Clash of Civilizations: The West and the Middle East

Edward Said's book Orientalism is at once a work that challenges the status-quo of writings on the Middle East, and the Asian continent at large. To Said, "Orientalism" is more than an academic discipline; it is the "corporate institution for dealing with the Orient...As a western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient.[1]" This is his critical indictment of the false notions of Western superiority and suspect scholarship that seems to perpetuate racist theories used by imperialists to justify the occupation of non-European colonies which comprises the vertebral argumentation of his book. Patrick O'Brein's article "The Costs and Benefits of British Imperialism, 1846-1914" adds his voice to Said's contention that the rationale behind British imperialism is essentially based upon assumptions that are, at best, delusional[2].

But where Said attacks imperialism on the grounds that it was socially and culturally ignorant in its assumptions, O'Brein argues that it was economically irrational. In his article, O'Brein contends that the British Empire had made an incalculable mistake in leveraging direct control over other territories and that it would have been more profitable in maintaining trade with independent countries rather than in expending the costs of maintaining an empire through military means[3]. Both Said and O'Brein engage in controversial exercises of academic analysis of history, but fail to address one fundamental gap in their theories: how is it that a culturally, socially, and economically delusional "Western" society was able to succeed for so long? If the assumptions of Western power and economy were so faulty, then why were they so effective? The question has become not whether these works are valid or not, but what use can they be in the scholarly debate over Western Imperialism and its legacy. That is the purpose of this paper; to examine the different works and debates surrounding them and ascertain how they contribute to change over time.

Edward Said opens his critique of Western scholarship about Asia with a definition of "Orientalism" as he sees it. To him, "Orientalism" is not just a scholarly discipline, but a "corporate institution for dealing with the Orient"[4] as well as a way of defining the "Occidental" by comparison with the "Oriental"[5] - in other words, a way by which European "us" is defined through negative Oriental "them" in every aspect from morals to intelligence to evolutionary standing. In fact, Said credits Orientalism with a flexibility of its theories (with Europeans never losing superiority in the relationship) that allowed European culture to extend its hegemony beyond its borders and into the Orient. Beyond that acknowledgment though, Said is immensely critical of those who attempt to learn about the Orient. Said writes:

"No one has ever derived a method for detaching the scholar from the circumstances of life..." "For a European of American studying the Orient there can be no disclaiming the main circumstances of his actuality. That he comes up against the Orient as a European or American first, as an individual second. And to be a European or American in such a situation is by no means an inert fact. It meant and means being aware, however dimly, that one belongs to a power with definite interests in the Orient, and more important, that one belongs to a part of the earth with a definite history of involvement in the Orient almost since the time of Homer.[6]"

It is Said's contention here that, no matter how well intentioned the scholar of the Orient may be, he or she is always operating from a sense of superiority when interacting with, speaking about, or studying the Orient. The point to note here is that Said would link the West inextricably and in an unbroken chain with ancient authors and philosophers, forgetting that for several hundred years, the works of such persons had been simultaneously "lost" to Europeans while read, commented upon, and expanded by Arab (and thus Oriental) scholars. It was not until the late 12^th century C.E. that the cultural apparatus was in place in Europe for the inclusion and analysis of these works, and that they were only gained through translations by Arab-speaking scholars that Europeans were able to read the works of Homer, Plato, and Euclid[7]. Such assumptions and misapprehensions about the continuity of European civilization serve only to weaken Said's premise, for if he is wrong in this assumption, then he can be equally mistaken on other points.

