Book Review: "The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11" by Lawrence Wright

"Wherever you are, death will find you, Even in the looming tower."

Introduction

In the aftermath of the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks, America found itself

in a search for answers. This Pearl-Harbor level attack elevated terrorism from barely a priority, to the forefront of the American radar. It is destined to remain there for the foreseeable future. The elemental question still resonated on many American minds: who attacked us, and why do they hate us?

The bipartisan 9/11 Commission was formed to trace the roots of al Qaeda, investigate the history of the 19 hijackers, examine missed opportunities of law enforcement officials to avert the disaster, and make recommendations to clean up the faulty incoherent intelligence-gathering operation. The 500+ page 9/11 Commission Report contains thirteen chapters of historical narratives, analysis and recommendations. All ten members of the bi-partisan commission signed off on the report, which has arguably become a national historical document.

Like the 9/11 Commission, Lawrence Wright sought answers as to why 3000 American lives were lost in the attacks on September 11th. An experienced traveler to the region, Wright endeavored to do his own investigative study into the history, ideology and circumstances behind this large-scale attack on American soil. What sets the Looming Tower apart, in my opinion, is its focus on the people involved in September 11th, both "over here" and "over there." The book does not go into great detail about the 9/11 plot nor its execution. Rather, Wright drills down on the historical background and the conditions that produced those individuals who planned, financed, supported and executed the attack. He also focuses on the individuals responsible for combating terrorism in the United States, and he is not afraid to highlight the flaws of their respective organizations.

In addition to introducing the specific personalities involved in combating terror, Lawrence Wright's book underscores the lack of creativity on the part of United States' agencies in general. He also exploits their inability to connect the dots of various bits of intelligence. It also points out that Alec station, the CIA's "bin Laden issue station," dedicated to tracking its namesake was deemed unimportant, and essentially ignored. (Wright, 2006, 6).

Where intelligence agencies failed, Wright jumps in and completes the puzzle. By using personal narratives, Wright traces the seeds of al Qaeda back to Egyptian ideologue Sayyid Qutb, who is so repulsed by his trip to America that he returns to Egypt in support of a radical theocracy. The book then introduces Ayman al-Zawahiri, a Qutb follower who forgoes his intelligence and training (he is a medical doctor) for a life of radicalism, terror and crime. Other personalities like Muhammad bin Laden, his son Osama, FBI operatives Dan Coleman and John O'Neill, and CIA counterpart Michael Scheuer are introduced and developed to tell the story of the historical roots of al Qaeda. It also paints an appalling picture of the ineptitude that plagued United States' intelligence agencies in the pre-September 11th environment.

Equally appalling is Wright's portrayal of the deep-rooted bureaucrats at the NSA, CIA and FBI who failed to share crucial information with one another because of petty personal differences and agency cultures that value conformity above true investigative integrity. Had the CIA, in particular, released information regarding the whereabouts of several individuals who ultimately participated in the 9-11 attacks, those tragedies might well have been prevented. While there is certainly enough blame to go around, it seems as though lack of communication might be atop the list.

About The Author

In order to understand the magnitude of research and integrity that supports The Looming Tower, it is helpful to know some more about the author, Lawrence Wright. According to the biography on his website, Wright is no stranger to the Middle East. Having both studied and taught at the American University in Cairo in 1969, he comes to the table with some firsthand knowledge of the region. He also studied a smattering of Arabic.

While Lawrence Wright is now a journalist for The New Yorker and an accomplished author, he did not set out to become a writer. After his stint in Cairo, he found himself in Nashville covering the end of the civil rights movement. Thus began Wright's career in journalism. It is of note than in addition to magazine articles and books, Lawrence Wright has written several screenplays, to include the movie The Seige, which received unreceptive reactions from numerous Arab organizations. (Wright.com).

On the day that the twin towers fell, Lawrence Wright was an active journalist for the New Yorker. That afternoon he sent a simple request to his boss: "Put me to work." From his home in Austin, Lawrence Wright did just that: he went to work interviewing a survivor in Queens, New York. He conducted the interviews long-distance, and put together an account based on the experience of this survivor. From there, Wright stumbled on the story of John O'Neill, the former FBI agent who became chief of security for the World Trade Center. The account of O'Neill's untimely perish in the 9/11 attacks became one of the central themes for The Looming Tower.

