous decision, which was in compliance with the view of the citizens, the Court must take a stance in favor of society at large, as this will begin to create respect for and awareness of the Court's power.

Some other factors were also responsible for the Court's success, and those factors need to be implemented by the present court as well. The First Constitutional Court was headed by Chairman Valery Zorkin, who was known to be a supporter of a strong executive, which made him simultaneously popular among the people and respectable within government. Zorkin himself made no secret of his views as he said, "No one can accuse me of harboring any hostility to the president" (Schwartz 2000, 121). The stance of the head of the court in favor of a strong executive is a tremendous advantage. The people of Russia desire a strong, authoritarian executive, and since the court needs the support of the people if it is to be considered legitimate, then having a chairman who supports the people's strong presidential ideology makes it much easier for the court to be considered legitimate. Incredibly, Chairman Zorkin, forced into political exile after the First Constitutional Court was dissolved by Boris Yeltsin, managed to be re-elected Chairman of the current Russian Constitutional Court in February 2003 (Schepelle 2006, 1842). A chairman and court who simultaneously hold public and governmental favor, but at the same time challenge and limit presidential authority is the right formula for Russia.

Another factor giving Russia's court credence from 1991-1993 was the Court's consistent appearance in the public eye. "Day after day, Zorkin appeared on television, in the print press, and before the parliament delivering his message on the importance of establishing and maintaining a rule of law state" (Schwartz 2000, 121). The results for Zorkin were very positive overall, as "His message seemed to fall on very sympathetic ears, and no one, least of all his colleagues on whose behalf he purported to speak, criticized his extrajudicial utterances" (Schwartz 2000, 122). Clearly, Zorkin had maintained proper balance between challenging the president and working in the best interest of the people, while retaining the respect of both. Zorkin and the current court need to work together with Putin for the greater good of Russia, and after public sentiment has been regained, the presidency can be challenged.

It is rare for any supreme court of any country to propose legislation, but sometimes the situation is dire enough to constitute such an action. Take, for example, the United States' Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education, where "separate but equal" educational facilities were declared inherently unequal. This was certainly a momentous decision in United States history, and it eventually led to the present, where blacks are closing the equality gap with whites. The point of this example is that the Russian Constitutional Court needs to take a similar drastic step, so as to draw the attention, and most importantly, adoration, of the general public. A good idea might be to legislate income redistribution. It is widely known that a large portion of Russia's wealth lies in the hands of a few very wealthy individuals, while many millions live in complete economic despair. Legislation, such as a progressive income tax, and then creating need-based programs for the poor could be very effective. Aiding those in poverty so as to meet the basic demands of life such as food and shelter would be a dramatic resolution. And, it would be very difficult for the masses in Russia to denounce such an act. This would make the Constitutional Court look very good in the public eye, and even though President Putin is already very popular, he would look so even more as he shows he is a strong authoritarian president who is willing to take care of his people. The only individuals opposed to the reform would obviously be the wealthy elite and any of their associates. Would this reform be easily implemented? No. Would it result in chaos, disorder, and violence? Definitely. A drastic change is never easy, and it is not supposed to be, but it will prevent much more future chaos, disorder, and violence.

The previous example is just a personal feeling of what could be done to attract the favor of the masses. The Court does not necessarily have to take this action, but some sort of strong action is required. After the Court has gained the favor of the masses, it can be presented in a positive light alongside Putin as an institution that is working together with Putin for a stronger Russian nation. After respect has been gained, limits on presidential power can be imposed, as people will see the value of a legitimate Court. Other areas of government will see it as a worthwhile institution and will be inspired to work with the Court toward the betterment of Russia. Government accountability will become increasingly possible over time as the Court is accepted as a legitimate institution.

Aside from not being seen currently as legitimate, the other key problem is the Court is not really operating in an independent fashion. After establishing its legitimacy and value in Russian society, the Court can begin to assert its independence. According to Article 124 of the Russian Constitution, the courts "...should ensure the possibility of the complete and independent administration of justice according to the requirements of federal law" ("The Constitution of Russia"). On paper, the Court is to operate independently, but in real life, it does not.

The chief contemporary obstruction to judiciary independence is that Putin can now "...choose the majority of members on the Supreme Qualification Collegium, which makes key decisions on appointing and dismissing judges" (Page 2004, A11). This development was effective as of 2004 and executed despite international protest. With this measure, Putin essentially has direct control over who can and cannot be a judge. This is a problem very difficult to overcome, but if the judges take a strong position concordant with Putin on an issue of public importance, the courts would look very good to be seen as associates of the president, and Putin would have no motivation to remove any of the judges.

Another problem restricting independence is "...the Russian tradition and Soviet practice of underpaying judges monetarily but adding such 'elite trough' perks as housing, dachas (vacation houses), and special medical care" (Schwartz 2000, 146). The government can distribute these perks as it sees fit. There must be no way for any government official to reward or punish any of the judges financially. The Court must not accept any extra perks, but rather needs a steady annual salary, with an occasional added pay raise. With Zorkin, who consistently defends the power of the Court, as chairman, it is not unreasonable to believe this could happen. The Court could easily legislate financial independence for itself.

It does not seem realistic that any of this will occur in the short-term under Putin's presidency. It seems as though it will take a long time to regain public trust and attain some distance from the presidency. Perhaps a future president of Russia will not be as strong and popular as Putin, and it will be easier for the Court to oppose that leader. Regardless, it remains important to begin the work now, and over time with good, consistent decisions by the Court, the Court can gain the notoriety it needs. A large determining factor will be the ability of the Court to resist corruption and gain notoriety. With this notoriety, it can then gain more power, and eventually the independence it needs to operate.

The bottom line is that Russia does not need a pure form of democracy, like one of the many Western democracies. It is entirely possibly for Russia to create its own form of government with an independent judiciary, separation of powers, and accountability to the rule of law. The rule of law needs to apply to everyone, everywhere, and in an equal fashion. A form of government can be constructed such that Russia would be able to retain its beloved strong, authoritarian leader, while simultaneously having a system of checks and balances. What Russia needs to remember is that under autocratic rule life was not exactly good. Though life was maybe a little better under Communism, the quality of life under a rule of law system is far better, but only if it is given time. Only through an independent judiciary and a system for governmental accountability can Russia ascend back to its former glory. Concentrating most of the power into one individual's hands may seem to work in the short-term, but eventually, as in Russia's past, history repeats and autocratic governments all collapse. Russia will not make significant progress as a country until it has separation of powers, rule of law, and an independent judiciary.

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