Colombia: A Perpetual Nightmare

Although once the crown jewel of Spanish colonial America, today's Colombia is a socioeconomic and human rights nightmare by comparison. Arguably the murder, kidnapping, and drug trafficking capital of the world, Colombia has endured non-stop violence, political corruption, and death on a scale not witnessed anywhere else in the world for the better part of six decades. This paper seeks to examine Colombia's turbulent history from La Violencia of the 1940s onward. In this it will explore the root causes of Colombia's continued socioeconomic struggles - namely drugs, guerilla violence, and rampant human rights abuses - and what avenues have been explored, both diplomatically and militarily, to abate them.

A History of Violence and Political Oppression

On the surface, Colombia seems like an ideal country. Situated in tropical latitudes with pristine countryside and picturesque ocean landscapes, it boasts a 92.8% literacy rate, a $366.7 billion GDP, a robust import-export relationship with the United States, and lucrative markets in coffee, cut flowers, and emeralds. However, should one look a little deeper, they would find an 11.1% unemployment rate, some 49.2% of the population living below the poverty line ("Colombia," 2007), and "a murder rate thirteen times higher than the U.S.'" (Rossi, 2003) This, of course, has not always been the case. Colombia's downward spiral began in 1948 with its ten-year-long civil war: La Violencia.

La Violencia began in 1948 with the assassination of leftist Colombian politician and mayor of Bogotá Jorge Eliécer Gaitán by anti-populists. His death was the trigger point of bipartisan political violence in Colombia. La Violencia "was a civil war of ferocious intensity that cut through class lines and mobilized people from all levels of society behind the banner of either liberalism or conservatism." (Goodwin, Jr., 2003) It claimed the lives of some 250,000-300,000 Colombians from 1948-1958. The bloodshed only came to an end in 1958 with the creation of a National Front by conservatives and liberals under which power was shared - the presidency alternating between these two groups every four years - and all other political parties were banned. This, of course, did not end the violence, but it brought some measure of order to the country until 1974. (2003)

During its sixteen-year rule, many leftist rebel groups emerged in opposition to the National Front. Among them were: the ELN in 1965; FARC in 1966; the National People's Alliance in 1970; and M-19 in 1971. ("Timeline: Colombia," 2007) These groups formed largely in protest of the National Front's heavy-handed style of governance and political repression, and were particularly catalyzed after the fraudulent election of Misael Pastrana Borrero over opposition candidate Gustavo Rojas Pinilla in 1970. (Hanratty & Meditz, 1988)

"In 1970 the government began to dismantle the structure of the National Front in accordance with the 1968 constitutional amendments" (1988) and allow opposition parties to be represented in Colombia for the first time since 1958. The dissolution of the Nation Front did not, however, put an end to leftist rebel groups in Colombia. Quite the contrary, guerilla violence and attacks on government targets actually increased from 1970 onward.

Insurgency or Freedom Fighting?

As a result of the National Front's sociopolitical repression, numerous counter-government guerilla groups emerged in Colombia throughout the '60s and '70s, most notably FARC and the ELN; however, the birth of these groups - and the violence that followed - also gave rise to counter-insurgency paramilitary groups such as the AUC.

Las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), or FARC, emerged in Colombia "in 1964 as the military wing of the Colombian Communist Party." (Pike, 2005) FARC represents "Colombia's oldest, largest, most capable, and best-equipped Marxist insurgency." (2005) Its forces number between 9,000 and 12,000 strong, not counting its thousands of other rural supporters for whom it was established. (2005) FARC's activities account for the largest part of terrorist attacks and kidnappings in Colombia. BBC News reports that most of the "3,000-odd kidnappings every year are carried out by the FARC rebel group, who use the ransoms to fund their long-running war on the state." ("Colombia's most powerful rebels," 2003)

FARC's reign of terror has persisted unabated since its formation. In recent years it has been tied to: the March 1999 murder of three American missionaries in Colombia; the October 2001 kidnapping and murder of Colombia's minister of culture; the 2002 kidnapping of Colombian presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt; a February 2002 airline hijacking and the kidnapping of a Colombian senator on board; and the November 2005 kidnapping and ransoming of sixty people in exchange for the release of "hundreds of their comrades serving prison sentences." ("FARC, ELN, AUC," 2005) Perhaps the most insidious threat posed by FARC, though, comes from its recruitment of child soldiers.