Prior to the release of The Looming Tower, Wright researched and penned a groundbreaking piece for The New Yorker entitled "The Man Behind bin Laden," which chronicles the life of Ayman al-Zawahiri.

Lawrence Wright's book The Looming Tower was welcomed by extensive praise. The book sat atop the New York Times bestseller list for eight weeks, was translated into twenty-five languages, and won numerous awards, to include a Pulitzer Prize in the General Nonfiction category. (Wright.com). "I felt I was born to do the book," Wright was quoted as saying. "I know it's something I have to do." (Wright.com).

Lawrence Wright individually interviewed over 1000 Arabs for the book. Compare this to the 911 Commission Report, which was backed by a team of 80 support staff and a budget of $15 million, the commission reviewed over 2 million pages of documents; conducted over 1,000 interviews, including sessions with the President and high-ranking officials in the Administration; and held several high-profile public hearings. (emphasis mine). In the course of its investigation, the commission received unprecedented access to all the materials and sources that it felt it needed to complete a thorough investigation. The commission, according to its own website, was granted access to each and every document that it requested to see.

While these two accounts - The 911 Commission Report and The Looming Tower - were borne out of a single event and seek to serve a similar purpose, they differ greatly in their approach and in the presentation of their findings. The 911 Commission Report offers a comprehensive look into the events leading up to September 11th. Yet, if one is to effectively understand the history, ideology and chain of events (and shortfalls) that led up to September 11th both "over here" and "over there," The Looming Tower is an indispensable tome if one is to have a complete 9/11 and al Qaeda salvo.

Analysis

In The Looming Tower, Lawrence Wright seeks to accomplish an intimated personal account of the formation of al Qaeda. By tracing the lineage of the organization back to Sayyid Qutb, Wright not only delves into the history of al Qaeda, but he also demonstrates numerous signposts missed by U.S. intelligence. The Looming Tower not only derives from a quote taken from the Qur'an, it also symbolizes the ominous event -"the Big Marriage" -- that was on the horizon for years, yet went unnoticed and unconnected by various American agencies.

Wright drills down on his thesis by tracing the history of al Qaeda back to its inception. Prior to doing so, however, he tells the story of Sayyid Qutb, the Egyptian ideologue who put down roots for what would eventually become the Muslim Brotherhood. Qutb was a staunch opponent of the Egyptian government, and would become even more influential posthumously. In his manifesto, Ma'alim fi-l-Tariq ("signposts along the way," or simply "Milestones"), Qutb puts forth that there is no such thing as Islam because in order to practice Islam you have to live in an Islamic society and in the modern world, such a society no longer exists. (Qutb, 1964, 90).

In Chapter two, Wright introduces Ayman al-Zawahiri. Dr. Zawahiri was an admirer of Sayyid Qutb. He worked with Sheikh Omar, and eventually went on to form al Jihad, the organization that contributed to the 1981 assassination of Anwar Sadat. Zawahiri was more focused on the internal enemies of Islam, such as Egypt, than the external or "far enemies" that would later consume Osama bin Laden.

Wright makes his first reference to Osama bin Laden in Chapter three, vis-à-vis the history of Osama's father, Muhammad bin Laden. The elder bin Laden was something of a construction hero to Muslims in general and Saudis in particular, due mainly to his reconstruction of the grand mosque. Muhammad bin Laden was of Yemeni descent and grew to be a very wealthy man thanks to his construction efforts within the kingdom. He had 57 sons, and Osama was the seventeenth of them.

Chapters four and five detail Osama bin Laden's military and financial involvement in the 1980s battle between Afghanistan and the Soviets. It was through this military success that bin Laden and his fledgling group gained its first real notoriety in the region. It was also this success that led bin Laden to approach the Soviets when Saddam Hussein pushed into Kuwait. Bin Laden felt as though his organization was strong enough to defend the Kingdom, and that there should be no need to invite the Americans to the Holy Land. Saudi Arabia refused bin Laden's offer, and the United States was instead invited to join the fight. This incident, along with America's subsequent perceived "occupation" of Saudi Arabia may have been responsible for pushing American to the top of bin Laden's objectives.

