Concerns Regarding Objectivity

In my discussion on the skeptical model of epistemological inquiry, especially into morality, I covered a broad range of topics that attempted to argue the limited nature of knowledge (or truth) itself from the perspective of human beings. The purpose of this article is to look closer at what this means and discuss some of the general concerns I have with epistemology in general. My objective here is to give the reader a more thorough and informed outlook on a more peculiar and fascinating application of philosophy. What I aim for is not to resolve the many problems that relate to truth - after all, in line with the skeptical tradition I fully understand that I am no more capable of making conclusive statements about knowledge and truth itself without escalating into some form of dogmatism.

First I want to discuss the possibility of anything existing objectively. Here, as you can probably deduce, I refer to objective as individual-independent of subjective perception or experience. In other words is there ever any truth that exists regardless of one's subjective interpretation? This is not only a concern for philosophers, but for many others as well. What we have to consider before we can make any conclusions about this possibility is what this issue entails.

First, we have to understand something more about ourselves as human beings. What does it mean for a human being to have an "experience?" I know I've used this word many times throughout some of my articles but I've yet to really clarify what is meant from possible experiences (and henceforth impossible experiences, as well). For the sake of clarity let's keep our definitions simple. An experience then can best be understood as the phenomenal intake via sensory perception central to human beings: hearing, observing, tasting, smelling, and touching. Before I continue it should be noted I left out the possibility of extra-sensory experiences such as those that are solely subjective to the individual and for all intents and purposes cannot be defined as "experiences" per se in this sense. For instance, the sensation of jealousy, grief, joy, or anger is a subjective response to certain stimuli. The stimuli itself is a possible candidate for being called an objective experience (maybe?) but the individual's reaction towards that experience are wholly subjective. For instance, the loss of a loved one in many cases causes feelings of grief and despair; however, this can hardly be called objective since these feelings depend greatly on one's past experiences with, attitudes towards, and overall recollection of the deceased.

Thus, in order for anything to be considered existing as an objective experience it must then be something that (across the spectrum of human beings) it must exist independently of any subjective considerations. Likewise, since the five means of sense impression are natural to all human beings unless other circumstances has impaired or destroyed them, these can be the only means for potential objective experiences.

Now, through a system of skeptical analysis regarding idealistic realities and potential non-physical noumena I've arrived at the conclusion that the most realistic estimate for possible objective experiences must rely on that which we can solely perceive and "experience" in the physical world - again reiterating the point that if anything is to exist objectively it must be bound in the physical, sensible world for which any given human being (assuming no loss to sense perception) could potentially experience.

Now that a definition has been given for our inquiry, other concerns need addressing. The next major concern then focuses on the preceptors themselves - and in this case human beings. What is it about human beings that must be necessary if objective knowledge can be gained if experience is our best opportunity at gaining any access to truth? As sensible creatures we need to find biological, neurological, psychological, physiological characteristics that make potential experiences indicators of objective truth. This raises another set of problems, including that regarding the reliability of our own perception.

While questions of this nature have been around for ages, only relatively recently have real empirical studies been utilized to arrive at reasonably accurate estimates regarding human perception, specifically as they relate to the brain itself. One of the major points of interest to philosophers is the question of human rationality. For many schools of philosophy this rationality plays a special purpose - far more than simply that of perception. Hence, our perception is not limited to merely taking in sense impressions and categorizing, memorizing, or connecting them in particular arrangements for our convenience or survival. Rather, rationality is something uniquely ours that gives us the power of peculiar insight. Whether or not this is necessarily so is a dubious and complicated concept. After all, much of the work is entirely speculative and holds little weight against the more objective accounts held by science.

Another major problem regarding this issue may seem odd at first. How is it possible that individual accounts could possibly be measured objectively? This is a strange idea in fact, but it is one that has been contemplated for centuries. Well before the onset of neurological science or psychology, philosophers, scholars, thinkers, and others have sought a resolution to this particular problem. If an account is in itself subjectively told through an individual's experience - can there be any objective truth or knowledge attached to it? It seems difficult when we consider the likelihood that experiences themselves can have devastating effects on the perceiver himself. For instance, severe trauma from extremely unpleasant experiences can significantly alter the objectivity of an individual's account. Likewise, doubts remain regarding the objective status of human perception even of sensory impressions to begin with. Thus, this problem seems to offer no easy solution either. Without even beginning to address some of the previously mentioned problems surrounding the concept of knowledge, many more need to be answered regarding the human equation.

Thus, it's fundamentally irrelevant to affirm or deny the existence of objective knowledge if we ourselves cannot determine the overall accuracy of our own modules of perception. So then, what are we left with?

Unfortunately - not much. Our best accounts are those that exist independently of the limited capacity of our brain. In return, each individual human being shares relatively insignificant differences in degrees of potency and accuracy in their sensory impressions. Hence, it is premature to assume more than we may allow ourselves to. This is the keystone for epistemological inquiry, and an important task for philosophy in general.