China's Three Kingdoms: Cao Cao's Influence on Jin's Reunification

The Three Kingdoms Period in Chinese history is a topic that invites much scholarship and popular interest. Many books, movies, TV series, and even video games have been created about this time. However, most of the accounts do not accurately portray the socioeconomic, political, and military differences between the three states, and do not adequately justify Wei's conquest of Shu and Wei's successor regime Jin's conquest of Wu within a relatively short amount of time. Based on various sources, the public is led to believe that the concept of "san guo ding li", a tripartite balanced structure of political stability, carried through for much of this time (Luoyang Travel Agency). While the novel by Luo Guanzhong and subsequent works portrayed the Shu as the legitimate successor to the Han, and the Wu as a wealthy maritime state, both these states' capabilities have been much exaggerated. One can conclude that Jin's success in reunifying China was threefold: Cao Cao's political, economic, and military policies, a natural resource and population superiority, and the comparative decline of the two rival states

The decline of the central government and the rise of regional warlords laid the foundations for the Three Kingdoms and its tripartite balance of power. Most histories acknowledge the Yellow Turban Rebellion of 184 AD as the traditional end of the Han Dynasty (de Crespigny, sec. 1). The massive popular uprising, along with natural disasters, seriously weakened the empire, and allowed for local warlords to take advantage of the power vacuum left by the increasingly compromised central state. What emerged was a continual cycle of regional warlords scattered across the country, seizing upon this opportunity to expand personal strength, followers, and territories, rather than work towards the stated goals of helping the empire regain control (Chen Shou). While by itself, the revolt was not fatal for the imperial government, the combination of personal ambition mixed with accumulating military power in the local warlords and the incompetence of Emperor Ling laid the roots for a long and protracted civil war. One can make the argument that Dong Zhuo initiated the chain of events that rapidly deteriorated Han power. A frontier general who had fought the Yellow Turbans, Dong Zhuo seized Luoyang for himself, putting into place his own puppet Emperor Xian in 190 AD. History's poor impression of him was not far off from the truth, for Dong Zhuo's practices, added to a record of cruelty, arbitrary brutality, and poor administration, turned many warlords throughout China against him. Despite his death at the hands of his adopted son Lu Bu within 2 years, Dong Zhuo set a pattern that decentralized power across the country, and fueled the flames for a nationwide civil war (Republican China). Within several years, ambitious generals like Yuan Shao, Cao Cao, and Sun Ce, all possessed with martial ability, had split up China and set the political atmosphere for the Three Kingdoms.

Political Advantages: the Mandate of Heaven and Internal Reform

While most of these warlords were motivated by personal ambitions for wealth and power, few of them shared the ability Cao Cao had for statecraft (Chen Shou). Ultimately, it was through his efforts that allowed the Wei to build up such a massive advantage by the time the situation had solidified into the tripartite equilibrium. One of the most important aspects of Cao Cao's success came with the support of the throne. In keeping Emperor Xian as a figurehead and protecting his status, there came a certain strategic advantage with the titular authority and the Mandate of Heaven, still believed to rest with the Han's return to strength (Chen Shou). The support of the imperial bureaucracy gave a large boost to the administration of the north central China region. Cao's mastery of politics enabled him to remain a step ahead of court intrigue, with minimal interference from imperial figures. With imperial authority in hand, Cao possessed, at least on paper, legitimate authority for command, a significant advantage in the three-way struggle for the throne later on. Cao Cao, and his successor, Cao Pi, had also introduced the jiupin system of appointments, which served to eliminate much of the bureaucratic excess characteristic of Chinese government at the time, and secured ties between local and central administration. While the results of this were mixed, and many aristocrats and officials simply used this as a tool for personal interest, this was a distinct step up, for no other state in the tripartite division of China had introduced such measures at this time (de Crespigny, sec. 2).