In Chapter six, Wright begins to detail the push-pull relationship that existed between Zawahiri's al-Jihad group and bin Laden's nascent al Qaeda. Eventually, bin Laden's group and its ambitions for large-scale jihad would absorb Zawahiri's more political group. Thus, on September 10th, 1988, al Qaeda was officially born. This time period also marks an irrevocable split between Osama bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam, who once served as a mentor to bin Laden. (Bergen, 2006, 74).

Wright goes on to point out that at the inception of al Qaeda, in or around 1988, America was not necessarily on the list of al Qaeda objectives. It seems as though the catalyst for America moving from an annoyance to enemy number one was its efforts to help Israel in Lebanon. To add insult to injury, America overstayed its welcome in the Saudi Kingdom after aiding Kuwait in its defense against the invasion by Saddam Hussein. As America became more of an occupying force in the land of the two holy mosques, we also became a lighting rod for anger, hatred, rage and revenge. Thus, many years of residue of United States foreign policies in the region landed America the top spot on al Qaeda's list of targets.

While Wright carefully details the history of al Qaeda, he also alludes to why it is so difficult for the United States to defend against it. The mistake of underestimating al Qaeda was a costly one before September 11th, and Wright cautions against making the same mistake twice. Al Qaeda is sometimes referred to as being broken and in retreat. In his article Is There Still a Terrorist Threat? The Myth of the Omnipresent Enemy, John Mueller argues that a lack of terrorist attacks in the United States since 9/11 equates to a diminished al Qaeda threat. According to Mueller, a lack of zealous terrorists in the United States coupled with a lack of proclivity to strike from abroad leads one to conclude that the threat al Qaeda once posed has lessened or disappeared. (Mueller, 2006). His forthcoming book entitled "Overblown" will postulate that September 11th actually diminished the threat of an al Qaeda sponsored attack in the United States because of the massive backlash against the organization. (Tierney, 2009).

The Department of Homeland Security does not seem to see it that way, stating that: "[t]oday's terrorists can strike at any place, at any time, and with virtually any weapon." Lawrence Wright's findings on al Qaeda seem to be more in line with Homeland Security's view, suggesting that the network is organized, inspiring, and universal in its reach. With the aid of globalization and technology, al Qaeda is able to reach out in search of like-minded radicalized Muslims who desire to join the movement in its grand jihad. (Hoffman, 2006). The organization truly serves as a "base of operation" or "foundation," from which a boundless, global Islamist revolution can be waged by eager would-be martyrs. In addition, al-Qaeda continues to exercise its core operational capabilities: "directing and implementing terrorist attacks, including perhaps the thwarted airline bombings, the 7/7 suicide bombings that occurred in London last July and the foiled 2004 plot to stage simultaneous suicide attacks on economic targets in lower Manhattan, Newark, New Jersey and Washington, D.C." (Hoffman, 2006).

One needs only to refer back to Wright's depictions of al Qaeda's two founders and front men, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, to recognize the organization as a stubborn, resilient, and patient group. Zawahiri and bin Laden share a relationship that is both harmonizing and symbiotic. Perhaps most importantly, they share a similar strategic vision of a global organization fueled by radical ideology, achieved through violent jihad, with the stated end goal of achieving a Muslim caliphate.

The Looming Tower does an excellent job of detailing the history of not only al Qaeda as an organization, but also as an ideology and a complex group of personalities, the sum of which may be greater than its parts. While it is difficult to find any fault with Wright's work, perhaps one criticism might be his focus on John O'Neill, the head of the FBI's counterterrorism field office in New York. O'Neill's story is certainly compelling and absolutely worthy of a place in Wright's book. However, he seems to become almost heroic throughout the work, and as such, similar counterparts (such as the CIA's Michael Scheuer), whose stories might be equally indispensable to the story, are glossed over or omitted. In addition, the emphasis on O'Neill seems to translate to a favorable view of the FBI. Wright's research undoubtedly led him to some of O'Neill's FBI colleagues, and as such, Wright was likely delivered an account through which the views of the CIA, NSA and other United States intelligence organizations are less than favorable. Wright's novel account of the two innermost figures in al-Qaeda and of the profound ideological currents and explosive dynamics that drove the 9/11 plot forward is somewhat distracted by the story of John O'Neill which, while interesting, would be perhaps better suited as a subplot.

