An Explication of the Current Debate Between Universalism and Cultural Relativism

As popular human rights ideologies, cultural relativism and universalism are simple, antithetical, and antagonistic. Taken into serious academic consideration, however, one finds a much more complex relationship between the two perspectives, with proponents on both sides taking positions in decidedly grey areas. It seems, though, that the dialogue has not been able to fully move past ideological bickering. Many relativist authors devote much of their work to refutations of essentialized (and often wrong) versions of universalism, and vice versa. As such, it is necessary to explore not only the academic arguments for and against the two perspectives, but also their ideological popular versions.

A Universalist perspective on human rights, in its most popular form, stresses a natural, "inherent dignity" and "equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family" (UNUDHR in Bell 2001: 383). This argument, raised in the 1948 UNUDHR, carries in it the philosophical underpinnings of Hobbes' Natural Law and Mill's Utilitarianism as well as the sense of moral certainty that followed the Nuremburg Trials. Whether through shared fear of death or by divine provenance of God, Universalism as an ideology asks that if rights are inherent, how can they be denied by someone with conscience.

The academic argument for universal rights, however, is much more nuanced than modern-day proponents such as President GW Bush would have you believe. Most universal theorists have retreated from the notion of innate rights to ones more rationally defensible. Hood, while holding that Western rights are subjectively superior to those of nonwestern cultures, still admits that rights are "relatively new" and are the result of philosophical discourse and discovery (Hood in Bell 2001: 98). Barnhart critiques the popular notions of natural law in favor of a more defensible position based on collective moral values forming incipient rights, or collective best bets. Morris writes that while rights are tied to each man's innate self-interest, the body of rights that logically follows is much smaller than the great, sweeping decrees of documents like the UNUDHR.

While the current administration may back up claims of the universal right to democracy with appropriate amounts of firepower, the more reserved universalist statements of the academics have more reserved applications. Hood may trumpet the superiority of western rights, but he ends his essay with the implication that the prospect of rights alone will be enough to affect regime change abroad, that "authoritarian leaders [will] fear the embarrassment of being the last dictator" to capitulate to westernization (ibid. 119). Barnhart suggests that the concept of universal human rights isn't an argument as much as it is a perspective through which critics can evaluate progress. Morris follows suit, remarking that practically, rights cannot be ends in themselves, but can "[suggest] instances in which greater equality and more rights may be desirable across cultural divides" (Morris in Bell 2001: 90).

While certainly not as flashy nor as sweeping as the UNDHR, this nuanced approach to universalism is more pragmatic and defensible than its popular cousin. It provides real instances in which universal human rights can be used to make the case for change or injustice. However, the reason such sweeping statements are not so readily accepted in serious theoretical debate is the competing perspective of relativism.

Its roots lie in the 20^th century anthropology of Boas, who wrote that culture is not innate, but is learned through processes of socialization. The implication of this thinking from a human rights perspective is that conceptions of rights, as extensions of culture, are similarly learned and are thus particular. The popular manifestation of this thought is a relativistic approach that views all cultures as unrankable in terms of moral rightness or any other measure. It follows, then, that as objectivity is clouded by the observer's own culture, all cultures are beyond reproach and their diversity is to be protected from the cosmopolitan (and in some extreme cases, the modern). There is no natural law. There is no moral certainty.

Just as academic universalism is more nuanced than ideological universalism, so is academic relativism more practical and defensible than the conclusions that flow from Boas' assertion. Dowdle does not reject the notion of rights, but rather he dismisses the notion of rights as absolutes, or "hard rights" in favor of more context-driven "soft rights" (Dowdle in Bell 2001: 127-8). Dembour rejects universalism as arrogance for its refusal to acknowledge the "other," yet takes issue with relativism for making "moral agents indifferent to immoral situations" (Dembour in Cowan 2001: 58-9).

The practical implications of this tempered relativism manifest themselves in a philosophy Dembour likens to a pendulum, throwing universalist and relativist policies into a dialectic where both parts are necessary to create and evaluate policy. Dowdle writes that respect for context "is not contrary to the notion of universal rights[,] rather, it is a refinement of that notion" (Dowdle in Bell 2001: 145). Merry takes the argument further, touching on Dembour's dialogue proposition while providing relativist reasoning for Barnhart's universalist argument of rights as a spreading construct. She argues for an expanded definition of culture that recognizes intracultural struggle and dialogue. These intracultural struggles both result from and contribute to a larger global rights debate, acting as a proving ground for globalization's impact on different cultures.

As can be seen from the similarities between Merry and Barnhart's arguments, the contemporary rift between cultural relativism and universalism is much narrower and the area is much greyer than we are led to believe. In this light, many critiques leveled by each side against the other are immaterial. Charges of universalism's ignorance of context are countered by Barnhart's theory of commensurable and incommensurable cultures. Charges of relativism's indifference are countered by Dembour's pendulum.

With the possible exception of Hood, the authors discussed agree that neither absolute universalism nor absolute cultural relativism provide comprehensive solutions. Dembour, Merry, Barnhart, and Morris all agree, to varying extents, in the necessity of the relativist-universalist dialogue in facilitating a more humane human progress. With that said, however, several critiques remain valid.

Because universalism remains rooted in a fairly well-entrenched position of right and wrong, it can often exclude the "experience of the other," as Dembour contends. This is distinctly obvious in Hood's essay, where while he considers the relative virtues of Confucianism and Islam as regards the Western conception of human rights, he ultimately dismisses them both as unable to provide their own comprehensive rights-based alternatives. His reasoning is rooted in a somewhat shaky ground requiring the belief that neither Confucianism nor Islam supports the individual's ability to challenge authority. This argument has its own problem of reifying culture, denying that moderate Islamists or Confucians are truly members of their respective cultures, or marginalizing them if they are. It is interesting to note that the reification of culture is a charge that was initially leveled at Boasian cultural relativists for their failure to allow a more fluid definition of culture, one that provided for internal struggles and dialogues.

One universalist critique against relativism is that it is often used by oppressive regimes as an "excuse for abuse" (Dembour in Cowan 2001: 59). That the Bangkok declaration of Human rights emphasizes the importance of traditional collectivism can be seen as a somewhat Marxist attempt by the elite of justifying their actions through ideology. Ultimately, however, this is not an academic position at all, and even defenders of the Bangkok declaration temper their arguments to favor cultural and economic context to cultural exceptionalism.

In summation, while it is clear that while there is a deep divide between the popular ideologies of cultural relativism and universalism, the majority of contemporary thinkers are not arguing in such absolutist terms. Tempered universalism and relativism have more in common than they do in contrast, and Dembour, Barnhart, Morris, and Merry borrow liberally from both, asserting the importance of dialogue between the two. The debate will have difficulty progressing, however, if thinkers on both sides continue to use essentialized versions of relativism and universalism in their critiques, as they are critiques of unheld positions. They would do best to admit their common ground and critique each other's own arguments, rather than criticizing the popular versions of those arguments.

Cited:

Bell, Lynda et.al. Negotiating Culture and Human Rights. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.

Cowan, Jane et.al. Culture and Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.