The Colombian government's Family Welfare Institute estimates that at least 30 percent of the FARC's fighters are younger than 18, compared to about 15 percent a decade ago. However, international and Colombia agencies that track the use of child fighters now think the FARC's numbers may be higher. During recent skirmishes between the Army and a FARC column, 32 of the 77 fighters captured by army troops were under 18 years old, and 19 of those were 15 and under. Of the 46 FARC fighters who were killed in the skirmishes, 20 were children. (Pike, 2005)

El Ejército de Liberación Nacional (the National Liberation Army), or ELN, presents a similar problem for Colombia, particularly for its oil infrastructure. Formed just a year after FARC, the ELN was inspired by the Marxist movements of Che Guevara and Fidel Castro. Comprising somewhere between 3,000 and 5,000 active participants, the ELN tends to operate mostly in the mountain regions of Colombia and along the Venezuelan border where the oil pipelines run. (2005) Its funding comes largely through kidnapping ransoms, protection money, and extortion of domestic and multinational oil corporations. "ELN attacks on oil pipelines have killed civilians and drawn the attention of the Bush administration, which has suggested training the Colombian armed forces to protect oil facilities." ("FARC, ELN, AUC," 2005)

Meanwhile, las Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia), or AUC, which, ironically, formed in response to the guerilla insurgency and kidnappings of paramilitary groups like FARC and the ELN, now poses almost as great a threat. Numbering between 6,000 and 8,150 members, the AUC rose to power in the 1980s as protection for hire, particularly by wealthy families and drug lords. "These right-wing paramilitaries, alleged to be linked to the military and to take a cut of the drug money, [now] terrorize the country, purifying it of anyone they imagine may be guerilla-linked." (Rossi, 2003)

The AUC is supported by economic elites, drug traffickers, and local communities lacking effective government security and claims its primary objective is to protect its sponsors from insurgents. It is adequately equipped and armed and reportedly pays its members a monthly salary. (Pike, 2005)

Collectively, these three groups - among a smattering of smaller, far-less organized others - account for the largest part of the violence in Colombia today. Left to tackle all three is the Colombian military: backed when possible by the US, but nowhere near as well-funded as the groups it's up against; "the Bush administration's proposed aid figure for Colombia in... 2003 included nearly $500 million in military and police aid alone." (Evans, 2002)

Narcotopia

Colombia is often referred to in Hispanic culture as "Locombia," meaning "land of the crazy." Given its much-publicized affiliation with narcotics trafficking, this title seems rather fitting. Indeed "Colombia continues to be the world's leading supplier of cocaine and most recently a significant supplier of marijuana and heroin." (Pike, 2005) Its biggest market is found in the US. Colombia provides "over 90 percent of the cocaine and 50 percent of the heroin entering the U.S." according to GlobalSecurity.org. (2005)

The [Colombian] drug trade has a terrible impact on the United States. There are 50,000 drug-related deaths yearly in the United States - with 19,000 directly attributable to drugs. This is six times the loss of life on September 11, and it happens every year. (Simons, 2003)

Be that as it may, the Colombian drug trade remains a thriving industry. Some estimates claim that 5-10% of Colombia's total GDP comes from narcotics trafficking. (Pike, 2005)

The Colombian navy recently intercepted several drug traffickers along the Pacific coast of Panama hauling just over thirteen tons of cocaine. "The haul remains the largest drugs seizure in Colombia so far this year. But in May 2005, 15 tons of cocaine was found in jungle near the Pacific coast," believed to belong to the Notre del Valle group, one of Colombia's largest drug cartels. ("Colombia cuts drug haul figure," 2007)

Even with setbacks like this, the Colombian drug cartels stop at nothing to deliver their product to market. Just last year, in fact, Colombian authorities, in conjunction with the US Drug Enforcement Agency, arrested twenty-two people in connection with a drug smuggling operation involving the surgical implantation of pedigree puppies bound for the US. "In one case, 14 packets of liquid heroin were found sewn into the bellies of six Labrador puppies... Ultrasound scans revealed the packets, weighing about 3kg (7lbs) and worth some $200,000 (£113,000), inside those dogs." ("Colombia smugglers 'used puppies,'" 2006)

As sickening and overwhelming a problem as drug trafficking is for Colombia, an even bigger problem exists by way of the connection between the drug cartels' and guerilla groups.

