Analysis of After Virtue by Alasdair MacIntyre, Chapters 15-16

Opinionated Analysis of MacIntyre's Ethical Standard

Christopher Cacace
The next chapter, The Virtues, the Unity of a Human Life and the Concept of a Tradition beings to explain the other two factors necessary for a virtue to be created: a moral tradition and a narrative order. A narrative order is important to humanity and serves as a method for a person to tell their life to another person. Without narrative structure, it'd be impossible for humanity to learn from one another as all of our interactions would be unintelligible. Moral tradition is also necessary since we need to build off the mistakes of the past. Without each of these, new virtues cannot be created. He continued to describe the importance of tradition and narratives, stating the merits each of them have in constituting a virtue.

Combining all three of the factors needed for a virtue seems to create a definition which holds true through all of the eras we have studied so far. Every ethical and moral code we've read about have been somewhat based on a previous moral code, it is taught in a way which represents a narrative and people have been able to associate practices with them. MacIntyre is doing a fine job creating these guidelines.

MacIntyre explains in this chapter another point which has been bugging me for a while now. All of the virtues we've learned about have been aimed toward bettering a society rather than a person, and MacIntyre begins to acknowledge this and describe how other ethical codes follow this trend. Aristotle's idea of friendship and of virtue as a whole seems to be to better the polis rather than the individual, while friendship is made to better the other person in the friendship. No one has thought of a virtue which can be practiced and maintained for the self and by the self.

The idea of a self-made and maintained virtue is one which conflicts with Aristotle's view on virtue. A self-virtue would only promote good upon the self and create pleasure for the self. If it doesn't better society or anyone other than the self, can it be considered virtuous? I believe Aristotle would dissent, saying that the good which would attain the virtue would have to affect not only the self but the polis.

MacIntyre traces this idea and others through the history of philosophy, from the heroic and classical periods through medieval times and into more modern thought. He finishes the chapter stating that if religion is abandoned in ethical though, some from of stoicism will be the only thing left, which I believe to be true.

Source: After Virtue, third edition. By Alasdair MacIntyre.

Published by Christopher Cacace

I'm a recent graduate with a background in proofreading, editing and photography but I'm hoping to expand my writing portfolio a bit. Whatever keeps the wheels turning, right?  View profile

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