Aerospace Power in War

The Battle Above: How Aerospace Did (And Did Not) Change War

Many of the lesser advances in the field of organized warfare aim at improving the lethality of a weapon. But, a few of these notions went beyond a simple statistical increase in killing power and shifted, inherently, the ways and means that nations and city-states conduct warfare.

Historically, war had been more or less structured into three basic functions in combat- Infantry, Artillery, and Cavalry (Malone, 86), with varying societies putting emphasis on the one best suited for their specific style of warfare. The addition of air power added a new function and a new dimension to warfare. It made the battle-field three dimensional, defeating some of the basic tactical and doctrinal theories behind defense and engagement (Van Creveld, 196). Where in the past troop formations had largely defined wars- phalanxes, convoy lines, trenches- airpower would fundamentally undercut the method in which warfare doctrine was approached.

Aerospace weapons platforms were capable of fast, decisive, hard-hitting and agile combat, conducted in real-time, and capable of defeating virtually every aspect of not just enemy ground operations, but everything from their population to their ability to conduct war itself. This combination of extraordinary flexibility, power, and speed gave airpower a singular place in the realm of organized warfare, providing commanders with a valuable tool that radically altered how war could be conducted.

Of course, interdiction and bombardment were just two of the applications of the specialized warfare that aerospace power was capable of. COL Warden, USAF, would develop a model of the enemy known as the Five Ring theory. It dictates that both in terms of importance and relative accessibility, the enemy, whether a cartel or enemy country, is presented in the following order: Fielded Forces, Population, Infrastructure, System Essentials, and Leadership (Warden). Airpower is unique in its ability to strike at any one of these 'rings', and do so with extreme prejudice and decisiveness of action, and the application of airpower to this demonstrates just how radically aerospace weapons altered combat.

Beyond interdiction, airpower was just as effective in application at all five levels of warfare. Against fielded military forces, airpower could produce tremendous volume of fire and devastating lethality. It allowed for extremely flexible, rapid firepower and response to enemy movements. Bomber aircraft were the death knell of large troop movements- though artillery could attack emplacements, bombers were able to make on-the-fly corrections to eliminate troops and vehicles on the approach, allowing real-time target acquisition as well as giving pilots the opportunity to make on the spot judgement calls in the case of a more viable target presenting itself. The B-17 and B-29, both mainstays of the American Bomber fleet, were capable of laying down tremendous volumes of bomb ordnance and regular ballistic firepower (USMA), as was their descendent, the B-52.

The concept of close air support also grew out of this need for defeating enemy troops and armor on the ground. Flexibility is one of the keys to success in combat, and close air support combines both flexibility of maneuver and extraordinary firepower in the attack. While fighter aircraft could and were pressed into this role, and bombers could be adopted for in-battle combat, a breed of aircraft specifically designed for air support were developed for this role- notably the AC-47 'Spooky' and the AC-10 'Warthog'.

Fighter aircraft could be pressed into this role if required, such as the expert use of F-8 Crusaders during the battle of 'Howard's Hill' in Vietnam. During this combat, in which Vietcong ambushed a platoon of Marines on reconnaissance, 1LT Phil Freed, forward controller for Charlie Company, 1st Recon BN, called down no less than eight attacks on enemy positions that were dug in almost on top of the friendly Marine positions, using both expert tactical air controller skills and capitalizing on the flying skills of the Marines piloting the F-8s. (Malone, 106).

Regardless of design or intent, the end result of troop attack aircraft was that it gave the military real-time, on-the-location battlefield assessment and delivery options. While artillery could lay down significant fire on a known but sight-beyond objective, aircraft could deliver much more precise ordnance where it would be most effective, using on-sight intelligence to defeat enemy forces.

Though it is generally considered 'unsporting' to attack civilian population centers, one cannot argue with the effectiveness of engaging the home front, the second of Warden's circles. While having infantry raping and pillaging the civilian population is generally bad for political relations, there is a certain dispassionate quality to a persistent, devastating artillery or air dominance bombing campaign. And even if it does not inflict a great deal of civilian casualties, there is something devastatingly shocking about heavy ordnance going off nearby. This alone can be enough of a psychological deterrence to help defeat an enemy's home population's will to fight, injuring their ability once again to conduct warfare. The massive bombing campaigns that Allied forces carried out on Nazi-controlled population centers evidenced this, as did the frequent Nazi attacks on London and the remainder of the south of England.

Another realm in which aircraft excelled was in targeted attacks against enemy infrastructure, the third of Warden's 'circles'. Though existing ground forces could damage enemy factories, run off their workers, or delay production, they lacked the ability to rapidly and devastatingly destroy the enemy's ability to conduct warfare. Air strikes gave military forces the ability to annihilate factories, commo facilities, knock out fuel depots, smash apart bridges, highways, and rail stations, and generally wreak havoc in the opposition's ability to conduct warfare and maintain their social structure. Instead of imprecise artillery strikes based on falliable intelligence, the military could conduct bombing raids with instantaneous hit-or-fail confirmation. Rather than commander relying on complicated sabotage, airplanes could simply drop their payloads on factories and fuel depots. Crippling the enemy's ability to conduct warfare is the definition of interdiction, and smashing their infrastructure is the easiest way to accomplish this.

