A Rational Cosmology: Can We Observe Others' Consciousness?

Partly as a response to my essays on the physicalist view of life, consciousness, and volition, Reginald Firehammer has published the treatise, "Consciousness Itself," in which he presents, among other ideas, his rebuttal to the physicalist model of consciousness.

Within his arguments, Mr. Firehammer posits the notion that consciousness is inherently subjective and that no man could possibly know what another's consciousness is like. As I am an adherent of the physicalist view, I see fit in this essay to explicate my true position on consciousness.

I shall defend the proposition that consciousness, like all other aspects of reality, is objective, meaning that any individual, if he undertakes the required procedures, can understand what another's consciousness is like.

According to Mr. Firehammer, there is an inherent limit to what we may know about another's consciousness. He writes:

"Consciousness in other people and other creatures is inferred from their testimony (in the case of people) or their behavior (in the case of animals), but cannot be directly observed. We believe the testimony of others about their consciousness, because what they describe sounds exactly like what we experience, and we have no reason to suspect them of deceiving us. If someone were not conscious, it is unlikely they would attempt to fool others into thinking they were. If they were not conscious, how would they know what it is and what possible motive could they have for deceiving others about it?"

Mr. Firehammer claims that it is impossible for us to definitively prove that somebody else is conscious, and, where the capacity for proof is absent, we have to simply take their word for it. Or, in the case of animals, we see that their behavior is sufficiently interactive with their environment to presume that they possess consciousness.

Yet, this argument runs into a pitfall. Even using today's computer technology, it is possible to create a "talking program" with a sufficiently broad ability to respond to a variety of data input. It might even be possible to program the computer to state, "I am conscious," as an answer to the corresponding question.

Yet, it is also known that a modern computer is not conscious, no matter how interactive it might be. If the computer is not conscious, and the animal is, there must be a means of demonstrating both truths. Clearly, then, to delineate between what is conscious and what is not, especially in so-called "borderline cases," we need a more rigorous standard of proof.

Yet, under Mr. Firehammer's model, this standard of proof is nearly impossible to establish, as Mr. Firehammer denies almost any certainty of similarity between even the perceptions of two human beings:

"In general we assume another's consciousness is like our own, and there is good reason to assume it. In fact, however, another's consciousness could be quite different, and we could never know it. If we try to explain to one another what our consciousness is like, I may give you examples of how I perceive things, and you the same. For example, I might point to a red car and say, "I perceive that color as red," and you might point to a blue car and say, "I perceive that color as blue." Neither of us will be astonished that we agree on the names of the colors, but, if we think we have any more idea of how the other actually perceives those colors, we are mistaken. The actual conscious experience I have when seeing red might be the actual conscious experience you have when seeing blue, and the actual conscious experience you have when seeing red might be the actual conscious experience I have when seeing green."

So, Mr. Firehammer's model leads us to a dead end in terms of demonstrating objectively the existence of consciousness. The ostensive demonstration that he likes to employ is, in many cases, inconclusive. Even for some human beings, it is at times hard to say whether they are conscious! Anyone who has observed a hip-hop-mesmerized zombie would express a similar doubt.

And, to add to the problem, Mr. Firehammer claims that there is no other gateway to an understanding of consciousness that we can employ, since, in his theory, he has placed barriers between even elementary perceptions of various individuals. To demonstrate the existence of consciousness objectively, we must show that these barriers are artificial and remove them.

Read other parts of "A Rational Cosmology" by clicking here.