Carl Schmitt on the Difference Between Parliamentarism and Democracy

"Parliamentary democracy" is a common phrase which has come to closely link its two constituent words. However, in The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, Carl Schmitt contends that the phrase is a contradiction, and that parliamentarism and democracy represent two entirely different political systems.

Parliamentarism predicates on the centuries-old justification that the people must decide in their entirety how to be governed. Because it is no longer possible for all to convene and decide on community issues, parliament forms a committee for the people, and in turn government forms a committee of parliament.[1] Parliamentarism's chief claim to legitimacy resides in discussion and openness. Laws do not arise from conflicts of interests, but from conflicts of opinion, in which rational and disinterested debate prevail among open minds. In this context, the notion of the representative of acting on behalf of the whole people and not an interest group, guarantees of free speech, and publicized political discourse become sensible components of parliamentarism. However, this element of deliberation requires no talk of democracy (as defined by Schmitt) because it is focused on truth-seeking, which does not necessarily require any democratic input. There is no valid reason why, then, truth cannot be sought by a single or small group of persons. Parliamentarism also appeals to a "general equality" of mankind in order to justify the political rights it confers to its citizens (i.e. "mass democracy")[2]. This, in fact, is not democracy, but a particular kind of liberalism.

In many senses, democracy is significantly different from parliamentarism. Schmitt draws this distinction principally along the lines of the existence of "the people," who, in democracy, are identical with the state: "the essence of the democratic principle ... namely, the assertion of an identity between law and the people's will."[3] In contrast to the universal inclusion of parliamentarism, a fundamental requirement of democracy is a substantive form of homogeneity, followed by the elimination of heterogeneity, if necessary. "Every actual democracy rests on the principle that not only are equals equal but unequals will not be treated equally." [4] This equality can be found in particular physical or moral attributes, whether it is religious convictions, civic virtue, or ethnic origin. A good democracy, as such, has the capability of halting anything which may threaten its homogeneity. Furthermore, not all the persons residing under the state need possess this equality in order for them to be dependent on democratic government; the British Empire and the Athenian city democracy are two examples of democratic states with governance over vast, non-citizen populations. Schmitt disputes the validity of the "universal" form of equality expressed in parliamentarism: such equality is meaningless because there is no possibility of inequality (in a way, this is an objection rooted in a "contrast" theory of meaning).

Though there is some kind of "human" equality expressed in modern democratic states, there is still a strong element of national homogeneity emphasized by the exclusion of outsiders from enjoyment of such equality. The position of parliamentarism tends to mix tendencies toward rights for restricted, homogeneous groups, with the universal rights entailed by liberalism. Democracy can thus be understood as the logically pure form of such recognition of a given homogeneity, untainted by the contradictory elements of parliamentarism. In this pure form, democracy is also an abstract kind of system: it is merely a statement of the source of power as being derived from the people, not a delineation of a specific political reality. This sets it distinctly apart from parliamentarism, which itself is a prescription of many particular political realities.

Source: Schmitt, Carl. The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy. Translated by Ellen Kennedy. (MIT Press, 1988). Original publication: 1923, 2nd ed. 1926.

[1] Schmitt, 34

[2] Schmitt, 15.

[3] Schmitt, 26.

[4] Schmitt, 9.