Economic Advantages: Tuntian's Impact

Yet perhaps most importantly, it came down to a matter of economics, human/resource management, and production. As China remained a subsistence farming state, and military operations continue to rely on the produce of farmers for supply and the farmers themselves for the manpower, agricultural reform was crucial in changing the logistical balance (Hook and Twitchett 158). The implementation of the tuntian system was to prove decisive in Wei's expansion and strength. Under the tuntian system, soldiers, peasants, and refugees were incorporated into a large public farming program, being provided with the necessary agricultural tools at low prices, and in turn providing some of the crops for the government. In a time of great chaos and large refugee populations, this alleviated the pressures on local infrastructure, while providing a measure of stability. The immediate advantages were threefold. Not only did production skyrocket from the increased labor and land distribution, but the masses of displaced people were converted into loyal subjects instead of potential rebels, and the abandoned land that had become a normal feature of the unrest of the time was once again worked (Speedylook Encyclopedia). Introduced first in the Western Han, Cao Cao's implementation of the tuntian system had a vast and lasting impact on the Wei economic structure, strengthening it enormously much like Shang Yang's reforms did to the Qin state in the 4th century BC. By securing a supply and agricultural base in northern China under this policy of agricultural subsidization, the Cao military was thus more capable of launching long range offensives and protracted operations (de Crespigny, sec. 2). The consolidation of northern China contained the ingredients for the eventual consolidation of China itself.

Military Advantages: Cao Wei's Decisive Manpower Advantage and Reorganization

It is central to focus upon Cao Cao's military reorganization and mobilization of the state as fundamental pillars of eventual success for the Wei/Jin. Cao Cao's decisive victory over Yuan Shao at Guandu in 200 and in the following campaigns in the north against his successors was to prove central to this numbers game. In defeating the Yuan clan, he secured unilateral leadership of the Northern provinces, combining the population resources and manpower base with the numerous scattered regional militaries in disarray with the onset of civil war (de Crespigny, sec. 1). By absorbing hundreds and thousands of captured rebels from the Yellow Turban cause, and integrating them into the tuntian arrangement, Cao essentially inherited a massive standing army which was experienced and ready for battle (Republican China). His adoption of Han military organization, which was constituted by centralized authority over a professional army held in reserve and larger regional armies, brought many back to familiar territory, and helped the preparation for years of long campaigning (Luoyang Travel Agency). Previously, with Cao Cao's personal retinue, along with his family and close friends, numbered no more a few thousand, and operations were limited by the time of the year and natural conditions (de Crespigny, sec. 2) With the annexation of Yuan Shao's army and reforms both in society and in military administration, this force swelled to hundreds of thousands.

The standard Chinese military structure at this time was still very primitive. During this time, feudal military organization remained the norm rather than the exception. Leaders and wealthy landowners had private military retainers, complete with a traveling camp of followers, which included merchants, women, prostitutes, and the like. Naturally, military recruitment and expansion continued, as de Crespigny describes, in a "ramshackle pattern" (sec. 1). Indeed, as the Romance of the Three Kingdoms suggests, individual courage and exceptional martial skill was greatly prized. While these accounts may have been exaggerated to a certain extent, breakthroughs and tactical victories depended on small unit action, often centered around the leadership on a charismatic and skillful leader (de Crespigny, sec. 1). As Lanchester's linear laws suggest, numerical advantage at a certain point in a line, regardless of superiority or concentration of firepower, would determine the victor. With un-aimed weapons such as lances, spears, and swords, where one infantryman is only able to engage his counterpart and so would continue the pattern for the rest of the battlefield, the casualties merely a factor of calculation between the numerically superior and inferior armies. Under these conditions, qualitative advantages were mostly negated and quantitative weight was seen as the most decisive factor in the consideration for strategic victory (Adams).

The population base of the Wei state was a key ingredient to creating this large army. While Luo Guanzhong's novel suggests figures of 800,000 to 1,000,000 or so at Red Cliff in 208, real estimates put Cao Cao's army at somewhere around 220,000-240,000, against a combined Liu-Sun force of maybe 50,000 (Yang 15-16). Of the territory left by the Han Dynasty, nine of the thirteen provinces belonged to the Wei. This was constituted by what is today Henan, Hebei, Shandong, Shanxi, as well as parts of Manchuria, Gansu, Anhui, Hubei, and Jiangsu (Yang 19-20). The population of the Northern provinces also far exceeded the Shu and the Wu as well. Based on both the Eastern Han and the Jin registers, 70% of the Chinese population resided within Wei borders (de Crespigny, sec. 1-3). Although both figures have large differences on the total household and population numbers, possibly due to the loss of government control during this period, it was clear that Cao Wei possessed a massive manpower advantage. At the time of the formal accession of the Jin Dynasty and the surrender of the Wu, the former Wei state numbered 4.4 million (de Crespigny, sec. 2). Thus it was no surprise that the massive superiority in numbers played a decisive role during battles and campaigns.

