Do Future Generations Have Moral Rights?

My objective here is to counter the claim made by Ernest Partridge in his essay "On the Rights of Future Generations" that posterity has moral rights that entail perfect duties justifying the restriction on present consumption. Rather than make the assertion that rights do not exist, I will instead argue that Partridge's claim is unjustified on the presupposition that justified beliefs are justified true statements dependent upon true facts or inferred from a series of justified claims. I will then analyze the components of a moral claim of rights to determine if it is a claim based on facts. If moral rights cannot be said to be facts, then the belief that they exist must inferentially depend on justified claims. Otherwise, it is unjustified. In order to complete this task I will examine all the possible assumptions associated with Partridge's claim in defense of posterity's rights. Using Partridge's own analysis, I will determine if his claim is a factual or moral one. If it's not factual then it is moral, and if it is moral then I'll examine if this type of moral claim is a justified one (adhering to my above definition). I will deal with some possible objections Partridge could raise against my conclusions as well and try to resolve them. It is important that I start by presenting a general summary of Partridge's claim and the potential assumptions which make support it.

Partridge argues for the rights of future generations and the necessary duties they impose upon current peoples. In order to see ourselves as having rights and corresponding duties, we must first see ourselves as rational beings. This goes without saying that this condition is analytic a priori for the very possibility of the existence of rights. To strengthen his argument, Partridge only extends rights to the basis of rational beings¹. Furthermore, a distinction is also made between legal and moral rights. The former are simply those established by positive law (institutionally based within coherent legal systems), while the latter are a priori (prior to experience) rights that exist by virtue of our being rational agents within a moral community². Assuming moral rights implies corresponding duties. Partridge argues for the existence of perfect duties rather than imperfect ones (admittedly, because they carry greater weight in morality)³. These duties by their very nature imply respect for the rights of others that are to be upheld by either specific persons or the world in general. Partridge suspects most of his critics will accept the existence of imperfect duties (beneficence) towards posterity, but his argument focuses on the alleged perfect duties because their existence implies necessary action on the part of current peoples on behalf of the future⁴. In the article Partridge defends his claim against counter-arguments of indeterminacy, non-actuality, temporal difference, the re-population paradox, and the no-claims. There's no denying his argument from his premises is internally valid, but what can be said about his premises in general?

The presupposed premises that make rights possible represent a metaphysical component to morality. The question of whether or not the claim that posterity has rights then depends on whether or not rights exists as facts. This of course depends then on an accepted definition of facts in general. For the purpose of my analysis, I define statements of fact as those types which include the following characteristics: 1) they are determinable by an accepted and established standard methodology for observation; 2) that they can be reproduced universally using this procedure; 3) they are the types of statements that can be verified objectively either through observation or inference from presupposed beliefs (or series of beliefs) that are justified; and 4) they contain within them true statements about contingent events, acts, or accounts as they occur in the empirical world. Justified beliefs proclaiming their content as fact then must assert these facts as (by definition) objective and true. Thus, Partridge's claim must prove itself to be justified on grounds that it contains facts, and that the existence of rights exhibits the properties of facts in order for it to be a justified claim of facts. If it does not exhibit facts, then it must be inferred from a previously assumed set of beliefs. If this is the case, then the claim that future generations have rights is a moral, not factual one. Whether Partridge's claim is a factual one or not depends on a number of important issues.

If statements of facts are the type of statements that exhibit certain properties (exactly or similar to the ones I previously listed), then we must examine the claim for rights and decide if it exhibits those defined properties. This is where Partridge's distinction between moral and legal rights becomes important. For Partridge, legal rights are defined and applied by institutions of law. These rights can best be understood as rights defined, upheld, and protected through institutions of state. Conversely, moral rights transcend human institution and extend universally to all members of the rational moral community. Partridge uses this distinction to refute the argument that inability to claim rights equals not having them, since this wouldn't apply to moral rights⁵. The distinction is more significant in another context though. Claims regarding legal rights can be understood to be statements of fact, which can be said to exhibit certain properties that distinguish them from other types of claims (ideas). If I make the claim that I have the right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, this is only a matter of fact in so far as I'm considered a legal citizen of the United States. Since I am a legal citizen of the United States, then I can verify my claim through reference to the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the United States of America. My claim can be objectively verified and reproduced by other persons as well. However, is this true for a moral right? Let's assume I make the claim that I have a moral right to enjoy fresh air, which others are dutifully bound to respect. No such right is guaranteed or institutionally recognized in the United States' legal system (which in turn is derived from the Constitution's definition of guaranteed rights). Whereas my claim of the right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment is a claim of fact, whose results could be verified objectively and universally by any other person, and did not depend on inference from presupposed beliefs. The same cannot be said about my claim to a moral right to enjoy fresh air. Thus, I am justified in believing that I have a legal right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment if, and only if, that claim is a factual one.

