Cote D'Ivoire: Past, Present, and Future

The history of Cote d'Ivoire is one of significant highs and lows. At one time it was the most prized French colony in African. Today it faces violence and political unrest. As Cote d'Ivoire struggles towards peace, it is important to understand the past of this nation in order to comprehend its current hardships and effectively make predictions for its future.

There is a scarce amount of recorded history that can be found on Cote d'Ivoire before colonization. However, it is known that the major ethnic groups that descended into the territory came from neighboring nations including Liberia, Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea, and Ghana. Each group entered the region at different times with the earliest settlers being the Kru, who came into Cote d'Ivoire from Liberia in the 1600's (Mundt 5). At the same time, the French and Portuguese explored the country in search of ways to profit from the new area (Schwab 49).

It was eventually the French that took hold of Cote d'Ivoire. Their primary interest in the region was economic. French traders exploited the country for its ivory, pepper, and people, whom the traders sold into slavery in French colonies in the Americas. In the 1840's, the French systematically persuaded chiefs to allow French domination of trade along the Ivoirian coast. By the 1880's, France began a conquest of the interior. 1893 marked the year that Cote d'Ivoire was officially declared a French colony (Schwab 49-50).

France's rule was characterized by forced labor. In 1944, Felix Houphouet-Boigny created the colony's first trade union for cocoa farmers. After a rapid rise in prominence, Houphouet was appointed to the French Parliament's Constituent Assembly in 1945. Houphouet fought to abolish forced labor while in Paris and won in April 1946 (Meredith 62), making him the undisputed leader of the Ivoirian people (Mundt 10).

In 1946, Cote d'Ivoire joined the French Union, an association of French colonies. By 1958 the association changed its name to the French Community and mandated that each colony be represented by a cabinet of native leaders. This increase in autonomy led to a call for independence from members of the French Community. In May of 1960, France offered independence to all members of the French Community (Mundt 11). Despite apprehension to succeed from France due to the threat of an economic decline (Schwab 48), Houphouet accepted independence on August 7^th, 1960, becoming the country's first president (Mundt 11).

Houphouet became increasingly conservative in his politics after independence. He soon became a French ally in West Africa and a traitor to Ivoirians who believed he had abandoned the ideals of his youth (Schwab 48). Following independence, a surge in French inhabitants made the continued influence of France clearer than it had been even before colonialism. Houphouet insisted that his sustained involvement with the French was to ensure the economic viability of Cote d'Ivoire (Meredith 285-286).

To guarantee little resistance to his power, Houphouet instituted a one-party system led by the Parti Democratique de la Cote d'Ivoire (PDCI). For twenty years elections were held uncontested. Intolerance of opposition was only one characteristic of Houphouet's tyrannical rule. A French investigation found that Houphouet kept one-tenth of the profits from Cote d'Ivoire's cocoa trade for himself. He also spent millions of dollars on to transform his home town of Yamoussoukro into the new capital of Cote d'Ivoire (Meredith 286-288). In addition, there was serious suppression of the press (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1043014.stm).

Opposition to Houphouet's control began in February 1990 with a series of strikes and protests. Resistance was quickly crushed by the police. Continued dissent led to the rise of Houphouet's biggest critic, Laurent Gbagbo. In April 1990, Houphouet declared that multi-party, open elections would be held in November, leaving opposition parties little time to strategize. Houphouet won 82 percent of the popular vote, defeating Gbagbo by a landslide (Meredith 390).

In 1993, the public became aware of Houphouet's battle with prostate cancer (Nugent 399). Houphouet's rule continued until his death on December 7^th, 1993 when Henri Konan Bedie became his successor (Mundt 16). In 1995, formal elections under the multi-party system were held. However, Bedie instituted an election code that prohibited most Muslims in the north of Cote d'Ivoire from running for the presidency. He created the concept of "Ivoirity" that referred to immigrants, who were usually Muslim, as less "Ivoirian" than Christian natives. Bedie was re-elected but faced dissent and claims of corruption soon after. He then supported a campaign to divide southern Christians from northern Muslims, fueling ethnic and religious tensions further (Schwab 60). Until this point Cote d'Ivoire had been seen as the only stable country in the region (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2846.htm).

