Concepts of Metaphysical Reality

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One of the most fundamental questions of philosophy is whether or not universals are real. The only way to even begin to answer the question is to further specify what universals are and what is meant to say something is real. Universals are generally defined as 'that which is predicable of many' or something that constitutes a larger number of objects into one general thing, such as whiteness, or hardness. Peirce, in his review of Fraser's The Works of George Berkeley, addresses the issues surrounding reality and the question of reality as applied to universals. In his discussion, he rephrases the question asked by both realists and nominalists alike and comes to a conclusion well supported by well-thought and logical premises. Murray G. Murphey, in his work, The Development of Peirce's Philosophy, Murphy examines and discusses Peirce's ideas and ultimately comes to the conclusion that his new concept of reality is incomplete and in need of further explanation and thought.

The question concerning the reality of universals is one that has been popular throughout time, addressed by many great thinkers in several different periods of thought. Peirce approaches the problem altogether differently as he decides that one cannot answer the question concerning reality because the question has never been stated correctly. According to Peirce, the question, or rather, the problem is really two in one-are there real objects? And are there real universals? Determining what is real is the first step that should be taken before attempting to answer the question concerning universals and whether or not they are counted as being real. Peirce responds to the problem of reality and attempts to answer both problems in the affirmative, saying that there are real objects and that universals are real. His response, however, is complicated in that he never completely decides how to fully answer the question without contradicting his other ideas and theories.
He begins by explaining reality in his review of Berkeley in 1871 and seems to be on the right track. As his theory develops and deepens, however, his ideas and views begin to conflict with one another and he never entirely solves the problem. Despite the confusion surrounding his ideas, his response to the problem of reality is a brilliant metaphysical view on the very nature of reality as well as that of universals.

Peirce argues for the existence of real objects by basing his theory upon his phenomenalistic belief that our knowledge is not a sensory copy of the cause of sensation but the product of syntheses if sense experience carried out by the mind. He points out that his theory is based more on the phenominalism of Kant and not that of Hume, in that there really are objects that the mind interacts with.
II

Peirce argues that there are, in fact, real objects, siding mostly with the realists and their definition of reality rather than that of the nominalists. He furthers his definition by saying that reality, or objects that are real, are whatever exists independent of the mind, i.e. that which is not whatever we happen to think of, but is unaffected by what we may think of.

In order to explain further Peirce's concept of reality, it is beneficial to examine, at least in part, what is in the mind and how it gets there. Thoughts are the only things immediately present to us and are caused, or brought to the mind via sensation. For example, when one sees a tree, it is not just a tree that one sees, but a collection of sense experience that is unified into a conception; i.e. the light from each leaf, and even every part of the leaf, as well as the light which reflects off the bark, the branches and every other part of the tree, enter the eye and we perceive the fact that we have experienced sensations. The perception of that particular sensation allows for the conception of 'tree' with which our mind has just interacted. Concepts (as in this example) serve to reduce sense experience to unity and are justified only be the unity they produce-as in this example we see the collection of light from the tree as a 'tree'. The same would be if a person touched the bark of the tree and felt its texture or if a person heard the wind rustling the leaves, the sensation would lead to the thought, or concept of whatever was sensed and perceived-in this case, a tree. Concepts serve to give coherence to what would otherwise be an unintelligible chaos. The entire process, from the sensation to perception and finally to conception takes place in the mind, the location of all thoughts, including the actual thought that results from the interaction is in the mind. Although these aspects of thought, including the act of seeing or the act of feeling and all other parts of sensation are in the mind, the sensation, which we experience actually interacts with objects aside from the mind and is necessarily influenced by something. In order for the mind to interact with an object and to ultimately be influenced by said object, the object must exist. To say something exists-i.e. if something exists-(in which the mind interacts with) is to say something is real, coinciding with the definition of reality provided by realists, thus one can conclude that there are real objects and those real objects are the things which are independent and interact with the mind. "It is the coherency of experience which demonstrates the existence of reality; or something permanent and fixed, to which our thought and experience, more or less perfectly, corresponds."

Peirce further explains the idea of concepts by employing the idea that they arise by hypothesis. For example, I hypothesize the existence of an object x in order to explain why I now have a certain sensation, and I refer these sensations to x as the cause of these sensations. The fact that the hypothesis gives coherence to the experience justifies itself as a hypothesis and leads us to further believe that the object, which is interacted with, must be real, based on the justified hypothesis and the idea that there is coherence in the experience of the object. The actual existence of real objects is thus hypothetically affirmed in order to explain the regularities of phenomena and thereby to make our experience intelligible.

