Contradictions in Spinoza's Ethics

Within his Ethics, Spinoza uses his theory of God, i.e. nature, to formulate an ethical framework within which humans should ideally live in relation to both the world and to each other. However, within this paper I wish to make the assertion that Spinoza breaks from his own theory in the formation of his ethical theory and consequently ignores several intrinsic contradictions that arise from the combination of the two.

In the first two books Spinoza builds a theory of the universe in which the idea of dual aspect monism is central, i.e. everything that exists including physical objects, mental processes, etc are all just an aspect of an unchanging, infinite whole. Therefore, because of the conclusion reached via the arguments in book one, it is impossible for there to exist an external creator of the universe, and God in fact becomes a metaphor for the unchanging infinite whole. Crucial to my critique of Spinoza's connection between this view of the universe and his ethical theory is a direct statement of one of the conclusions he has reached from the appendix to book one, "...that all things have been predetermined by God...." I shall return to this idea following a brief synopsis of Spinoza's ethical theory, after which I shall demonstrate the incompatibility of the two.

Spinoza begins the ethical portion of this work with a discussion on active and passive emotions. The first point I wish to illustrate is Spinoza's assertion that active emotions are to be desired more than passive emotions because they are in accordance with reason, and that man is being true to his own nature when he is being reasonable. Because passive emotions are caused by external stimuli, one is intrinsically not in control of his/her life while experiencing those passive emotions.

The next point that must be made is Spinoza's emphasis on self-control over emotions and life via reason. Throughout this portion of the writing, Spinoza uses a non-deterministic language to describe the nature of human existence. This, however, seems to be in conflict with his earlier claim that all things are predetermined by God, i.e. nature. In the third and fourth books, humans are described by Spinoza as possessing volition and, more importantly, that that volition results in a direct change in the workings of the universe, e.g. their own lives and emotional states. It seems to me that this is a radically different view of the universe than was discussed in the first two books. From the first two books, and specifically from the above statement from the appendix to book one, I received the impression that humans were better thought of as determined parts of an infinite whole and that any perception of free will was simply an illusion.

I am very attracted to the idea of God as the infinite whole because it allows for a rather holistic perception of the universe, even from a mere human standpoint. From such a worldview it is possible to recognize that each thing or person has its own unique place in an intricately connected whole. It also seems that Spinoza's worldview must allow for the fact that even subjective emotions are yet another aspect of the whole. Consequently I feel that Spinoza's appeal to reason as a higher goal than pure emotion, simply because of the fact that they are caused externally and do not allow for control, is in direct opposition to his premise that all things are intricately and infinitely connected within God. Also, because all things are in God, it seems impossible for passive emotions to be something which are unhealthy since they must consequently come from God and God is a perfect, infinite entity.

One of the conclusions reached by Spinoza does indeed seem to follow directly from his conceptual universe, i.e. that one ought to do what is in his/her best interest, and that by doing so, he/she is being true to his/her intrinsic nature. Being true to one's nature is a crucial facet to Spinoza's Ethics because we can no longer be viewed as separate entities, e.g. a Cartesian ego, etc., but as aspects of a perfect being who are acting in the best interest of the whole when seeking self-interests as well. However, it seems to me that one cannot simply seek what is in one's self-interest, but must also seek to do what is in the best interest of others as well because of the interconnectedness of all aspects of nature.

The direction that Spinoza takes in his third and fourth books seems to be counter-intuitive. In the first two books he builds a rather postmodern picture of the universe, stripped of an external God as a metanarrative. However, in the third and later books he seems to revert back to a rationalist mode, which is evident in part five, proposition seven, "Emotions which arise or originate from reason are...more powerful...." There is an interesting contrast between the method used by Spinoza in his Ethics and the conclusions reached. He begins by defining his terms and presenting his axioms, which, when seen in a postmodern fashion, makes Spinoza's work a rationalist language game. And although he begins with a modernist language game, in the first two books most of his conclusions tend to be postmodern, i.e. the tearing down of the prevalent meta-narratives of the time. Within this postmodern universe that Spinoza discusses there exists the possibility for a very ecologically sound, emotionally based existence in which one is allowed to feel a kind of kinship with all fellow creatures due to their shared nature. From reading the first part of Spinoza's writings I got the impression that pure emotion, even the passive ones, would have a very important place in his ethical theory, consequently I was caught quite off guard when reason and rationality were given a higher place by Spinoza.

Although, there is little surprise in the fact that he must finally appeal to reason, even when viewed from a postmodern perspective, because of the nature of the particular language game with which he begins. However, it seems that there is an unacceptable contradiction between the type of universe for which Spinoza argues and the ethical theory he claims follows from the nature of this universe. By placing reason above passive emotions, he is indeed saying that the universe is neither interconnected nor determined, thereby contradicting his previous assertions to the contrary. For if the universe is truly as interconnected as was previously claimed, it seems that Spinoza cannot be justified in saying that passive emotions are less healthy than active ones because no one can truly be in control of anything if everything affects everything else within the framework of the whole. Emotions, it must be said, fall under the same category, and must consequently be just as uncontrollable and determined as human actions, given the truth of the view of God as the whole and of the inseparability of all things within God, i.e. nature.

Therefore, I think Spinoza has refused to acknowledge the true consequences of his theory of God and the universe by placing reason on a higher pedestal than emotion. And it is because of this fatal flaw that much of his ethical theory falls apart because it is based on reason as a meta-narrative, for which it seems there can be no justification, especially due to the fact that Spinoza also views the universe in a deterministic manner. Although I do think that the conclusions of Spinoza's ethical theory are not to be considered unreasonable, it doesn't appear that they follow directly from his initial premises or axioms. Speaking from personal experience, I have found that emotion works best to one's advantage when it is combined with reason. Much of the ethical theory seems to be intuitive, e.g. the importance of reason, that it is wrong to hate, that a thing is good if it agrees with our nature, etc., however, many of those very conclusions do not agree with the consequences of Spinoza's worldview. I am inclined to say, because of the seemingly obvious truth of the propositions and because of the apparent incompatibility between the worldview and ethical theory, that there is a flaw in the very worldview on which the ethical theory is claimed to be based. And yet, the arguments for a holistic, interconnected, non-created universe are indeed compelling. I feel that the answer may lie in my above observation that much of the language used by Spinoza is inaccurate. For example, should our existence be determined, the language Spinoza uses to describe actions, i.e. good and bad, choices, etc. is inappropriate because no such concepts could have any real meaning in such a universe. And while there may be no room for such concepts from an objective perspective, given our illusion of free will, Spinoza's Ethics may in fact present a useful narrative for coping with the universe around us, the usefulness rather than the truth of which is more important.

In conclusion, I believe Spinoza to have failed in his attempt to create a valid ethical theory from the view of God as nature, and that his ethical theory is best viewed from a postmodern perspective rather than a modern one because of the inherent contradictions in his writing.