The country's first coup took place on December 24, 1999. Though the coup was bloodless (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2846.htm), General Robert Guei ruled by force once he came to power. He promised civilian rule and democracy, but never delivered democracy to Cote d'Ivoire, calling those who believed in democracy xenophobics. Ethnic and religious tensions persisted as Guei voiced his disapproval of Muslims moving to the north side of Cote d'Ivoire from Burkina Faso, calling them trespassers (Schwab 60-61). The new constitution was drafted and ratified by the public in the summer of 2000. Its terms emphasized the divide between the Muslim north and the Christian south (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2846.htm).

In the 2000 elections, the concept of "Ivoirity" persisted. Guei too prohibited anyone who was not a "pure" Ivoirian from competing for the presidency (Schwab 61). Alassane Ouattara, the Rassemblement des Republicaines Party's (RDR) candidate for the presidency, was born to an Ivoirian woman. However, his father was Burkinabe, making him ineligible to run for the office (Nugent 399). The disqualification of Ouattara caused members of the RDR to boycott elections. That year, 62% of Ivorians chose not to vote (Nugent 479).

After several disqualifications, Guei was left with one opponent: Laurent Gbagbo, a member of the Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI). When early results showed Gbagbo in the lead, Guei halted the election, claiming the election board was corrupt. Guei declared himself the winner. Gbagbo supporters, outraged, rioted in Abidjan. Civilians assaulted the president's palace forcing him to flee to France. After the votes were counted, Gbagbo, with the most votes, took the position of president (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/

bgn/2846.htm).

The win by Gbagbo enraged Muslims of the RDR who had been kept out of the election by Guei's election code of "Ivoirity". They called for new elections that would include Ouattara and the PCDI's candidate (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/

2846.htm). When these demands were not met, fighting broke out in Abidjan once again, resulting in the death of over 200; many of whom were executed by security forces (Schwab 61). The fighting ended when Ouattara called for peace several days after the fighting began (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2846.htm).

January 7^th, 2001 brought an attempted coup against Gbagbo's government. The effort was thwarted and elections were held only weeks later. This time the RDR and PDCI gained the majority of local seats. Stability seemed to be returning to Cote d'Ivoire. In response, the European Union (EU) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) renewed their economic aid to the country (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2846.htm). Yet opposition still remained in the north. Militias were formed using weapons smuggled into Cote d'Ivoire with the support of insurgents from Sierra Leone and Charles Taylor, Liberia's dictator. Taylor aided rebels in hopes of broadening his power into Cote d'Ivoire, which he anticipated would make him a major actor in West Africa (Schwab 61).

In December of 2001, Guei, Gbagbo, Bedie, and Ouattara attended the Forum for National Reconciliation. At this meeting, the FPI turned over some positions within the government to opposition parties, however, this brought little resolution. (Nugent 479). National unity seemed to be in sight when in August 2002, Gbagbo developed a de facto government that incorporated the RDR (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2846.htm).

The peace established by Gbagbo's de facto government was short lived. Rebels assailed military and security facilities and assaulted government officials in Abidjan, Bouake, and Korhogo on September 19^th, 2002. In the attacks, the Minister of Interior Emile Boga Doudou and other prominent military figures were murdered. Guei was also counted among the dead. The government was successful in ending the attempted coup in Abidjan (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2846.htm). It was later found that the coup was financed largely in part by the Compaore regime in Burkina Faso (Nugent 479).

Without delay, Gbagbo's government invaded shantytowns in Abidjan, searching for rebels and weapons. These towns were, in many cases, burned or destroyed by the security forces. This action displaced more than 12,000 Ivoirians and immigrants (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2846.htm).

Soon after the failed coup, rebels took control of Bouake and Korhogo. The country was then split in two, with rebels, calling themselves the Patriotic Movement of Cote d'Ivoire (MPCI), asserting power over the northern part of the country only two weeks after the failed coup. In mid-October 2002, MPCI and the government agreed upon a ceasefire, allowing the French military to watch over the ceasefire line (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2846.htm). Nonetheless, the French had ulterior motives of protecting their own economic interests and citizens who lived in Cote d'Ivoire by provided 4,000 troops for peacekeeping operations (Schwab 61-62).

Despite peacekeeping efforts, the western part of Cote d'Ivoire developed into a military front when MPCI joined forces with the Ivoirian Popular Movement for the Great West (MPIGO) and the Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP) in late November of 2002. Together the three rebel groups were called the "New Forces." In response to the mounting rebel power, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sent 1,500 troops from Ghana, Benin, Senegal, Togo, and Niger, in addition to the French peacekeepers. These troops would help to ensure the maintenance of the ceasefire agreement (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2846.htm).