After the conclusion that there are real objects that we experience through sensation, the question remains, are universals real? As explained before, universals are things in general, that apply to many-that which is predicable of many, like whiteness, for example. Of universals, Peirce explains that "this view of reality is inevitably realistic; because general conceptions enter into all judgments, and therefore into true opinions. Consequently a thing in the general is as real as in the concrete." Peirce continues to explain that if we have an image or an absolutely singular representation, it would therefore have to be absolutely determinate in all respects, or that every part of the object is true and real. More simply, a universal is an abstract property , such as whiteness, and it is true to say that all white things have whiteness in them; since whiteness is part of that object which we interact with via sensation, the whiteness must be real. Since the abstract property, or quality, of such real objects can be real in the singular as well as the general sense, it is true to say that universals are real.

Later, Pierce redefines his definition of the real by outlining this new definition of the real written in his Consequences of Four Incapacities, "The real, then is that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning would finally result in, and which is therefore independent of the vagaries of me and you. Thus, the very origin of the conception of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the notion o a community, without definite limits, and comparable of a definite increase e of knowledge..."

Although this statement recognizes the theory we have already discussed, it introduces a new idea of the real-the real being that which is ultimately agreed upon, which can be applied to the reality as we have examined, but adds a great deal of complexity to the theory in that reality is not and should not be dependent on mortal man or the community-which are part of the reality we experience and interact with that ultimately creates the cognition.
III

Murphy evaluates Peirce's theory of reality and for the most part gives the theory justice by examining its roots as well as Peirce's intentions. His opinion is fairly objective and he seems to agree with Peirce up until Peirce begins to further explain the 'real' qualities of objects in light of his theory of perception and his theory of cognition. Murphey points out several areas where Peirce's theory becomes confusing and ambiguous. One of the points where confusion ensues is when Peirce states that qualities are only known as abstractions from things compared, i.e. properties are not abstracted from an object, but noticing the difference between two different objects. An apple, for example is red, but according to this later addition to the theory, it is not red because the apple has a true quality of redness, but because the redness is different than other things around it; it reflects light differently. This idea seems to be true in that in order for qualities to be qualities in and of themselves, there would necessarily be another object of comparison. The confusion arises, however, with the idea that qualities are real based on the realness of the object rather than the idea that the realness of a quality is derived from the fact that there are two objects to compare and contrast in order to extract the realness of the quality, which in turn confuses the idea of universals and reality. Another idea that seems to generate some confusion is the idea surrounding conception and the fact that a cognition is a sort of a priori knowledge or inference-in that cognition is based on a previous cognition and extends infinitely into the past-concepts and cognitions were never created but just happened-as if in motion. Because reality is dependent on concepts and cognitions to be real and true it seems confusing to say that those conceptions came about as a priori knowledge or as an induction that never really started but just are-existing arbitrarily. This idea of cognition is apart from Peirce's theory of reality but because Peirce bases a great deal of his theory on his ideas of conception it must be examined as a sub-doctrine. The sub-doctrine, in itself is ambiguous and creates a degree of confusion when applied to his theory of reality. Peirce's answer to this question is that all probably inference, whether induction or hypothesis is inference from the parts to the whole. The answer raises even more questions than it answers because even as Peirce responds by presenting his argument in terms of induction he is leaving a great deal up to the reader to derive the an analogous proof for hypothesis.
Another area of confusion is the second step, or condition in finding the real: that an object must be an object of inquiry and is not real until the entire community agrees that the experience of said object is similar enough to be true. Where the theory works in trying to outline the real (e.g. a tree is experienced mostly the same way by every one in the community and is therefore counted as real, or as being part of reality), it raises the question of whether Peirce is actually committed to holding that inquiry will in fact go on forever, in which case he will have to show that some inquirer will exist, or whether the infinite extension simply defines an ideal limit. It is established that Peirce believes the community to be real (for other reasons aside from the necessity of its reality pertaining to his theory of reality), but what must be determined is what the theory of agreement itself presupposes. Peirce introduces a principle of relativity of sensation, which explains that the effect an object has on a perceiver is not entirely based on the object itself but on the relation between the object and the perceiver, and since that relation between object and perceiver is different for each perceiver at different times then no two perceivers or even the same perceiver at different times will see the same thing. It seems that this principle would negate the idea of the community and inquiry, but for Peirce it does just the opposite-it confirms the existence of an object based on the condition and circumstance the object is found in, which can be different at varying times. Because different people can experience perceptions in a similar way in different situations and, it further proves the existence of the object and ultimately the real.

