Canadian Foreign Policy in the Post-Sept. 11 World

In the wake of the terrorist attacks on the United States that occurred on September 11, 2001, the Canadian government was confronted with the necessity of reassessing its domestic and foreign policies and practices. Given the long shared border with the United States, the generally positive relationship that the two countries have enjoyed over the years, and the degree to which the two countries' economic and geographical stability are intertwined, such a reassessment would be of vital significance to both countries. Any changes would also have a global impact, for whatever reforms or positions that Canada identified and implemented would send out ripple effects since Canada has long been considered a stable, consistent, and even predictable political player in world politics. Neufeld and Whitworth (1997) identify Canada's history and position in foreign policy as that of a "middle power" (p. 7), an "interposition force between conflicting parties" (p. 7). This position is characterized by the dynamic tension of Canada as a loyal ally and a loyal opposer, which, at least in Neufeld's and Whitworth's (1997) perspective, are not actually so different.

Despite the fact that the terrorist attacks were an unprecedented event for all North Americans to confront and respond to, Canada did not alter its foreign or domestic policies and practices radically in the aftermath. Unlike the United States in its swift implementation of a number of significant policy changes affecting nearly every aspect of society (workplace, educational, immigration and were just a few of the areas where policy changes aimed at preserving security) Canada did not take such fast action. In fact, Foreign Minister Graham and the Privy Council seemed so shell-shocked by the events that they failed to respond effectively for several years and it was not until relatively recently that policy solutions were put into place. They turned to the public in a series of town hall forums in an effort to gauge Canadians' sentiments and opinions about how the Canadian government should position future foreign policy. This act, while inclusive and thoughtful, lacked the direction and decisiveness that characterized the response of their southern neighbors. Neufeld and Whitworth (1997) criticize a Canadian policy that does little to fulfill the goal of social and global responsibility. Although their analytic framework was developed four years before the terrorist attacks, it can be applied effectively to help understand some of the concerns and debates surrounding the rather delayed policy and other reactions of Foreign Minister Graham's and the Privy Council's responses to the events of September 11.

Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, Foreign Minister Graham and the Privy Council indicated that while the terrorist events would have an inevitable impact on Canadian politics and economics, any response on the part of the Canadian government in terms of policy and practice would be approached slowly and cautiously. In other words, they wanted to wait for a while and gauge the situation as well as monitor the outcomes of other actions that had been taken in other areas, mostly notably in the United States. An application of the Neufeld and Whitworth framework would assess this wait-and-see response as lacking not only in political resolve, but in moral resolve as well and that it was not only socially responsible for swift action, but responsible in terms of the political and structural future as well. The Graham and Privy Council approach was largely passive, seemingly intended to gauge, over the course of time, exactly how September 11 would impact the Canadian economy before any counteractive measure were to be taken. The approach also allowed time to discern how the United States, which had suddenly turned towards security concerns rather than fiscal ones, would implement its own policy and practice changes that might impact Canada directly, namely through changing border and transportation regulations. This approach might be characterized, then, as reactive rather than proactive. Indeed, according to Neufeld and Whitworth (1997), this stance has been more or less typical of Canada's foreign policy throughout its history, even in the case of events that do not carry such world-changing consequences.

Neufeld and Whitworth (1997) offer a concise but comprehensive consideration of Canada's history of foreign affairs engagement, and note that Canada's modus operandi in foreign relations is to play a "middle power" role (p. 7). Part peacekeeper, part mediator, Canada avoids instigating or contributing directly to conflicts, but becomes involved in responding to conflicts in one of two ways. The first way is a paradigmatic practice that Neufeld and Whitworth (1997) describe as the loyal supporter. The support, of course, is mostly loyal to the United States, the country with which Canada most closely aligns its political, social, and economic concerns. At the same time, however, Canada does not want to appear too supportive of the United States' own policy initiatives and practice interventions, particularly in a situation as politically and religiously charged as September 11 and the response of the War on Iraq. In this sense, then, Canada plays the role of loyal opposer. It publicly criticizes some of its ally's decisions and actions, but is careful to restrict itself from being so critical that it is perceived as disloyal. While this kind of passive action keeps Canada from incurring hostility or open criticism from other nations (particularly to degree this is the case in the United States) it is not always the best political or policy-related decision for Canada in the long run.