In January 2003, the Linas-Marcoussis (LMA) accord was signed. This accord called for a Government of National Reconstruction that would incorporate all political parties and allow some rebels to re-enter the army. The accord also mandated the removal of naturalization laws from the Constitution so that candidates such as Ouattara could run for president. Furthermore, the prosecution of those who drove xenophobia was to be addressed by the government under the accord (Nugent 480). The LMA also requested the involvement of the United Nations (UN) Monitoring Committee in the execution of the accord's stipulations (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2846.htm).

President Gbagbo appointed Seydou Diarra to the position of Prime Minister in January 2003 as well. By March 2003, Diarra had created the Government of National Reconciliation, consisting of 41 ministers. When the new government met in mid-April, UN peacekeeping forces were there to protect the New Forces' ministers. On July 4^th, 2003, the New Forces signed an "End of the War" declaration with the government that pronounced the rebels' acceptance of Gbagbo's authority. The declaration also proclaimed the government's promise to carry out the LMA and create a program called Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/

bgn/2846.htm). Yet, the LMA remained largely unimplemented until December of 2003 when talks between rebels and the government resumed. Still, some of the major issues the LMA set out to address, such as requirements for nationality and land reform, were left unresolved (http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iv.html#Govt).

The government's neglect of the LMA gave rise to violence in spring and summer of 2004. At the Accra III talks in Ghana, the government recommitted itself to the aims of the LMA, signing the Accra III Agreement on July 30, 2004. The agreement set a late September deadline for the government of Cote d'Ivoire to carry out reforms within legislation. It also required rebels to disarm by October 15^th. Both deadlines passed without action from either side. On November 4^th, the government commenced the bombing of rebel targets in northern Cote d'Ivoire. The campaign resulted in the bombing of a French military force in Bouake on November 6^th. Nine French soldiers and one American civilian died. In retaliation, the French wiped out a small part of the Ivoirian air force nearby. Anti-French sentiment flared, and Ivoirians took to the streets of Abidjan once again. The UN placed an arms embargo on Cote d'Ivoire on November 15^th, 2004 and gave the government one month to regain control over the peace process or Cote d'Ivoire would face a travel ban and a freeze on their assets (http://www.state.

gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2846.htm).

In April 2005, the African Union (AU) served as a mediator between the government and the New Forces. During the talks, the Pretoria Agreement was signed. This agreement stated that both sides consent to end the state of war and attend to issues of the DDR, the reinstatement of the New Forces in the government, and the restructuring of the Independent Electoral Commission. Elections were to be held in October of that year. However, the UN Security Council and the AU believed an extra 12 months under Gbagbo was needed to ensure the full implementation of the LMA in the peace process. In December 2005, a new cabinet and Prime Minister, Charles Konan Banny, were chosen. Gbagbo supporters protested against the Banny government in January 2006, voicing disapproval of the continued presence of UN peacekeeping troops in Abidjan (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2846.htm).

The future of Cote d'Ivoire is largely uncertain. With elections to be held in October of 2006, the nation may see a new regime take hold (http://www.state.gov/

r/pa/ei/bgn/2846.htm). With the large influx of Muslim immigrants from Burkina Faso, the next president may very well be Muslim, or at least a Muslim sympathizer. What is certain is that this election will not put ethnic and religious tension to rest. The divide has been made; and without considerable patience and understanding, it will not be dissolved. Amnesty International predicts an increase in human rights violations and a humanitarian crisis if the next leader of Cote d'Ivoire does not promote Ivoirian unity (http://www.

reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/KKEE-6HJTKD?OpenDocument).

Until the day when Cote d'Ivoire resolves its ethnic/religious intolerance, the western world will more than likely be involved in trying to maintain peace on the ground. Countries such as the United States and France will continue to promote peace with the hidden objective of protecting their economic interests in Cote d'Ivoire. This western influence will inevitably incorporate western ideals on government and economic into Cote d'Ivoire, leaving little room for West African ideology (Schwab 63).

The history of Cote d'Ivoire is a complicated one. Cote d'Ivoire had been seen as a beacon of stability in tumultuous West Africa. But after more than 30 years of calm, chaos erupted. Unlike many other nations in the area, the seeds of rebellion were not planted during colonialism. Ethnic and religious divide grew from a place of patriotism and pride in being Ivoirian. Nonetheless, that divide was exploited by tyrannical leaders who sought to gain power through disunity. Now, Ivoirians are left to pick up the pieces and move forward; in unity, or rebellion.
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