Ethical Concerns of Reproductive Cloning

Amidst the controversies surrounding the recent developments in cloning and genetic technology, there lies a strong debate around the possible therapeutic possibilities of cloning human beings. This ethical controversy focuses on a vast array of concerns ranging from appeals to human dignity, scientific manipulation of natural reproductive methods, and slippery slope concerns over what such advancements may arise. In order to understand the ethical concerns surrounding this controversial topic, it's essential to understand what is at stake in reproductive cloning and to analyze the opposing positions. For the purpose of this analysis, I will take into context both the descriptive empirical facts and the broader philosophical ideas surrounding them. Briefly, let us examine what reproductive cloning actually is.

This paper will focus on using cloning specifically as a means of alternative treatment for infertile couples whom have a strong desire to give natural birth to children with a genetic makeup remarkably similar to their own. This is a revolutionary new technology that offers infertile couples the chance to have children of their own biological and genetic makeup when other standard forms of infertility treatment have failed, or would otherwise require them to look to donors or genetically dissimilar children (adoption). The facts involved in this process render limitless possibilities in addressing problems of infertility. Prior to examining the broader ethical concerns of either side, understanding the facts about the procedure itself is key.

Reproductive cloning refers to the process of duplicating an already existing organism at the cellular level. The process is known as somatic cell nuclear transfer. In this process the genetic materials from one organism are transported into an ovum whose nucleus has previously been removed (Cloning Fact Sheet 2006). Next, a chemical or electrical stimulus is added to the cells to promote cell-division and growth. This procedure is not creating a duplicate organism or an "exact copy," but rather a new organism with similar genetic material as the original donor. Thus, this procedure would be able to give infertile couples their own biological child while not being an immediate replica (Cloning Fact Sheet 2006). This is but a brief summary of the scientific procedure behind reproductive cloning. Next I will assess the ethical implications that arise from this.

There are a number of important ethical concerns surrounding this procedure and it is important to look at them from either side of the perspective. One of these criticisms against reproductive cloning focuses on the moral personhood of the artificially conceived child. The genetic uniqueness of children conceived through cloning technologies is also a serious concern. Other arguments rest on genetic modification coinciding with reproductive cloning and the possible slippery slope it entails (Strong 2005). My intention is to examine these important ethical questions from the perspective of both supporters and objectors to reproductive cloning technologies.

For those who object to reproductive cloning (and typically cloning in general) a great deal of stress is put on the metaphysical treatment of the fetus. Concerns focus on the fetus' status as a human being, and the question of whether or not such reproductive methods treat it as merely a means to an end, or whose humanity is an end in itself (Schuklenk & Ashcroft 2000). This is a greatly divisive philosophical debate that has intrigued moral philosophers and bio-ethicists for many years. To treat someone merely as a means to an end is to not take for granted their dignity as a member of a particular community of rational beings (Schuklenk & Ashcroft 2000). This idea has been popularized well before reproductive cloning was ever an issue. This is known as a deontological moral argument, or an argument stemming from our duties, which is well-grounded in humanity according to these objectors. What this view holds is that through the cloning process, the child (once brought to term) is not the "undivided author" of his fate. He will not see himself as a unique member of a community of autonomous, rational beings (Mameli 2006). Once the child has been informed of his status as a person conceived through methods of reproductive cloning, he will deny his own autonomy and will view himself as nothing but a means to someone else's ends (presumably his infertile parents). According to J. Habermas, in order to consider oneself a full-member of the moral community as a rational being one must believe himself a full member by virtue of his autonomy (Mameli 2006). Without this component the child is then susceptible to living an unfulfilling life without concrete belief in his own moral status as a human being or more importantly a person. It follows that once someone does not see themselves as full members of this community then they're no longer justifiably held responsible for their actions and, moreover, will not see themselves as morally responsible by virtue of their very being having been determined by the factors that led to their creation in the first place (Mameli 2006).