Said's argumentation becomes even more problematic as he returns again and gain to the premise of Western culture proceeding in an unbroken line from Homer to Henry Kissinger[8]. However, Said's argument is also based upon the post-structuralist premise that it is essentially impossible for one person of a certain time and culture to understand the true meaning of the words of another time and place[9] and simply devolves into a "system for citing works and authors.[10]" Clearly, Said's book - and indeed entire premise of this point - is based upon a post-structuralist argument of the innate fallibility of understanding the written word. For illustration of Western folly in attempting to understand the Orient, he uses the satire of Fabrice Del Dongo's search for the battle of Waterloo, which he read in a book and wants to see for himself, not realizing that the event took place in the past[11]. While an amusing sideline, it raises another question about the value of Said's premise, for if he is a Palestinian, is he able to truly understand European culture because of his "outsider" status? Or is he more of an Occidental, since his education is British and his tenure American and therefore can not truly understand Oriental culture? Much of the literature and history of "Orientalism", Said further argues, is based upon the mistaken belief that the "'East' has always signified danger and threat...[12]" to European culture, first as Persians and lately as Russians. Additionally, Said's incorporates literary work such as The Song of Roland, The Persians by Aeschypalus as well as other literary works as evidence of the European proclivity to demonize the Oriental. This type of argumentation flounders because it fails to take into account the mindset of the time, the proclivity of all cultures to demonize other cultures, and presents the Franks - and by extension, Christianity - as a monolithic, unified force that can adequately represent all of European culture. For instance, while Charlemagne's invasion of the Iberian Peninsula is the setting for The Song of Roland, Charlemagne also campaigned against non-Christians in Saxony far more often than he ever engaged Muslim forces. Furthermore, Europeans in the form of Basques also are demonized in The Song of Roland, as is Ganelon for they conspire with outside forces (the Orientals) against the Franks (not all Europeans, as Said asserts).

Despite these gaps in argumentation, Said's book does offer some value in its critique of (for lack of a better term) "old school" mentality of corporate Orientalism. Balfour and Cromer[13], as cited in Said's book, were not speaking entirely out of school about scholarly attitudes about Oriental societies, and in fact many scholars of the day bought into and expanded upon the pseudo-scientific principles of social Darwinism in order to define the British, French or American civilization as superior. Those attitudes continued well into the 20^th century, and were often used in misguided foreign policy decisions in America, France and Great Britain. Said's work, though not on the cutting edge, was perhaps the most visible component of the shift in attitude by next generation Asian and Middle Eastern scholars who saw their areas of study not as something to dissect and analyze in a dispassionate manner, but as a culture worthy of respect which had something of value and worth that could be learned by immersion in the culture. Today, and even in the day that Edward Said's book was published, exchange and Foreign Language Abroad Studies programs were taking place which immersed the student of the region in the cultures (note the plural) of the region which they were studying. Though Said's argumentation is flawed, and even some of his critiques display the ignorant presumptions that he accuses Europeans of practicing, his book Orientalism adds to a movement of increased re-evaluation of the value and legacy of Imperialism. The legacy of Imperialism, and its justifications, have been matters of great debate and scholarship since the 1960's. For instance, where Said tackles the racial and political myths of Imperialist attitudes, authors like Patrick O'Brein attack the economic necessity of Empire.

Patrick O'Brein's article about the cost and benefits of the British Empire overseas is a direct indictment of the justification of the military and administrative take-over of other territories. O'Brein states that the illusion of profitability of colonies was so extensive that "The majority of the English people cheerfully and even proudly shouldered a tax bill for an empire from which they derived very little in the form of tangible pecuniary gains.[14]" His premise is that the British Empire eventually collapsed because it could no longer afford the high costs of its overseas colonies and that Britain would have benefited more from trade with free and independent countries without the burden of military expenditure[15]. He cites that, prior to 1757, despite the declining status of the Mogul Empire, Holland, Austria, France, Denmark and Britain had established profitable trade with an independent India[16]. He supports this premise by citing Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations in which Smith states that Colonies impose an unfair burden upon British taxpayers through "increased threats of war and the probability of political corruption at home.[17]" Because of the increased expense, and in turn, the need for increased raw materials, the British were forced to import an increasing number of foodstuffs and materials in order to support the larger navy and army that Britain then used to maintain its empire[18]. O'Brein's theories, despite sounding logical and based upon sound facts, are based upon counter-factual data, according to his critics, Paul Kennedy and Avner Offer.