The Rival States

The other two kingdoms enjoyed neither the natural benefits nor the reforms brought about by its leadership. In contrast to the Cao Wei state, the Wu kingdom, under the Sun family, had only one major discernible advantage. Commonly famous for possessing "di li", or the power of terrain, Sun Quan's Eastern Wu occupied most of southeast China, in what is today Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Jiangxi, Hunan, and shared parts of Jiangsu, Anhui, Hubei, Guangxi, as well as Vietnam (Yang 19). This kingdom was unique in that it sparked commercial and economic growth in South China, a gradual transition of wealth from north to south that continued into modern day. Protected by the Huai River, and the lower Yangzi, Wu enjoyed an excellent defensive position, one which it would use to great success in the first few decades. Focused on coastal warfare, the unique amphibious abilities of the Wu were put to good use along the Yangzi, a barrier that would protect the Wu state as long as they held control of the waterways. However, despite great military leaders like Zhou Yu and a strong navy, Eastern Wu could not compare to the Wei in terms of resources or manpower. The Sun clan, once a family of ambitious military entrepreneurs, was gradually forced to the defensive in response to the Wei, first led by the Cao family, and then the Sima family. At the time of surrender to the Jin Dynasty in 280 AD, the population numbered 2.3 million, with a tenth of those under arms, no match in the long run for the neighbors north of the Yangzi (de Crespigny, sec. 2).

Like the Wu, the Shu also suffered from a dearth of human and natural resources. Only having firm control over the Sichuan province, with a population at the time of surrender numbering less than a million and without any natural defenses, Liu Bei was hard pressed to make any real challenge to the established order (Yang 19). From a popular perspective, especially with the massive influence of the Romance of the Three Kingdoms, Shu Han was seen as the legitimate successor to the throne, as the inheritor of all things good with the Han, and the "centre of wisdom, courage and loyalty" (de Crespigny, sec. 2). Indeed, figures like Zhuge Liang, Guan Yu, and Zhang Fei had, after all, become folk heroes and attained legendary status in East Asian culture. Zhuge Liang, exaggerated by accounts in the Romance of the Three Kingdoms, had evolved into the embodiment of military strategy itself. The fictionalized stories of his genius at Red Cliff, the multiple stratagems he had employed against Cao Cao's forces time and time again, as well as his magnanimity towards his fallen foes, won over popular imagination (Chen Shou). While the real Zhuge Liang was certainly a very capable administrator and grand strategist, he was certainly no miracle worker, evidenced in his limited success in warfare after Liu Bei's death (Yang 7-16; Chen Shou). The Shu, with its already limited resources, wasted men and time against the Wu in an effort to avenge Guan Yu, and furthermore, exhausted much of its energy in futile expeditions against the Wei in the north under the command of Zhuge Liang (Chen Shou). Unlike the Wu, which benefited from economic expansion and colonial development, Liu Bei and his inept son, Liu Shan, did not take advantage of the human and natural resources they did obtain, nor did they maintain a strong civil administrative presence. Even Zhuge Liang was unable to change this (Yang 12). The failure of policy, leadership, and execution placed them in the worst position of all three. One can sum up the Shu-Han as "a warlord enterprise in a provincial state, and it never became anything more" (de Crespigny, sec. 2).

