Another Possible Account for Moral Experience?

Before I begin my account of moral experience, it is imperative that I lay out any and all presuppositions so as to prevent any conflict or internal contradiction in the logical outcome of my argument. These presuppositions have been established in my previous essays on morality, but I will briefly recite them for the readers' convenience, and the fortitude of my argument.

Presupposition 1: Theoretical reason, if it exists, is for the purpose of generating knowledge as it exists to phenomena (the world of appearance, not things in themselves). Theoretical reason, as defined by those who do posit its existence, cannot legitimately extend to the noumenal world of things in themselves (even if such a world exists).

Presupposition 2:Therefore, we cannot reasonably or justifiably generate any knowledge for that which exists outside the world of appearances - and this limits our knowledge to that given through our sense impressions; and likewise through our cognition about these experiences.

Presupposition 3: If reason were to exist as the basis of the moral world, it could only be said to be the use of our practical reason for doing so. By practical reason I mean the use of reason for determining a free-will (which can only be said to be an assumption from Presupposition 2). However, practical reason doesn't relate to knowledge of things in themselves.

Presupposition 4: Morality by definition of universal truth is hence an unknowable idea that cannot be given through sense impressions. This must necessarily be true, otherwise it would not be universal or objective - since our experiences as human beings are subjective (we all have different (although reasonably similar) experiences across different social, economic, and political environments. It would be absurd to say that the experiences of a Nigerian farmer could be parallel to anything experienced by a service worker in California.

Presupposition 5: Even if moral truths exist, they are unknowable by Presupposition 1, 2, and 4.

Presupposition 6: As far as practical reason is concerned with morality, we fall into the same circular logic that presupposes a free-will, but again something by its definition not experienced through the physical world cannot be said to be known. This is only speculation.

The above presuppositions must then be accepted if we are to begin with constructing another, more valid claim to morality and how we experience it. For the purposes of my argument, I shall employ an example of moral claims that are strictly human. By this I mean they are things that are applicable to human understandings through our own assumptions of our own worth and value. For the purpose of serving an example of a moral claim that might be seen as universally true, I shall choose one that many would find hard to disagree with. This is not for the sake of choosing a radical example, as it stands, most of our moral experiences do not test our moral worth in extreme situations, but rather more common, trivial to anybody but ourselves. These examples will serve a different point to contest the universality of morality but is an entirely different issue.

Our example then is the following moral claim that I believe most human beings would find acceptably universal at face value: "torturing infants for sexual gratification is wrong."

The implications that follow from this claim are important for my inquiry into morality. One, it implies a certain value to human beings that demonstrates there inability to be seen as merely means to an end. Secondly, it employs the paradigm that things that are not good, must be wrong. By wrong we operate within this paradigm and could logically make the next step to claim that the torture of infants for sexual gratification is not only wrong, but possibly evil. The nature of this evil is not important and I shall not go into this here.

However, are we justified to make this claim, even though this may be a universally held belief? Notice - I said universally held, not universally true. To make the claim that the above was universally true does nothing for the argument at hand, but also does not deal with the issue regarding moral knowledge either. So, when I say universally held 'belief' I mean simply that most people would believe it would be wrong to torture infants for sexual gratification across cultures, across time-spans, and across ethnicities, etc. However, the significance of this belief and how universal its applicability or quantitative support does not logically conclude in its universal value as truth.

Even though we may find few people who would make the opposite claim, that torturing infants for sexual gratification is in fact good, we are still not justified then in concluding this as a universal moral fact. Rather, and I think I am correct in making this conclusion - we are experiencing something more universal in human psychology and human institutions as it relates to our own species in general and our attitudes (however justified or unjustified these may be). In other words, to make the claim that it is wrong to torture infants (for any reason) is not because we believe it to be a moral truth - for which this would be the only sufficient means for believing it wrong in the first place, but rather a sentimental reaction to the significance and importance we place upon infants and their relative treatment. Thus, our moral experiences are more in tune with our sentiments - David Hume was right. The basis for our sentiments then rests in our psychology as human beings, and the emotional weight created by the moral claim regarding the perceived immorality of torturing infants for sexual gratification is nonetheless one that can be explained by evolutionary psychology. For, if evolution explains the necessity of gene replication across species through reproduction then only those species that can nurture and develop their offspring into reproductive maturity will perpetuate themselves. And since homo sapiens have perpetuated themselves to the present time, this indeed serves a plausible explanation for human psychology as the basis of our basic individual morality (not taking into account more complex morality from society).

This has only been a brief argument, and it has not answered the problem of whether or not our sentiments could be the result of recognizing the value of infants AND the truth of moral claims that condemn the torture of infants. However, this view is problematic itself. It denies Presupposition 1, 2, 4,5, and 6. To deny these presuppositions means then that one must try to provide an argument to get oneself outside the circle of making moral claims of knowledge in regards to ideas that cannot be knowable by their constitution and a priori definition.

If this is true, this tells us something interesting about morality in general. Namely - that morality then is itself something that is useful and only instrumentally valuable to human lives. I agree with the claim that morality is indeed useful, often times human beings in failure to recognize their own fallibility when it comes to knowledge will attach themselves to moral truth whenever it is available. Secondly, it has a socially productive aspect to it. Clearly we would not want to go down the path that would conclude that torturing infants is socially permissible simply because it is neither morally good nor bad. What is occurring here is not a moral problem then, but a social problem - one that can and will be addressed and better explained by those things given to us through sense impression and cognition. We can institutionally mandate sanctions against the individual who tortures infants for the sake of his own sexual pleasure and that is valid enough explanation. Why should we feel so motivated to look to metaphysical answers to empirical problems to begin with, when they are neither adequate nor sufficient for generating practical solutions?

Critics of this view might deny Presupposition 3, regarding practical reason as the necessitation of our will and the only access we have to the metaphysical world. However, this can be resolved here and I will do so within the internal language of those moral philosophers who employ this belief.

If our practical reason can be said to direct the necessitation of our will through its capacity to bring into conformity our actions with any series of universal laws, then we are making a huge assumption of our own autonomy. This was dealt with by Kant and other deontologists but was never adequately explained. Kant concluded in his first Critique that this question is not one that can be answered (Kant was after all an epistemological skeptic and phenomenalist). However, he feels it is an idea of reason (and a necessary one) for the possibility of seeing ourselves as having moral experiences to begin with, which Kant presupposes is true. However, this can only be accepted if we accept Kant's definition of moral experiences as the necessitation of reason in general, and deny the plausibility of all other explanations of morality. This doesn't seem to be the case, and in general moral rationalism and deontology have not provided us with sufficient grounds for accepting this to begin with. So, we are no more justified in believing ourselves to be in the possession of a free, autonomous, undetermined will than we are to believe that any moral claim is one that can be said to be universally true in and of itself.