Afghanistan, Airstrikes, and U.S. Strategy

Bill Roggio of The Long War Journal published an analysis October 1 in which he discussed the increasing number of U.S. airstrikes taking place along the Afghanistan - Pakistan border and the effect that those airstrikes are having on Taliban and al Qaeda fighters. These airstrikes, and the strategy surrounding them, are important to note because there are signs emerging that indicate the United States might be considering withdrawal from Afghanistan in favor of an increase in the use of U.S. airpower.

Roggio says, "In August and September of 2009, the US covert air campaign in Pakistan's lawless, Taliban-controlled tribal agencies scored four high value al Qaeda and Taliban targets. The deaths of Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud and three senior al Qaeda leaders have helped to fuel the push for increasing the role of strikes in Pakistan. The US is now urging Pakistan to take on the Quetta Shura, led by Mullah Omar, and other targets in Baluchistan, and has considered expanding the air campaign outside Pakistan's tribal areas."

Roggio adds, "The US is also considering switching from a counterinsurgency-based strategy in Afghanistan, which focuses on securing the Afghan people and building up the government and military, to a counterterrorism-based strategy that focuses on covert raids and airstrikes against al Qaeda in Pakistan. This potential strategy shift is meeting resistance from circles within the US military and the intelligence communities, who while supportive of the present air campaign in Pakistan, warn that the tactic has limited use in dismantling al Qaeda and believe that such a strategy would destabilize Pakistan and lead to a Taliban takeover of much of Afghanistan."

I don't think there's any question that the increased use of airstrikes is having an effect, but there is a significant amount of concern being generated over the possibility of a strategy shift away from "boots on the ground" and to a primary reliance on airpower. Think about this for a moment. Over the past 6 months, leading administration officials (including Press Secretary Robert Gibbs and Defense Secretary Robert Gates) and prominent uniformed officers (including Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen) have stressed that the United States had about 18-24 months to determine the fate of the Afghanistan war. Add to that the decreasing public support for the war in the United States, and increasingly wary NATO allies who have proven reluctant to commit additional forces, and the overall willingness to continue the fight appears to be waning.

Then came the news reports from President Obama's Afghanistan strategy session September 30 in the White House situation room. The Wall Street Journal reported after the session that the President "...focused his questioning on the current threat posed by al Qaeda and whether a resurgent Taliban would give al Qaeda leaders a new haven to regroup...which could indicate Mr. Obama is more concerned about the status of a threat to the U.S. than overall stability in Afghanistan."

Taken together, the 18-24 month timeline, the drop in American public and allied support, and the questions about the strategic impact of an Afghanistan once again controlled by the Taliban make it clear that a wholesale withdrawal of U.S. forces from the former al Qaeda stronghold could be as little as a year away. So we're beginning to see the concerns about a potential strategy shift. Any possible move away from "boots on the ground" and to a reliance on airpower brings back memories of U.S. reaction to terrorism prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001. Before 9/11 we were nothing if not consistent: if Islamic terrorists took a shot at us, we inevitably responded by launching a few cruise missiles or conducting a few airstrikes. Never anything substantive. Never anything to put the terrorists on the defensive. There was no fear factor for the Islamists, so they felt emboldened enough to hit us at home.

Airstrikes are valuable for targeting key terrorist leaders and for disrupting terrorist operations, but they have limited value when it comes to really suppressing the threat from Islamic radicals. A comprehensive U.S. strategy for combating the danger posed by Muslim extremists has to be broader in scope than reactionary measures that allow the terrorists to dictate the terms of the fight. The concerns beginning to emerge about a potential shift in strategy are bigger than just whether the United States wins or loses in Afghanistan. They are grounded in the fear that Washington might be returning to the days before 9/11, when Americans felt protected by two ocean borders and Islamic radicalism was a distant problem plaguing the Middle East. Complacency is beginning to set in, and once firmly in place it will only be a matter of time before the next 9/11, perhaps even larger in scale and more costly in terms of American lives, smacks us in the face.

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/10/analysis_us_airstrik.php