The Long Road to Victory

The conquest of Shu and Wu took many years to complete, not without setbacks for the Wei side. In the Battle of Red Cliff, allied Wu and Shu forces managed to hold off a numerically superior army commanded by Cao Cao, changing the fortunes for the future half century. Despite a massive advantage in numbers, Cao Cao was unable to capitalize on the relative strength of his position, and was forced to abandon his immediate plans for the reunification of China. Attacked by fire and burdened by the lack of experience with naval affairs, Cao Cao's troops suffered a calamitous defeat at the hands of Zhou Yu, who might possibly have had a chance to end the war at that very point had he pursued any further on the heels of the routed Cao army (Yang 15-16). This, de Crespigny suggests, marked the transition between a rapid reunification under the northern armies and a long, drawn-out triumvirate balance of power. Without the naval base at Jiangling, which sat at a strategic juncture in the Yangzi, the Wei did not have a chance to control the river which would've allowed them the transportation of men and supplies into Wu itself. By allying with one another, Liu Bei and Sun Quan formed a working partnership that sought to delay the conquest by the Wei, and even to change the eventual outcome of the empire (de Crespigny, sec. 1).

Yet put into perspective of grand strategy and against the calculations of sheer numbers, the outcome was never really in the balance as time wore on. Shu-Han was the first to feel the effects of attrition. Its architect of victory, Zhuge Liang, died in 234 AD, exhausted from his futile Northern Expeditions, and left a Shu state in disarray, without the same kind of leadership that Liu Bei and he had provided. While under Zhuge Liang the Shu state committed most of its troops regularly in offensive operations against the Wei or the southern tribes, the Wei was never seriously threatened from its strategic position (Chen Shou). Jiang Wei's attempts to continue Zhuge Liang's legacy of taking the offense against Cao Wei further drained supplies, so that even when successful in the field, the Shu Han forces were forced to withdraw from logistical problems. When Deng Ai and Zhong Hui launched a multi-front offensive in the fall of 263 AD, a combination of surprise and incompetence on the part of Shu generals and its emperor Liu Shan had forced total capitulation by November of the same year. The same ignominious end lay in wait for Eastern Wu, albeit under a different regime and with a set of different circumstances (de Crespigny, sec. 2).

By the time the Jin Dynasty was established by Sima Yan in 265 AD, the seeds of victory had already been sown by previous generations in the Cao Wei state. While the switch from Jin to Wei was more than just nominal, the foundations erected by Cao Cao and his family were to prove fundamental to the reunification of China. The Sima family did not possess the same military ambition that the Cao family enjoyed in such great quantities, yet it compensated for that in matters of state. In consolidating the support of elites and powerful families in the Wei, the Sima clan asserted itself as the natural replacement of the Cao family that it now viewed as arrogant, outdated, and "without sympathy for the true leaders of the community" (de Crespigny, sec. 2-3). Despite the Sima family's apparent disregard for the later descendants of Cao Cao, they continued to maintain the same structures and policies implemented since the end of the last century, aware of the significance of the preparations made by Cao Cao. Whereas in 265, the numerical advantage was overwhelming in the three pronged offensive into the territory of the Shu-Han, the conquest of the Wu presented a problem with a more difficult solution. Facing powerful natural defenses, the victorious Sima clan had turned to the question of achieving naval supremacy, ordering a massive naval construction program as early as the final Shu-Han campaign. While the Jin was developing a strong navy capable of overcoming the Wu's maritime forces as early as 262, Sun Quan's descendants were preoccupied with questions of succession and a desire to maintain their wealth. Even before Sun Quan's death in 253 AD, factional infighting had crippled governmental authority in the kingdom of Wu, and each successive generation was unable to restore the position that their founder and ancestor had propelled them to (de Crespigny, sec. 3).

Instead of an agricultural military state that Cao Cao had produced, and a rogue military enterprise Liu Bei had founded, Sun Wu gradually transformed from a state characterized by aggressive opportunism and active military operations into one whose leaders were motivated more by wealthy, authority, and the desire to maintain the status quo in pursuit of the aforementioned goals (Fairbank and Twitchett, 159). Sun Hao's reign proved particularly disastrous for the kingdom, and like Liu Shan in 263, he underestimated the Sima willingness to seize the initiative and reunify the country, and thus did little to defend against the imminent offensive. Faced with a navy now superior to theirs, and enveloped from the newly conquered western provinces as well, Wu capitulated in 280, surrendering after a three month campaign on both water and land that saw a demoralized Wu military rapidly collapse and Jianye, the capital of Wu, falling in May of that same year. China, after a century of turmoil, civil war, and rival empires, was finally united under a single emperor, albeit of Sima lineage (de Crespigny, sec. 3).