Conclusion

Over nine years ago, the phrase "we have some planes" changed the world. In the search for answers as to who was behind the September 11th attacks, why the attacks were planned, and why America failed to prevent them, Lawrence Wright's Looming Tower is not only recommended, it is essential. While other works such as the 9/11 Commission Report present history, analysis, and recommendations, one would be remiss to pass over Wright's personality-driven narrative of those who were involved in September 11th.

While the book does seem to paint al Qaeda as a violent departure from the fundamental tenets of Islam, the book does not in any way demonize Islam. Perhaps due to Wright's unique understanding of and experience with Middle Eastern culture, Wright is cautious to present a historical account of al Qaeda and its ideology from a position of neutrality. Any negativity that Wright seems to cast is in the direction of the various United States agencies that missed the signals, or simply failed to appropriately share and connect them. Wright does not mince words in terms of agency infighting, turf wars, personality conflicts and information hoarding, especially insofar as any or all of these events might have prevented the September 11th attacks. Wright seems to be highlighting the fact that the United States not only failed to recognize the severity of the threat posed by al Qaeda, but also that its agencies were ham-handed when given the information to defend against it. The book also details al Qaeda as a complex, universal organization that should not be underestimated (again), dismissed as incapable, or believed to be defunct.

REFERENCES:

Bergen, Peter. (2006). The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda's Leader. Simon & Schuster, Inc.: New York.

Bernsten, Gary and Ralph Pelluzzo. (2005). Jawbreaker: The Attack of bin Laden and Al Qaeda: A Personal Account by the CIA's Field Commander. USA: Crown.

Carafano, James Jay, Ph.D. (July, 2004). What the 9/11 Commission Report Should Contain: Four Recommendations for Making America Safer. The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, No. 1778. Retrieved December 20, 2009 from http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache%3A15SssvDitYQJ%3Awww.heritage.org%2FResearch%2FHomelandSecurity%2Fupload%2F66356_1.pdf+carafano+what+the+911+commission+report&hl=en&gl=us&sig=AHIEtbS9S9AIPXxstAnBCpOl1MyM3Z8e4A&pli=1.

Clarke, Richard. (January, 2005). Ten Years Later, The Atlantic Monthly.

Filkins, Dexter. (August, 2006). The Plot Against America. The New York Times, retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/06/books/review/06filkins.html.

Flynn, Stephen E. (Jan/Feb. 2002). America the Vulnerable. Foreign Affairs. New York: Vol. 81, Iss. 1; pg. 60.

Hoffman, Bruce, (August, 2006). What Went Wrong? The Washington Post. Retrieved December 11, 2009 from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/24/AR2006082401147.html.

Lawrence Wright. www.lawrencewright.com

Kettl, Donald F. (2007). System Under Stress, 2nd Edition. CQ Press: Washington DC, Chapters 1-7.

Mueller, John. (September/October, 2006). Is There Still a Terrorist Threat? The Myth of the Omnipresent Enemy. Foreign Affairs. Retrieved December 11, 2009 from http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61911/john-mueller/is-there-still-a-terrorist-threat-the-myth-of-the-omnipresent-en.

Qutb, Sayyid. (1964). Ma'alim fi'l-Tariq (Signposts on the Road, or Milestones).

Recommendations for Making America Safer. The Heritage Foundation. Retrieved from http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/bg1778.cfm.

Tierney, John. (September, 2009). Waiting for al Qaeda. The New York Times. Retrieved December 11, 2009 from http://select.nytimes.com/2006/09/09/opinion/09tierney.html?_r=1.

Wright, Lawrence. (2006). The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11. Knopf: New York.

Wright, Lawrence. (September 16, 2002). The Man behind Bin Laden. The New Yorker. Retrieved December 14, 2009 from http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2002/09/16/020916fa_fact2.

Zakaria, Fareed. (2001). The Politics of Rage: Why do they hate us? Newsweek. Retrieved December 11, 2009 from http://www.fareedzakaria.com/ARTICLES/newsweek/101501_why.html.