Since the 1970s, drug traffickers based in Colombia have made temporary alliances of convenience with leftist guerillas, or with right wing groups... Some insurgent and paramilitary groups have, in fact, become little more than bands of well-armed thugs selling their services to drug traffickers. (Pike, 2005)

FARC and the ELN have openly admitted to "limited... cooperation" between themselves and the cartels, but these "units are far more intimately involved with cocaine processing and export than the leadership admits." (Crocker, 2001) FARC in particular earns some additional $300 million annually just from "taxing" cocaine production and trafficking. ("Colombia's most powerful rebels," 2003)

This alliance between the guerilla groups and drug cartels has led to the proliferation of narcoterrorism: the exchange of drugs and/or their profits for weapons. In November 2000 BBC News reported that Mexican authorities arrested a Colombian doctor, Carlos Ariel Charry, who was "coordinating drug shipments for... FARC that were exchanged either for money or weapons by Mexico's Tijuana drug cartel." ("Colombian rebels exchange drugs for weapons," 2000) Similarly, a November 2002 narcoterrorism bust in Houston, Texas uncovered an attempted AUC transfer of drugs for $25 million worth of Russian and Eastern European-made weapons. ("Ashcroft Announces New Arrests," 2002)

The Human Toll

Underage conscription, as previously detailed, is not the only human rights-related concern facing Colombia today. "Massacres, extrajudicial execution, murder, torture, forced disappearance and kidnapping, threats and forced displacement" (Pike, 2005) have become commonplace in a nation fraught with such rampant drug trafficking, guerilla and paramilitary violence. GlobalSecurity.org reports that violations of "due process, and freedom of opinion, association and assembly also occur." (2005)

Some "3,000 citizens are believed to die every year as a result of the conflict [in Colombia]... Thousands more are killed in mainly urban criminal violence... Many indigenous communities have also suffered attacks." ("Q&A: Colombia's civil conflict," 2005) This is to say nothing of the estimated 1,900 kidnapping which take place in Colombia yearly. Most at risk in Colombia are those with high-profile roles in the community, most notably political activists, social leaders, trade unionists, and human rights campaigners. (2005)

Recent escalation in insurgency has resulted in the mass exodus of thousands of Colombians - including many of its wealthier citizens - to neighboring countries, as well as the internal displacement of more than three million people. The United Nations notes that "many [of these] displaced people often end up living in shanty towns... where they have little access to health or educational services." (2005)

Much Ado, but What to Do?

The resolution of these three issues - guerilla and paramilitary violence, narcotics, and human rights abuses - is fundamental to remedying Colombia's sociopolitical woes. Although much has been done to resolve these three problems, there is still a great deal of work ahead for the Colombian government and its people.

In terms of resolving the guerilla and paramilitary issue, the Colombian government made some headway during the late '80s and early '90s with the former militant group M-19. After considerable negotiation, M-19 agreed in March 1989 to demobilize in exchange for a government pardon and the ability to reintegrate into Colombian society as a democratic political party. The result of these negotiations was the 1990 ceasefire and disarmament of M-19 and the formation of La Alianza Democratica del M-19 (the M-19 Democratic Alliance), or ADM-19. "One condition of the M-19 agreement [was] the creation of a special national assembly to revise the constitution. During December 1990 elections for the assembly, ADM-19 [won] 27 percent of the vote and 19 seats." ("A New Constitution," 1991) This political good fortune inspired many of Colombia's other guerilla and paramilitary groups to seek similar amnesty deals and agree to ceasefires. Unfortunately, few of these agreements held, and insurgency continues.