My claim to a right to enjoy fresh air is neither universal nor objective. It's not universal because not everyone will agree that I have any right to enjoy fresh air at all. Likewise, it's not an objective claim for a number of reasons. In order for my claim to exist objectively true, it would exist independently of my own thinking about it. And in order for such a claim to exist as true, then its contents would have to be based on unbiased facts rather than affection towards those contents. My claim of having a right to enjoy fresh air says more about my feelings about fresh air, rather than an objective existential claim. Thus it is subjective, as I cannot determine (objectively) that such rights can be said to exist, rather I infer them from other sets of assumptions about rights and fresh air. My feelings towards it give me an incentive to try and stake a claim in its existence as a right. I derive this right from presupposed assumptions regarding what I may claim to be entitled to, and what I can reasonably expect others to be able to abide. Furthermore, my subjective claim that such a right exists to me (when not objectively verifiable) further implies that my claim is not factual, but inferential. Whether or not this type of claim is justified needs further analysis.

So far I have argued that moral rights are not factual statements. One could rightfully make the claim then that moral rights do exist but our legal institutions are misguided or simply not in line with our moral rights. So in the context of statements regarding contingent facts, moral rights do not exist as anything more than mere ideas, but one is nonetheless still justified in making the claim that future generations have moral rights that imply duties to restrict our consumption. Partridge does make this claim - which indicates the existence of moral rights even when they contradict institutional legal rights (i.e. that the legal institutions of 19^th century U.S. denied slaves' their moral rights)⁶. Objections can be made in my definition of facts - which some may find only adequate for defining empirical facts. Mathematics, for example, does not have correlating empirical objects yet they are contained as facts. The statement "2+2=4" is indeed a statement of fact and a justified one as well. Now I must assert another premise regarding justified beliefs that is not wholly dependent upon claims of empirical facts given through sense impressions.

My previous definition of justified beliefs was simply to rule out the possibility of moral claims being justified on grounds of claims of fact. The objection raised in the previous paragraph presents another problem: justified beliefs from inference. By inference I mean the process of reasoning to conclusions with some probability relative to the premises. Moral claims, because they are not claims regarding observable facts, must be inferred from beliefs/ideas (by ideas I am referring to concepts with no corresponding empirical sense impression). In order for this type of claim to be a justified belief, it must be inferred from other justified beliefs/ideas. If moral claims can be inferred from justified beliefs, then Partridge's claim regarding the existence of posterity's moral rights is indeed a justifiable one for restricting our current levels of consumption in light of the duty implied by these rights. If these claims are not inferred from justified beliefs, then it follows that Partridge's claim is not justified, and there exists no justifiable explanation (through rights that impose duties) for current peoples to restrict their consumption for the sake of posterity.

Partridge's conclusion regarding the existence of moral rights depend on those beliefs he is inferring them from. In order for these beliefs to be justified, they cannot be inferred from strictly descriptive premises--otherwise one is committing the naturalistic fallacy (inferring "ought" from "is"). Partridge avoids this mistake and rests his premises for which he infers rights on strictly normative grounds. Normative (in this sense) means a prescriptive claim of value or "ought" as opposed to a positive (descriptive) claim of how things exist as we sense them. Partridge grounds his definition of rights on what philosophers have called "moral agency." By moral agency, Partridge refers to:

the capacities, and consequent interests, which designate 'personahood' -i.e., use of an articulate language, self-concept and self-consciousness, time perspective, hypothetical thinking, abstract reflection, responsiveness to moral principles...⁷

Is Partridge's normative claim a justified belief? In order for it to be, then it must not be inferred from any moral premises since it follows that moral premises require further justified inference. Otherwise, this moral belief depends upon another moral belief which in turn depends on the inferences from even more moral beliefs. This cannot be the case since the result would place the argument for posterity's moral rights in an infinite regress, and it follows that any belief whose premises depend on an infinite regression cannot be a justified one. If I can demonstrate that Partridge infers his conclusion that posterity has moral rights on a moral claim then it follows his belief is unjustified.

As noted in his article, Partridge infers a particular concept of rights that imply special perfect duties towards posterity. First of all, he extends them to rational moral agents (defined above). Secondly, he constructs moral rights as valid claims against particular or general persons (as well as institutions)⁸. Partridge also adopts H.L.A. Hart's following principle: "to have a [moral] right entails having a moral justification for limiting the freedom of another person and for determining how he should act" ⁹. Note how this principle invokes a moral claim as to how one ought to act towards anybody who has claim to a right. If posterity has rights, then current people ought to act in accordance to their duties. This is not a strictly normative statement, but partially normative and partially moral. The normative claim would simply posit human beings as rational agents with some value. However, one cannot derive rights solely from the grounds that human beings (regardless of temporal distance) are rational agents without a moral component. Hence the other component of Partridge's principle - rational agency determines how such agents ought to be treated. For Partridge his moral claim for the existence of moral rights is inferred from a normative/moral claim that rational beings have rights (which presupposes that beings with rights ought to have those rights respected). From this, Partridge states that beings with rights deserve respect, and hence we can conclude that his premise for which he grounds his position is indeed dependent upon (at least partially) moral premises. Can moral claims inferred from moral premises (regarding rights) constitute a justified belief?

