Book Review: Robert Divine's Eisenhower and the Cold War

Since Dwight D. Eisenhower's presidency, historians and critics saw Eisenhower as a president who leaned on the expertise and actions of his subordinates, primarily Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, to achieve any domestic or foreign agenda. They saw him as someone who lucked into the White House through his role in World War II. Robert A. Divine disputes the stigmas of a lazy and lucky Eisenhower. Instead, Eisenhower and the Cold War embraces the contemporary view that Eisenhower had an active involvement in affairs, and Divine argues that thesis through four broad topics.

The book is divided into four parts: "Eisenhower and the Presidency", "Massive Retaliation and Asia", Eisenhower and the Middle East", and "Eisenhower and the Russians". The first chapter looks at Eisenhower's leadership in foreign policy, his complicated relationship with Dulles, and his activist role in settling the Korean War. The chapter also examines Eisenhower's personal qualities, such as his self-confidence and -worth. In the second part, Divine analyzes the stalemate between Chinese and American officials over the islands of Matsu and Quemoy. Once again, he points out Eisenhower's role in foreign affairs by his embrace of massive retaliation, which meant the potential use of nuclear weapons. Divine writes on page 65-66: "The beauty of Eisenhower's policy is that to this day no one can be sure whether or not he would have responded militarily to an invasion of the offshore islands, and whether he would have used nuclear weapons." In other words, Eisenhower introduced the idea of ambiguity into American foreign policy.

Eisenhower deals with the overthrow of the Iranian government, the Suez Canal Crisis, and the military intervention in Lebanon in chapter three. Divine points out the strained relations in the Middle East-something he attributes to our involvement in Iran. In the final chapter, Divine discusses the Cold War and its implications on the United States and the world as it pertains to how Eisenhower dealt with the Russians. He achieved a bilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. The chapter also analyzes Eisenhower's involvement in handling the Berlin affair and the U-2 incident. The latter, in which, he took the brunt of the blame.

Eisenhower and the Cold War rebukes the role of a lazy, incompetent president, and proves through the series of four chapters the active approach Eisenhower had on a foreign level. The author makes sure to reveal that just because Eisenhower had an active role did not mean his activity always translated into success, such Divine mentioning the long-term problems that resulted from the Iranian government overthrow.

While Divine proves his central thesis, he fails to exploit his ideas a step further, especially when it came to Dulles and Eisenhower. He explains in the first chapter their complex relationship, but who had more power when it pertained to foreign policymaking? Divine leaves that question unanswered; even though, it is close to his thesis. Divine's strength is staying away from overcomplicating events. Instead, he uses the events to prove his thesis, which makes for a direct and enjoyable read. Likewise, the chapters were long enough to provide convincing evidence, yet terse enough to keep the reader craving more.