Constitutional Law and Katrina

Constitutional law is often cited as the source of all American legislature, and the structure of government is said to be based directly on the Constitution. Yet, Steve Griffin, a professor of law at Tulane, argues that governance by Constitutional law is separate from the actual structure of the government. He uses Katrina as the prime example, highlighting this government debacle as proof for a system reformation. The advantage of studying through Katrina is that every level of government was in work during the post hurricane relief. More specifically, it was an insight into current Congress organization and federalism present today.

There was much evidence, as with many major national disasters, that the devastation caused by Katrina was in a sense guaranteed by government failure. Three separate studies showed severe deficiencies in the levee construction, but Congress treated it as a "water project." Professor Griffin states that Congress treats the creation of sound legislation as a "byproduct," and essentially the purest form of pork. Policy is not the main objective of Congress, and as a result "instead of one policy, we have 535 policies." With a collision between the activist states, interest groups, and Congress, Professor Griffin puts it cynically as "every member of Congress gets something, and that's what keeps it going."

Yet, it is not merely the inability of Congress to place utmost importance on the creation of policies. When Senator Cobert attempted to use funding for Alaska's "Bridge to No Where," for Katrina relief, he was adamantly opposed, making clear the fundamental problem that lies in treating all projects equally. In the 1950's and 1960's, the national government attempted to prioritize projects through informal constitutional change, yet fell short due to unanticipated side effects. Professor Griffin consistently emphasizes the fact that informal constitutional change can rarely bring about the desired effects, and that basically America has not spent the time to make the changes possible.
Within the United States there is some level of autonomy for each different government, from the national down to the local. Katrina showed a commitment to localism and the value of the fragmentation of authority. In the post 9/11 era, the Department of Homeland Security created a National Response Plan, detailing instructions for the bureaucracy as to who was responsible for different tasks. There was a constant emphasis on the lowest level of government possible handling the responses. Federalism has had a strong influence on the national policy, and Katrina exposed in a harsh manner the wrongs of such localism. The federal government does not supercede the state and local governments during catastrophes, and as a CNN reporter put it, "everyone is in charge, but no one is in control… there are many heroes, but we lack a leader." Professor Griffin points out that the framers valued federalism as they feared tyranny, and this underlying value of federalism understood as localism indeed affected the response to Katrina.

It took decades to even convince the government that the federal involvement during disasters was a necessity. As a matter of policy, the national government had no provisions until the 20th Century, bringing with it the social changes mostly attributed to the Great Depression. Over the years, policies have been mended so that aide is available on a national level, but Professor Griffin poses the question, "It things have changed so much, why did the government stumble?" He answers himself by going back to the 18th Century Constitutional structure, the formal structure of which still stands. Informal changes which have been put into effect over the centuries can only go so far, and the Constitutional structure itself is what stops America from moving forth.

Though Professor Griffin made several valid points and emphasized his main arguments with a plethora of little facts, he fails to consider in his discussion the sheer effort that is necessary to make any formal Constitutional change. While he argues clearly of Congressional error, he again does not bring up the deep rooted method for creating these policies that has grown over centuries. He does an excellent job asserting what is wrong with the government and the outdated constitutional structure, but he never touches upon the extreme complications that such radical change would implicate. Near the end, he states quickly that the structure necessary for dealing with such massive disasters as Katrina takes long years for its creation, yet sails right over the need for structural change in both the Constitution and governmental policies without the mention of the decades of dedication these would require from many lawmakers. His discussion of Constitutional law and structure was intriguing, but it was lacking in several details which would have helped to ground his theses in reality and not complete idealism.