Egyptian Israeli Peace Treaty of 1979

The primary factors generating a peace agreement between Egypt and Israel in 1979 consisted of a mixture of domestic and external factors for the respective sides. While Egypt maintained an offensive "Egypt first" policy behind Anwar Sadat, who hoped to eliminate Soviet influence while embarking on a rebuilding phase for the country, Israeli sentiment shifted in terms of the cost of retaining possession of the occupied territories and the Sinai(Bickerton, Klausner, 191). Israelis began to perceive the Sinai occupation as a detriment rather than an advantage and it was always seen as "negotiable" in the eyes of Israeli Prime Minister Begin (Bickerton, Klausner, 190, 191). The combination of the Egyptians strong desire to regain the Sinai and Israel's reluctance to hold on to it was critical in opening the door to potential peace agreements. Another reason behind the signing of the peace treaty was the objective of both Israel and Egypt to retain support from the United States which would prove to be crucial to the welfare of both sides for years to come.

The main factors contributing to the other Arab nations not signing the agreement was due to the fact that neither of the frameworks in the Camp David accords addressed the questions of the fates of Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, and the issue of Palestine. These issues were all central to the cause of the major Arab states like Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iraq. The accords and the peace treaty were more catered to gaining specific benefits for Egypt and Israel which ultimately left many issues significant to other Arab states excluded from negotiations. This coupled with the political ramifications potentially suffered by any Arab leaders who dared side with Sadat and Israel eventually led all Arab states to oppose the agreement leaving Egypt alienated from the rest of the greater Arab world.

In order to realize the accords of Camp David, Israel agreed to turn over "all Israeli settlements from the Sinai, as well as... the oil fields and Israeli air bases" (Bickerton, Klausner, 190). This was done so because Begin realized that "The ideological and political reasons for retaining the West Bank and Gaza did not apply to the Sinai"(Bickerton, Klausner, 191). This outlook was reiterated in Begins statements insistent that the Palestine issue would see only autonomy for the people not for the land. This demonstrates how Israel recognized that there being no real stake at any level in maintaining the Sinai and that doing so had "enabled Sadat to launch surprise attacks" and rather than sustaining secure borders was actually "doing the reverse" by allowing Egypt to transform into it's offensive posture without crossing the desert, leaving Israel constantly vulnerable to surprise attacks (Bickerton, Klausner, 191). Israel would in turn secure itself from any Arab attack "neither Jordan nor Syria would go to war without Egypt" and would also obtain "Normal commercial sales of oil" providing both military and financial incentive for Israel to enter into a peace treaty with Sadat and Egypt (Bikcerton, Kluasner, 191). This information exhibits how vital it was for Israel to engage in these peace treaties and how beneficial they were from multiple standpoints.

Egypt's motive for entering into the peace agreement was triggered by the policies of Anwar Sadat seeking to quell Pan Arab identity and achieve an agreement for Egyptian purposes. Sadat sought to "free up resources that had been devoted to waging war in order to reconstruct and widen the Suez Canal and to Free Egypt from the Soviet Orbit" (Bickerton, Klausner, 191). This statement symbolizes Sadat's desire to push Egypt in an independent direction that envisioned a political climate in which Egypt detached itself from Pan Arab ideology and restrained Soviet influence that defined the Nasser era. This detachment by Sadat from fervent Pan Arab nationalist politics, revolving around freeing Palestine and eliminating Israel, to the Egypt first policy, allowed for peace negotiations to persist without overrunning Israel's firm stance of preserving the land of the West Bank and Gaza and afforded Sadat the opportunity to

agree to a "separate peace, without regards for other Arab states or the Palestinians" (Bickerton, Klausner, 190). This shifting ideology, lent to Egyptian politics through Sadat, would lead to a striving by Egypt to retain the Sinai to rebuild infrastructure while widening the Suez lending a greater sense of independence and strength to Egypt in order to embark on the path of building a strong nationalist state without regards for other Arabs and Palestine.

An integral external motivation influencing both Egypt and Israel to agree to the peace treaty was the presence of the United States, and greater than this the need for the aid of the U.S. for both countries. Although the efforts of Jimmy Carter and his administration in mediating the negotiation amongst the two sides can not be underestimated, the financial assistance the United States offered was the most pressing factor in why this agreement was signed. "Both sides... were fully aware of the importance of future relations with the United States"... Concern for this relationship perhaps more than any other factor led Begin reluctantly to agree to concessions" (Bickerton, Klausner, 191). This statement is monumental in exhibiting just how much Israel in particular, needed U.S. support for future prosperity and to survive in a hostile Arab world. Already Israel received nearly 2 billion dollars and the agreement would only secure them 3 billion more in financial aid, while Egypt would double it's aid to 2 billion dollars(Bickerton, Klausner, 192).

The Arab states not signing on to the peace agreements of 1979 comes as no surprise. The two Frameworks of the Camp David Accords were highly unfavorable to the Arab states. The first framework encompassed the broader issue of peace in the Middle East, calling for "Jordan, Israel and 'representatives of the Palestinian people to settle the question of the West Bank and Gaza" along with a 5 year transition to Arab control while talks resumed(Bickerton, Klausner, 192). This vague outline, intended as the road map to a resolution, provided virtually nothing in the way of answering the question of Palestine. This was done with great caution, sensitive to Israel's firm stance that it will not give up these lands and Begin's clear statements that Israel will not concede these territories at any cost. The structure of the framework was such that it alienated the Arab world, excluding issues important to respective states. The lack of consideration to Jerusalem meant the Islamic powerhouse Saudi Arabia could not accept the agreement, seeing it's role as the catalyst for political Islam in the region. Saudi Arabia's political leadership was contingent upon it's vested authority in preserving purist Wahhabi Islam and the failure to address Jerusalem left them at a loss and unsupportive to the agreement. The lack of attention given to the matters of Palestine and the Golan Heights excluded Iraq and Syria from the agreements as well. The agreements were shaped in such a way that conceded little to nothing to the Arab states and neglected to address the concerns that subsisted at the heart of the entire Arab world.

Another reason why the Arab states refused to sign the peace treaty was the Negative image circulating amongst the people regarding the exclusive nature of the agreement and the complete disregard it showed to the interests of the greater Arab world. In a region where political power is rooted in the ability to rally popular support any leader who agreed with such an unpopular measure would have "endangered their own political survival, owing to ideological and spiritual importance of the issues to their people" (Bickerton, Klausner, 192). It is apparent from this quote that to agree to these already unfavorable frameworks would have signaled political suicide for any Arab leader who engaged in them, seeing as how Sadat was already perceived as a villain by the Arab world and cut off from the Arab League through multi faceted sanctions and shunned through being expelled from various Arab organizations. Sadat was less

restricted due to massive benefit received from the agreements from Israel and his Egypt first policy implemented in the country.

In concluding the essay I feel personally that the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt was more detrimental in the long run to Middle East politics than it was beneficial. The agreement really failed to touch on resolving the issues of the West Bank, Gaza, Golan Heights and Jerusalem which undermined future efforts at peace. The Camp David accords made Arabs much more reluctant to deal with the United States, Israel and Egypt as they viewed the events in question as trying to stop the Arab movement for Palestinian liberation in the region. "The Palestinians were largely overlooked and ignored and ignored as the 1980's as the 1980's began" (Bickerton, Klausner, 193). This is indicative of the situation. Nothing was resolved and hostilities only grew worse with each passing day as trivial agreements were signed. The intended ripple effect of having Anwar Sadat make a landmark visit to Israel and signing an agreement was non existent.