Kennedy asserts that, without British administration and hence Imperialism, there might not have been a unified and independent India to deal with. Kennedy asserts that "The Victorians themselves had little doubt...as to the conditions that would prevail were India to be abandoned.[19]" Where O'Brein asserts that the British Empire would have saved money by not having to support a strong navy, it is Kennedy's assertion that it was not only good economically for the British to have a strong navy, but that the colonies were an important - one might say decisive - factor in the conduct and outcome of the First World War[20]. While acknowledging that the assumptions of Victorians and later British imperialists were undoubtedly based upon an arrogance based upon the belief that European culture was superior to non-European culture, Kennedy nevertheless holds that British structure was indeed necessary to preserve a profitable level of trade with India mainly because it actually happened that way (in other words, he operated with factual data). In his article about this very debate, Avner Offer notes "It is disquieting to find that investors and statesmen should have persisted in irrationality for generations, even if one does not hold that everyone maximizes all the time.[21]"

This question bypasses the rhetorical debate over sources and citations that obscure much of the debate between Kennedy and O'Brein, and cuts to the heart of the matter: If - as O'Brein assumes - the British Empire made no fiscal sense, then why did it persist for so long? Offer further wonders "Were the dominions shirking? And why did Britain allow itself to be exploited (for defense monies for which the colonies did not "pay their fair share" for)?" as O'Brein and Smith assert[22]. If this had been true, would not the empire have quickly bankrupted itself, instead of lasting for centuries? Offer finds that, like others before him who questioned the financial sense of Empire, O'Brein's data "highlight(s) those time periods which favor their argument, and slice the data in ways that support it.[23]" To support his argument, Offer expands upon the very data that O'Brein cites (as compiled by Edelstein) and shows that not only did foreign investment make money, they far outstripped the profits made at home, while avoiding the risks of trading outside the Empire, and that to assert otherwise is to discount the amount of investment needed to ensure the security of mercantile ships, and the merchants themselves[24]. Further more, Offer notes that the Navy had already been paid for by the British taxes, and that merchants were merely taking advantage of the pre-existing security net provided by the navy[25].

These facts aside, Kennedy and Offer acknowledge that O'Brein's article, and others like it, are important for they reinvestigate the old notions of Empire and its costs, freshens the debate by introducing new ideas and new questions that need to be asked. Similarly, Said's book also asks important questions, and holds a harsh light of criticism upon the preconceptions that have led to mistakes in dealing with non-Europeans by Imperial powers. Both Said and, to a lesser extent, O'Brein represent a post-colonial shift in global thinking for the historian and international relations scholar and are influenced by post-structuralism in that they interpret historical data in ways that are counter to traditional, modernist interpretations. The importance of these works lies not in their accuracy or lack there of, but in the questions they ask and the barriers they seek to destroy through debate and dialogue. In the introduction of Orientalism, Said acknowledges that the knowledge gained through "Orientalism" of the 19^th and 20^th centuries "must be something more formidable than a mere collection of lies.[26]" I assert that, despite their foibles, the works of O'Brein and Said are equally formidable because of the debate they engender and the reexamination they demand of scholars, politicians, and western society in general.

[1] Said, Edward Orientalism New York, Vintage Books, 1978/1985 Pg.3

[2] O'Brein, Patrick "The Costs and Benefits of British Imperialism, 1846-1914" Past & Present 120 (1988): 163-200

[3] O'Brein 195

[4] Said Pg. 2

[5] Said P. 3

[6] Said Pp. 10-11

[7] Hollister, Warren C. Medieval Europe: A Short History8^th edition McGraw-Hill 1997

[8] Said Pp 10-11, 21, 47, 69, etc.

[9] Said P. 22, 50, and 55

[10] Said P. 23

[11] Said p. 93

[12] Said P. 26

[13] Said P. 34-5

[14] O'Brein, Patrick "The Costs and Benefits of British Imperialism, 1846-1914," Past & Present 120 (1988) Pp. 195

[15] O'Brein Pp. 163-4

[16] O'Brein "The Costs and Benefits of British Imperialism, 1846-1914, Reply" Past & Present 125 (1989) P. 192 - hereafter, this article will be differentiated by the use of the word "reply" in the citation.

[17] O'Brein P. 164

[18] O'Brein P. 168

[19] Kennedy, Paul "The Costs and Benefits of British Imperialism, 1846-1914, in debate" Past & Present No. 125 (1989) P. 187

[20] O'Brein P. 194

[21] Offer, Avner "The British Empire, 1870-1914: A Waste of Money?" The Economic History Review, New Series Vol. 46 No. 2 (May, 1993) P. 221

[22] Offer P. 223

[23] Offer P. 218

[24] Offer P. 221

[25] Offer P. 222

[26] Said P. 6