As for Colombia's narcotics problem, the only real strategy to emerge in the last six decades has been the US-backed "Plan Colombia." Plan Colombia was originally the brainchild of then Colombian president Andrés Pastrana Arango. First presented in 1999 as part of an initiative to revitalize Colombia, it aimed to elicit foreign aid to help stem the violence and economic turmoil. As Pastrana explained in his memoirs, La Palabra Bajo Fuego (The Word Under Fire):

Developed countries should help us to implement some sort of 'Marshall Plan' for Colombia, which will allow us to develop great investments in the social field, in order to offer our peasants different alternatives to the illicit [coca and poppy] crops. (Pastrana, 2007)

The US was eager to take part in this initiative; however, its primary concern had less to do with the economic revitalization of Colombia so much as stemming the narcotics trade and guerilla violence there. It thusly rewrote Plan Colombia during the Clinton Administration so as to reflect these concerns, devoting large sums of money to bolstering Colombia's military and counter-narcotics initiatives; this foreign aid was further augmented during the Bush Administration. (Simmons, 2003)

The revised Plan Colombia was met with criticism by many of Pastrana's supporters because of its decidedly military slant. Pastrana's original plan had focused more on resolving the guerilla conflict and its narcotics affiliation through diplomatic means rather than the use of military force; however, since US dollars were the primary source of funding for Plan Colombia, Pastrana had little choice but to accept the revisions. ("Plan Colombia," 2003)

In addition to military initiatives, Plan Colombia also focuses on the eradication of the coca plants necessary for the production of cocaine. This has been achieved through aerial spraying of chemical herbicides over the countryside. While, indeed, this has been an effective means of killing off the coca plants, it has also destroyed countless other legal crops, poisoned water supplies, and sickened many indigenous peoples in the process.

The US hoped that by destroying coca plants it would hamper the activities of terrorist groups like FARC receiving funding from the narcotics trade. Instead the contrary occurred: the US decreased the coca supply but not the demand for cocaine itself. The street price therefore went up, and those groups earning revenue from its trade actually became richer. (Simmons, 2003)

As for human rights, the presidency of Álvaro Uribe Vélez has made perhaps the most impact in Colombia to date. "In a sign of public dissatisfaction with Pastrana's conciliatory approach to terrorists, independent Alvaro Uribe was elected as Colombia's new president on 26 May 2002 with 53% of the vote." (Pike, 2005) This was the first time in Colombian history that a candidate received absolute majority in the first round of elections. Uribe's popularity can be attributed to his hard-line approach to terrorism and narcotics trafficking in Colombia.

In Uribe's estimation, there should be no negotiating with terrorists, no matter what they call themselves or what they claim to be fighting for. In his first official act as president, Uribe created a war tax to increase funding for the Colombian military and to bolster the Colombian police force nationwide. Uribe also established "a citizens' network throughout the country to support the military by providing information about armed insurgent groups." (2005) In addition to his security objectives, Uribe has also enacted several measures to provide wider healthcare coverage, universal education, and micro-finance schemes for Colombia's poor. ("Colombia Race Affirms Uribe's Popularity, 2006)

Since Uribe's election, Colombia has made moderate but steady inroads into its guerilla and narcotics problems. Although initially in 2003, FARC and the ELN forged an alliance to oppose Uribe's counter-terrorism initiatives, by 2006 numerous members of both the ELN and AUC had turned in their arms in exchange for amnesty. (Pike, 2005) FARC still remains a staunch holdout. "Mr. Uribe has said he will offer peace talks to rebels of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), who still control large rural areas, but only if they first lay down their weapons." ("Profile: Alvaro Uribe Velez," 2006)

Uribe's success is due in large part to US financial and diplomatic support. Uribe is after all "President Bush's staunchest ally in Latin America." (2006) Colombia currently "receives more than $3 billion in aid from the US" to combat its narcotics trade. (2006) Nevertheless, he does have his critics, particularly among those who allege that members of his government have ties to right-wing paramilitary death squads at-large in the Colombian countryside. ("Bush applauds Colombian support," 2007) These allegations have yet to be proven. Irrespective of this, "the rates for kidnapping and murder [have] reached their lowest level in over twenty years" thanks to Uribe's dedication. (Pike, 2005)

Conclusions

Colombia, to say nothing of the Uribe administration, has a long and arduous road ahead of it. Despite lavish financial aid from the US to combat narcotics trafficking, cocaine and heroin production remain a lucrative industry. This presents a serious problem in the War on Drugs and the War on Terror as cocaine revenues (and the taxation thereof) are what keep insurgency groups like FARC in business. Until such time as the drug trade is fully eradicated in Colombia, peace and human rights will never be secure.