These two positions may seem diametrically opposed, but they are not. In fact, strategically speaking, they are inherently compatible and they have been the strategies that Canada has employed successfully for years. The loyal ally and the loyal opposer are really just two sides of the same coin. As Neufeld and Whitworth (1997) explain, this foreign policy strategy is a "mix of behind-the-scenes support and occasional public questioning-albeit, always within limits...." (p. 6). It is the "within limits" (p. 6) part of the equation that Neufeld and Whitworth (1997) find so problematic. Clearly, the utilization of this strategy is an effort to protect Canada's own domestic interests, particularly economic ones. As Neufeld and Whitworth (1997) point out, "the government has announced that that the first objective in foreign policy decisions must be the extent to which they promote prosperity and employment within Canada" (p. 7). Nonetheless, Neufeld and Whitworth (1997) would be likely to contend that such a strategy lacks ethical and moral soundness, for it avoids Canada's responsibility to itself and to the rest of the world to articulate its opinions and back them up with action. Instead, the strategy is founded on an unsound concept: that Canada must temper what it says and what it does so as not to offend its neighbor to the south, with whom the country's past and its future are so intertwined. While this passive role is thought to be somewhat irresponsible, it must be remembered at all times that much of the economic security Canada enjoys depends, at least a rather large way, on its support and continued positive relations with the United States.

Neufeld and Whitworth (1997) offer a number of examples about the ways in which this paradoxical strategy have had negative consequences both for Canada and for countries throughout the world, thereby exposing incongruencies and inconsistencies between what Canada says it stands for philosophically and ideologically and what it actually supports and embodies. Consider, for instance, that Canada is the seventh-largest supplier of weapons to Third World Nations (Neufeld & Whitworth, 1997). If Canada is so supportive of the notion of peace, is not such an action hypocritical and in direct conflict with the role that the country plays in so many conflict and peace operations around the globe? The obvious answer is "Yes"; however, Neufeld and Whitworth (1997) explain how the complex demands of various stakeholder groups influence the emergence of such discrepancies. In addition to the pressing need to maintain a harmonious relationship with the United States, Neufeld and Whitworth (1997) explain how the Canadian government is also subject to other individuals and interest groups. Canadian business interests, for example, are also becoming an increasingly important stakeholder to placate when crafting foreign policy and practice. As Neufeld and Whitworth (1997) write, The "seamier side of Canada's foreign policy" (p. 12) involves the influence wielded by Canadian business interests and the degree to which they shape Canada's foreign policy (p. 12). "The Canadian state... has sought and continues to seek to promote the interests of Canada's business elites" (p. 12).

Such dynamics further complicate the possibilities of articulating and implementing a clear and decisive foreign policy. One might expect that the fact that September 11 was such an anachronistic event might have jolted this dualistic foreign policy paradigm significantly, but such was not the case. It is difficult to counter years of history and dominant ideologies and practices, even in the wake of cataclysmic events that seem to demand change. Again, Neufeld's and Whitworth's (1997) observations become almost prophetic. They contended that Canada has historically seen itself in a fixed, inalterable position: "too small to be a great power, too big to be marginal" (p. 7). This self-perception persists in the twenty-first century, despite radical changes in the political, social, and economic environments. The "too small- too big" dilemma has had serious foreign policy implications as well as attendant domestic consequences, particularly as the United States' identity as the supreme hegemonic power has been "declining" (Neufeld & Whitworth, 1997, p. 8). This condition of contemporary world politics means that "the role of the middle powers is ... in flux" (Neufeld & Whitworth, p. 8).

In the post- 9/11 world, where politics and economics and international relationships are not what they once were, it seems that Foreign Minister Graham and the Privy Council are willing to acknowledge that Canada's domestic and foreign policies and practices needs to change. This is especially true with respect to "free trade, government cutbacks, and militarism", which must be changed "at home" before they can affect foreign policy positively (Neufeld & Whitworth, p. 12). Nevertheless, Graham and the Privy Council remain uncertain and unresolved as to just exactly what the changes will be and how they should be implemented. The Canadian people seem to be almost as ambivalent as their leaders, lacking clarity about how Canada can maintain cordial relationships with other countries that so flagrantly violate international norms of peace and political justice. Canada remains fearful of changing its time-worn foreign policy stance because it anticipates a "loss of influence" and favored nation status with the United States (Neufeld & Whitworth, 1997, p. 12). While it has spoken up against some of the United States' foreign policies and practices since September 11, such "'loyal opposition' does not go far enough in demarcating Canadian foreign policy from an unjust and violence-prone status quo" (Neufeld & Whitworth, 1997, p. 11).

This Janus-faced role of Canada as loyal ally and loyal opposition is too limiting for 21^st century foreign policy. As Neufeld and Whitworth (1997) warn, these "two images [of loyal ally and loyal opposition] prescribe very limited roles for the Canadian state in critiquing the existing international order" (p. 12). The alternative that Neufeld and Whitworth (1997) offer is intended "not to maintain the system, but to help to transform it" (p. 12).

References

Neufeld, M., & Whitworth, S. (1997). Imag(in)ing Canadian foreign policy. UnderstandingCanada: Building on the new Canadian political economy. ed. Wallace Clement. 197-214. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.