Conclusion: Cao Cao's Legacy

In closing, the foundations of this final triumph lay in Cao Wei's natural and prepared advantages. As Twitchett and Hook mentioned, warlord magnate combinations of generals and military entrepreneurs with scholar-officials were the norm rather than the exception and this structure characterized most of China during this century of civil war (158). However, Cao Wei's efforts marked a noted departure from this trend, and set the course for a more organized system of statehood and government, widening the gap of strength led by Cao Cao. Northern Wei's large population figures almost doubled the other two states' combined sum, and through the early campaigns of Cao Cao to establish a firm grasp in the north, military manpower was even further increased. The ability to field half a million men at this stage in history is impressive, and gives testament to the success of the tuntian system, whose agricultural military garrisons throughout the Wei empire provided not only men and supplies, but a base for extended operations, and also solved the potentially disastrous refugee situation. His management of initial campaigning against northern warlords like Dong Zhuo, Lu Bu, and Yuan Shao cemented his military strength and strategic position. Cao Cao's support of the Han throne, which secured the nominal official legitimacy, along with the adoption of the Han military organization and the reorganization of the civil service, further capitalized upon the circumstances Wei was placed in at the time (Hook and Twitchett 158). Indeed, instead of bemoaning the failure of Wei to secure a quick victory in the civil war, one should appreciate the work that Cao Cao had accomplished to put them in such a position in the first place in spite of all the difficulties, something that Chen Shou actively acknowledges in Records of the Three Kingdoms, giving him the title of the Grand Ancestor (Chen Shou).

In contrast, both Shu and Wu lacked the leadership in the later years to make full use of their resources, as factionalism, court intrigue, and a lack of consistency hamstrung their already comparatively weak states, factors which only hastened their imminent conquest. The Stories from Chinese History's volume on this period concludes, "Whether we consider land, production or population, Wei was the largest with the most and Shu was the smallest with the least" (Yang 20). While one can make Luo Guanzhong's case for individual bravery and excellent leadership among these two kingdoms to compensate for the inherited disadvantages, they were certainly no superior to that of Wei and Jin regime, for they had, despite legends extolling their prowess and genius, achieved little to prevent their defeat (de Crespigny, sec. 2). On the other hand, Sima Yi was just as capable of an administrator and general as Cao Cao had been, following with consistency and competence in the later Wei and Jin years to preserve the might that had been amassed for final victory (de Crespigny, sec. 3).

As Chen Shou, translated by Loder, writes, "the Great Ancestor devised a stratagem for castigating the empire and to take hold and demonstrate the laws and standards of Shang [Yang], and the breadth of Han and Bai's exceptional plans." Although he did not live to see the fruit of his efforts, dying in 220 AD of a brain tumor, nevertheless it was clear "that he was the most outstanding person of his time," a worthy acclaim upon the man who engineered China's reunification. His efforts early on provide organization and structure to the military, economy, and society, the natural advantages of population and resources enjoyed by the North, and the decline of the other two powers secured the Jin Dynasty ultimate victory in reunifying China.

Works Cited

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Chen Shou. "Cao Cao (Mengde)." Sanguozhi Officer Biographies. Trans. Adrian Loder. 2006. Kongming's Archives. 17 Nov 2008.

Chen Shou. "Zhuge Liang (Kongminh)." Sanguozhi Officer Biographies. Trans. Jack Yuan. 2002. Kongming's Archives. 17 Nov 2008.

De Crespigny, Rafe. "The Three Kingdoms and Western Jin: A History of China in the Third Century AD." Rafe de Crespigny Publications. Nov 2003. Australian National University. 17 Nov 2008.

Fairbank, John, and Denis Twitchett. The Cambridge History of China. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. 15 vols.

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Yang Ju-pin. Stories from Chinese History: Three Kingdoms Period and the Wei and Chin Dynasties. Trans. William Nienhauser. Taipei: The Overseas Chinese Library, 1993.