The criticism leveled against reproductive cloning based on the lack of genetic uniqueness in the child is a complicated one. The lack of genetic uniqueness for the child would cause real-life harm for the individual. Namely, he would not see himself as a unique individual on any grounds. This would lead to the mistreatment of individuals conceived by reproductive cloning means, a lack of respect for such individuals both in society and within themselves, and would result in an overall harm in society. These are broad leaps, but to understand this criticism requires us to think of how important our own individuality is to us. Would we feel any less of an individual to know that we had a direct link in genetic material to one of our parents? The question of what potential scenarios might stem from this raise further question. To deliberately bring a person into the world in which his lack of genetic uniqueness will have severe impacts on his personhood and the way in which he views himself or how society treats him would certainly be doing him a harm (Mameli 2006).

A final claim against reproductive cloning lies in the uncertainty in the future. Many believe that reproductive cloning, especially coupled with gene modification would represent a "slippery slope." This slippery slope represents the fear that perhaps one day science will end up with gene "manipulation." The possible negative side effects to arise out of this are endless. The major claim is that we are "playing god" with a human life that is perfectly capable of living a fulfilling, healthy life without the interference of science. In other words, "why fix what's not broken" (Strong 2005)? A second possible outcome would be the creation of a type of human being (through genetic modification) that won't resemble human beings as we know them in the present. This fear holds firm the belief that genetic modification technology will lead to the implantation of genes responsible for abnormal qualities not found in typical human beings (Mameli 2006). Thus, the slippery slope rests on the fact that while reproductive cloning is beneficial for infertile couples, it is opening up a whole new front of scientific and genetic control by scientists akin to Pandora's Box. This type of objection assumes that this technology might have unforeseen consequences we would readily reject.

Contrary to these objections, proponents offer a number of ethical viewpoints aimed at refuting the aforementioned criticisms and positive arguments for the ethical justification for reproductive cloning. The arguments for reproductive cloning vary in their support for how far it should go (whether or not to include genetic modification), what limits should be set, and what the possible outcomes will be in the future (Mameli 2006). Proponents argue that much of the objections to reproductive cloning are unfounded in both science and reasonably expected outcomes, and we shall look at these now.

To counter the claim that the child born through reproductive cloning means will not see himself as a moral agent, philosophers and bio-ethicists have pointed to the fact that moral autonomy and responsibility are not contradictory to children who are developed by such artificial means. In fact, in her essay against such claims, M. Mameli argues that there would be no reason at all to expect that more children born through reproductive cloning would exhibit moral-devaluation (as Habermas calls it) than children born of traditional reproduction (Mameli 2006). Furthermore, the only real cause that would lead to such a denial of one's own moral responsibility and moral autonomy would be done so by parents who wished to modify genes responsible for mental development - which in turn would be a form of abuse. Mameli continues to argue that such forms of abuse would and could not be tolerated and such claims resemble abuses of the technology--not problems inherent with the technology itself (Mameli 2006).

The claim that reproductive cloning will rob children of a distinct genetic uniqueness is unfounded in science according to many experts (Strong 2005). This objection is made under a misunderstanding the process itself and what could reasonably be expected. Only the nucleus of the adult parent cell is placed into the egg-cell, and this only creates similar genetic material - the way in which this genetic material manifests itself through the growth and development of the child could be dramatically different. Similar nuclear DNA can bring about significant differences in phenotypical features (Strong 2005). Even if the genetic material is the same, this is not all that matters. The environment of the fetus will be drastically different and will create distinctions in the child that will contribute to its uniqueness. Most importantly, cloning does not replicate the mentality, attitudes, goals, ambitions, or even the brain itself of the parent DNA. Thus, the child will have a completely unique and independent mind, regardless of his being born through reproductive cloning (Strong 2005).