Partridge's normative claim that human beings are rational agents is a justified belief. He makes this point through appealing to the interests, capacities, and qualities that make this value judgment true. Humans indeed to exhibit the characteristics described by Partridge (and many other philosophers) so we are justified in believing this claim. However, as I mentioned above, there is more. To extend how these rational beings ought to be treated implies a moral statement. This moral statement in turn is not justified in the same regards as the claim of human beings being rational. How does Partridge make this assertion without referencing some other moral claim? To make a value claim about human beings is not the same as saying how human beings (in accordance to this value claim) ought to be treated. The claim about how humans ought to treat one another (regardless of temporal difference) is a moral claim inferred from other moral beliefs. Where do these moral beliefs come from? They cannot be said to be inferred strictly from morally neutral claims. They can only be inferred from other moral beliefs. These moral beliefs would then have to be inferred from other moral beliefs. This can (and will) go on forever. As you can see here, the logic employed represents an infinite regress. If a belief implies an infinite regression, it cannot be justified. The infinite regress occurs in this manner: posterity is composed of human beings (p₁), human beings are moral agents (p₂), as moral agents they have rights (p₃) - thus, posterity has rights. However, (p₃) depends on a hidden moral premise that presupposes rational moral beings with rights ought to be treated in a particular way (with respect towards these rights), but this depends on a moral premise that posits a belief that moral agents ought to be treated in that particular way over its opposite (not having their rights respected), which again would be another moral premise whose justification would depend on further moral premise. Thus, premise (p₃) presupposes further moral statements of "ought" that indicate an infinite regression.

Partridge could object to my claim that his belief in the rights of posterity is an unjustified one by stating that the majority of society do believe in moral rights and according to their own moral positions would believe they apply to posterity just as much as they do to current generations. However, such a position is neither sound nor justified either. Society can be (and has been according to Partridge) wrong about moral rights in the past. If moral rights exist, then late 18^th century American society was very confused about their application when they started importing Africans by the thousands to live a life of chattel slavery. Likewise, universal moral rights apply universally. There would have to be a general consensus across the entire spectrum of culture, nations, ethnicities, races, etc. regarding the existence of moral rights towards posterity. Such historical and current disagreements about the existence of moral rights seem to refute any justification for moral claims (about moral rights towards posterity) on grounds of social acceptance.

Partridge could also object that my conclusions would be absurd in that it would posit all moral claims as unjustified beliefs. However, this is a reduction ad absurdum. My claims strictly apply to moral claims about rights since these particular claims try to impose perfect duties that current peoples are morally bound to. Such demands on current peoples indeed require investigation as to whether or not they are justified beliefs, since much would have to be sacrificed to satisfy these duties. Claims to rights for posterity (and their duties) are problematic for the reasons stated above. This doesn't deny morality or make the ambitious claim that all moral statements are unjustified. Moral claims not based on moral agency and rights could in fact be justified. I would neither endorse nor support the application of my argument to all moral claim, but rather only ones which infer conclusions from moral premises.

Furthermore, even if Partridge is correct, it still leaves many problems in tact. Human beings don't seem particularly motivated to respond to transgressions (or outright violations) of moral rights within their own time. Even if we accept the existence of moral rights, why do we continue to allow such violations in our own generations? Human beings are always interested in defining and reacting in accordance to moral rights/duties when it's convenient, but have a dubious reputation for upholding them universally. Current peoples (whom the "re-population paradox and time-span" arguments don't apply) are denied the same moral rights Partridge is arguing for today. If the problems of indeterminacy, non-actuality, and an inability to claim their moral rights prevent us from upholding our perfect moral duties to people in our own generation, what hopes do we have of respecting them for posterity?

If the claim that moral rights exist for future persons is unjustified, then we can conclude that current people are not bound by perfect duties to restrict their consumption on the basis of rights (for the sake of posterity). However, my claim is not to say that we are (or ought) to be morally disinterested in the needs of the future nor our effects on their well-being. Rather, my objective here has been to demonstrate that rights-based claims are not justified and cannot serve as proper explanation for why current peoples ought to do anything towards posterity. Alternatives that could satisfy this problem of a justified claim and present current peoples with reasons to act (or abstain) from certain behaviors in regards to the well-being of the future, do exist. The question for philosophers, politicians, environmentalists, and scientists then is to find this bridge between the present and future.

End Notes:

¹ Partridge, Ernest. "On the Rights of Future Generations" University of California Riverside, 1990. p.2.

² Ibid., p.2 & 8.

³Ibid. p. 2.

⁴ Ibid., p. 3.

⁵ Ibid., p. 8.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid., p. 2.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.