"There were five communications centers in the country, so we didn't have to destroy all their...airplanes, but knock out their brains...[W]e hit their missile and communications centers, their operational commands...in twenty minutes....we knocked Iraq out of the war." (Col. Horne, USAF; Rich, 101)

Beyond simply attacking an enemy's war making ability, aircraft allow military forces to assault directly the system essentials (Warden). This goes beyond simply hurting their production means- striking at vital components of social structures can absolutely cripple not just the military, but the indigenous civilian population. Basic social amenities, such as civil service, food and water distribution, and communication lines can all be severed by tactical strikes against, say, a power plant.

If "war is the continuation of politics by other means" (Clausewitz), then there are few ways to absolutely turn the minds of a native population than to make wartime life so unbearable that they do not wish to continue the conflict. Though this may not be as effective in a non-Western state, where the people command the actions of the military, there is an undeniable element of complication when an enemy commander must not only contend with the actions of an invading army, but deal with civil unrest as well.

At the apex of Warden's circle is leadership. Historically, it is nearly impossible to eliminate the specific leadership of an enemy force- they are too well protected, traditionally concealed behind if not the entirety of their armies, at least exceptionally well protected by bodyguards. As evidenced by the use of both missiles and precision-guided munitions during Operation Iraqi Freedom I-IV, American forces have made exceptional use of aerospace weaponry to eliminate the senior leadership of the Iraqi military, not only military but political leadership, notably the Hussein family. Striking at the leadership, isolating them and eliminating them, is the most sure way to if not halt organized enemy activity altogether, then at least throw it into chaos.

Beyond of Warden's Five Rings, airpower has a singularly unique application- rapid troop delivery. If Mobility is one of the key essentials towards dominating military operations, then the ability to deliver troops, tanks, and materiel anywhere in the world in less than 24 hours is one of the finest examples of this degree of controlling war. As of now, the US Army has two Stryker Infantry Brigades that can be deployed to anywhere in the world in less than 24 hours, as well as Airborne Infantry and Special Operations troops that can be inserted via air wherever they are needed.

Additionally, airpower provided commanders and generals with a heretofore unknown degree of intelligence and reconnaissance ability. The first aircraft in the
US inventory, in fact, were balloons, built and used for reconnaissance (Salmon). The planes that followed were also initially designed for reconnaissance and surveillance (Creveld), though the notion of dropping explosives over the sides caught on fairly quickly. Still, using planes as aerial reconnaissance vehicles is a practice that has proceeded to this day, with such notables as the SR-71 Blackbird and the U-2 leading the way, along with Kodak special high-speed cameras that can be added into virtually any aircraft in the US inventory. (Rich)

Air power is not capable of winning all ways, everywhere- it merely adds another dimension to a military's ground combat forces. In terms of engaging and defeating an enemy, it still boils down to boots on the ground. War absolutely requires all four primary means of combat- Infantry, Artillery, Cavalry, and Aviation. "Despite any technological advantages that our armed forces might have over the enemy, only close combat between ground forces gains the decision in battle. (FM 7-8)" Fire and maneuver and the need to take and hold ground are the essentials of victory at war, and as effective as a JDAM or GBU bomb might be in damaging an enemy in combat, the sole domination by means of air power can only be through massive destruction.

Air power changed a great deal about how warfare was conducted, yes. But the basic needs of war had not changed. Winning wars remained the domain of the infantry and rifle platoons, the basic ability to close with the enemy and suppress them through close combat. Air power could support that, could enhance the lethality and efficiency of warfare, but could not conquer an enemy country, could not capture resources and land. It was revolutionary in that it added a fourth dimension to the four means of combat, but it was by no means a total change in the ways nations fought.

Works Cited

COL Salmon, Douglas, (USAF). Lectures. Professor Aerospace Studies WSU/UI. Oct. 2004.

COL Malone, Dandrige M, USA (Ret.) Small Unit Leadership: A Commonsense Approach. New York: Ballentine, 1983.

CPT Saltzman, B. Chance (USAF), and Searle, Thomas R. Introduction to the United States Air Force. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air Power Institute, 2001.

Dr. Van Creveld, Martin. Technology And War. New York: The Free Press, 1991.

Rich, Ben R. and Janos, Leo. Skunk Works. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1994.

US Army. FM 7-8: Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad. US Army Infantry School.

US Military Academy. Definitions and Doctrines of the Military Art, Past and Present. Department of History, 1981.

Von Clausewitz, Carl. On War.