Murphy continues to outline the different theories and views that Peirce develops and adopts while trying to explain his theory of reality and does so faithfully, but because Peirce changes his mind so often, especially in the development of reality, he concludes that unless some other proof of the reality of objects is present, Peirce's theory ultimately fails.
IV

Peirce certainly outlines an interesting theory of reality, pertaining to the objects our mind interacts with as well as whether universals are real or not. In his review of Berkeley's works, Peirce seems to have a clear understand of exactly what reality is, but, as pointed out by Murphey, his theory continues to confuse as it contradicts itself as well as other theories while he continues to attempt explaining his definition or understanding of reality. Unfortunately, despite Peirce's profound insights on reality, a firm understanding of his ideas is unclear; that lack of clarity has contributed to the fact that his ideas have never fully been realized. His ideas do, however, deserve careful study and examination in that they shed light on several difficult issues.

Murphy objects to the idea of conception, as explained above, simply because there was never an actual beginning to the process of conception. Peirce uses an example of a race to explain this idea, but is better explained with the more modern analogy involving an airplane in flight. If someone were to make a line graph from zero to one, zero being the point at which the plane is not moving, and one being the point at which the plane is in the air in flight, it is clear to see where the motion actually begins, or simply does not begin but just is. At point zero the plane is motionless and on the ground; at point one, the plane is in the air, flying. In order to begin flying the plane must move from the point at which it is motionless to the point at which it is flying. As one approaches zero from one on the graph, the numbers, or in this case, the degree of motion, gets smaller and smaller (decreasing to infinity) but will never actually reach zero, the point where the plane is not moving. Therefore, the plane theoretically never begins moving, but when it moves it is in the process of moving, and when it flies, it is in the process of flying, never having begun to fly. The same is for conceptions; they just are, once a person senses, perceives and develops a conception, he has not begun a process but finds himself already in the process. Peirce's theory of conception, although difficult to comprehend, should not be used to invalidate his problem of reality but as discussed in previously, should further emphasis the idea of the real. Furthermore, all points at which Peirce's doctrine becomes confusing should be examined with the understanding that his theories were developing and maturing.

Another objection to Peirce's ideas which Murphy pointed out (which has also been discussed that of infinite inquiry and agreement-whether it is possible and even provable if inquiry can go on for infinity and if so the question still remains whether an agreement will ever be reached because it is possible (maybe even more probable) that one could inquire forever and never reach agreement. To respond to this problem one must again look at hypothesis. The very nature of hypothesis is that if one idea is wrong, it is eliminated and a new idea takes its place, getting closer and closer to the truth with each hypothesis. It is inevitable, that with a given amount of time (into infinity) enough hypotheses will be employed and discarded as to only be left with one option, agreement on that which is true, on that which is real.

Peirce's downfall is not the basis of his theory on the problem of reality, indeed it is very easy to understand and seems to identify with truth. The problem is that, although he changed his mind and introduced new ideas and meanings to his theories, he never decided upon a concrete and consistent definition or response to the question of reality. The consistency and concreteness that is necessary and fundamental for a philosophy is simply non-existent-the lack of which contributes wholly to confusion surrounding his ideas.

To conclude, Pierce began his detailed response to the problem of reality in his review of Fraser's book on Berkeley and the ideas discussed in this paper were focused primarily on the extension of those ideas and omitted a great deal of Peirce's later ideas concerning reality. The definition of reality that he outlines in his review is the most basic and fundamental theory Peirce develops with regard to the problem of reality.

1 Peirce, C.S., Fraser's The Works of George Berkeley, pp. 90
2 Reality is term with which the definition is used differently by the different schools of thought. For the realist, reality denotes that some things exist while others do not.
3 Nominalists, on the other hand define reality, as certain things exist while certain things do not; furthermore, reality, for them is based on experience, a snapshot of the universe, things that can be and are experienced.
4 Murphy, Murray G., Development of Peirce's Philosophy, pp. 124 (Paraphrased from this chapter with the understanding that this idea is implicit in the review of Berkeley and was the idea that he carried throughout his ideas.)
5 Murphy, Murray G., Development of Peirce's Philosophy, pp.124
6 Peirce, C.S., Fraser's The Works of George Berkeley, pp. 90
7 Murphy, Murray G., Development of Peirce's Philosophy, pp 130
8 Murphy, Murray G., Development of Peirce's Philosophy, pp.143 besides the confusion he claims comes about because of this seemingly muddled principle; Murphy further explains this concept in a way that I found to be enlightening. He says (on the same page), "Although the presence of an S does not imply that I have sensations A and B and... and K, yet the presence of an S under conditions C1 and... Cn (including my relation to the object) does imply that I have these sensations. Therefore the following hypothetic inference becomes possible:
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The presence of an S under condition C1... Cn is always followed by the perceptions A and... and K
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I perceive A and... and K
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Conditions C1... Cn prevail
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Therefore there is an S here.
9 Murphy, Murray G., Development of Peirce's Philosophy, pp.146