The "slippery slope" arguments regarding the uncertainties of the future are unfounded as well. These arguments assume unreasonable expectations regarding our own commitment to morality and ethics in the medical and scientific fields. Scientific safeguards and regulatory bodies will continue to exist, and instances where these regulations and standards are transgressed would be dealt with appropriately. Why should we expect that advances in technology will lead to moral deterioration? This form of argument is logically invalid though because it assumes that if we make changes or exceptions to our current standards of bio-ethics based on available technology, then our commitment to moral decency and ethics in these fields will eventually be discredited, and that will be an overall negative outcome for all. This does not follow logically and cannot possibly be true. Reproductive cloning will open all sorts of possibilities regarding genetic modification and other uses of cloning to increase human welfare, but we should conclude that this means such technologies will not be held to the ethical standards of the community and experts; and further, uncertainties of the possible future are not sufficient grounds for limiting our advancement or application of this newfound technology. We already accept the uncertainty of the future in many ways but we do not discontinue particular policies or plans in light of this uncertainty. The same applies to reproductive cloning.

Up to this point I have indicated three ethical arguments for and against reproductive cloning. Personally, I find myself in favor of reproductive cloning and find the arguments posed by objectors to be insufficient and inadequate to justify our abstaining from utilizing this new technology. The possibilities of reproductive cloning would provide an overall increase in human welfare. Not only will infertile parents be given new opportunities to have genetically similar children, but will broaden our understanding of our own genetic makeup. This information is an invaluable resource in addressing the number of genetic problems we face as human beings. Further, it can lead to new opportunities in dealing with other complex issues regarding our own health related and social issues.

The power and control over genetic materials is certainly a fragile one. I also believe that in order for this technology to be beneficial it must be conducted and utilized in a socially responsible and ethical way. We must push the boundaries of our scientific understanding while at the same time not undermining the very purpose of our doing so. If scientific advancements do not serve the general welfare and in fact bring about some form of harm, then they should be discontinued or significantly altered. The possibility of misuse does not correspond to a justifiable reason for discontinuing such research and practices altogether though. If society can benefit from reproductive cloning, and I do believe the empirical data supports this, then whatever minor harms may arise are outweighed by the benefits brought forth. This utilitarian point of view requires continued study into the possible effects and ways in which to regulate such technologies, but does not conclude that we should altogether dismiss this possibility when there is evidence to believe that it could bring about significant benefits. We have to look at future possibilities and not merely within the limited framework of our own understandings. As our technology and understanding of human genetics increases, so too will our ability to grasp the ethical issues at stake and best formulate a serious and effective plan for dealing with them. Thus, I do not see any possible harms that could be imposed upon society through the responsible use of reproductive cloning technologies now, nor do I see the aforementioned criticisms having any serious weight as to justify limiting our advancements into genetic sciences and technologies in general.

I have presented reproductive technology as a breakthrough with the potential to make great additions to medical and technological advancements on a number of fronts. Accordingly, I have also tried to present the arguments for and against as objectively as possible. These criticisms against reproductive cloning focus on the ethics of such technology in general and the possibility of unforeseen consequences in the future. The responses to these criticisms, which also serve as arguments in favor of reproductive cloning, attempt to dispel the misinformation and unfounded concerns. Overall, reproductive technology remains a controversial and sensitive issue that continues to raise serious questions in a broad spectrum of concerns.

Sources:

Cloning Fact Sheet (2006) Retrieved 17 October 2007, from the Human Genome Project Information, U.S. Department of Energy Office of Science, & Office of Biological and Environmental Research http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/elsi/cloning.shtml>.

Mameli, M. (2007). Reproductive cloning, genetic engineering and the autonomy of the child: the moral agent and the open future. Journal of Medical Ethics, 33, 87-93. Binghamton University Library: .

Schuklenk, Udo & Ashcroft, Dr. Richard. (2000). The ethics of reproductive cloning (research). Monash Bioethics Review. 19(2), 34-45. .

Strong, C. (2005). Reproductive cloning combined with genetic modification. Journal of Medical Ethics, 31, 645-658. Binghamton University Library: http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/31/11/654?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&fulltext=Surrogate+motherhood&andorexactfulltext=and&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=0&sortspec=relevance&resourcetype=HWCIT>.