A Rational Cosmology: Complex Self-Sustaining Physical Systems

The thinker Reginald Firehammer has recently released an installment in his project to create an objective, rational ontology. This treatise, titled, "Life," explores Mr. Firehammer's ideas concerning the ontological nature of the process of the same name.

As a purveyor of a different fundamental definition and thus a different theory on life, however, I intend to give Mr. Firehammer's treatise a thorough analysis with the intention of demonstrating where he has erred.

Using Mr. Firehammer's language, I would be called a "physicalist," who holds the view that "whatever is not physical does not really exist, or at least only exists as phenomena of the physical."

To clarify, a physicalist such as myself still considers life, consciousness, volition, ideas, abstractions, and concepts to have a real existence. However, he considers all of these phenomena as arising from certain physical interactions, be they among parts of the body or cells of the brain; he recognizes that any concept must ultimately refer, however indirectly and by whatever multiplicity of steps, to properties of physical existents and be formed by a physical mind in a physical brain.

He recognizes that life, perception, and volition are the result of an immensely complex series of physical interactions among the trillions of components of the human organism, a system so complex that it has attained the capacity to direct its own operations in a self-sustaining manner instead of just being passively manipulated from without. There are essential differences between this position and Mr. Firehammer's, and I hope to demonstrate the greater accuracy of the physicalist view in the course of this treatise.

Mr. Firehammer writes:

If consciousness were only physical matter as the physicalists maintain, we would not be entities of matter and conscious[ness], we would simply be entities of matter. But, we are not only beings of matter and consciousness, but volitional beings, and Ayn Rand makes it very clear, volition is not a physical attribute, that volition is impossible to physical matter alone.

"The day when [one] grasps that matter has no volition is the day when he grasps that he has-and this is his birth as a human being." ["Galt's Speech", For the New Intellectual, Page 156.]

What Rand was referring to is inert matter (for which the word "matter" is but convenient intellectual shorthand), i.e., matter that is 1) outside the human organism itself and 2) incapable of changing its state unless acted upon.

Inert matter behaves as described by Newton's First Law; if it is rest, it will remain at rest until something else moves it. If it is moving at a certain rate, it will keep moving at that rate until something else stops it.

All matter follows Newton's First Law, and it seems on face that this means that all matter is inert. However, we might consider the following system: particle A, in motion, pushes on particle B, which is thus put into motion from a former state of rest. All of A's momentum is transferred to B, and thus A is now at rest. B similarly pushes on C and facilitates its motion while itself coming to rest. The paths on which these particles move are such that C's motion is directed precisely toward A. C transfers its momentum to A, and the cycle repeats itself indefinitely.

A, B, and C are discrete particles of matter that must have other particles act on them, but the system of A, B, and C, is entirely self-sustaining in that the action performed by the system, i.e., the perpetual motion of the particles, is not caused by any entity outside the system.

This scenario runs into several problems, which preclude it from describing what is known as "life." For example, friction and energy loss through heat in the course of the collisions would eventually bring the motion of the particles to a halt, and the particles are unable to actively respond to these external influences.

But what if a system were to exist that was able to counteract its own losses of energy? What if, for every joule of energy lost, the system would take in a joule of energy to compensate for it? What if the system was able to actively seek out those sources of energy so that it would have a greater chance of experiencing no shortfall of them? What if it was able to, solely through the functioning of its constituent elements, manifest an adequate response to whatever external stimulus affected it (unless that stimulus were to grossly disrupt the response mechanisms themselves)?

Certainly, the system thus described would need to be of immense complexity, and no three-particle system would suffice to furnish all of these purposes. Therefore, no system of three particles, or even three million of them, has ever been observed to be alive.

However, let us examine a typical human being whose body has about 10²⁸ atoms in it, which, for all purposes of macroscopic analysis, can be considered fundamental discrete particles. Might it not be possible for a system of 10²⁸ particles to be arranged in such a manner as to facilitate adequate and long-term responses to a multitude of external forces that would attempt to disrupt the system and its processes?

Of course, not every system of 10²⁸ particles will necessarily suffice for this purpose, as the spatial arrangement of specific particles in the proximity of specific others is essential to the functions such a system would need to undertake in order to be deemed alive. (For example, not every way that A pushes B will guarantee that B will come into contact with C.)

Furthermore, the particles themselves and their specific natures are also crucial in determining the adequacy of the system for sustaining itself. The human body possesses an unparalleled diversity of atoms and molecules in it, many types of which are compartmentalized into particular cells, tissues, and organs so as to be more effectively devoted to the purpose with which they are most commensurate.

A large metal ball, however, though it might even have more particles in it than a human body, is still inert matter, because its constituent elements are not diverse enough to facilitate the complex functions necessary for the metal ball to be able to resist external forces that preclude it from sustaining its activities indefinitely and on its own. But the human living organism is both entirely physical and so configured as to be capable of self-direction to an extent that enables it to transcend the designation of mere inert matter.

Read other parts of "A Rational Cosmology" by clicking here.