Evaluate the View that the Expression of Religious Belief Involves a Commitment A2 Practice Essay 41/50

When looking at faith, some may consider it important to also look at how this coincides with reason. If someone gave faith to a specific ideology without any fixed ideas or absolute reason or logic to the idea that they are believing in (e.g. if someone believed that when you die you were reincarnated with no absolute and reasonable evidence) then some may consider these ideologies to require some commitment as you are to accept the belief without having an absolute knowledge of whether it is true or not.

But is all the basis of faith based around this idea? Logically you could have faith and reason together (e.g. I can have faith that I will be able to eat dinner tonight based on the firm reason that I can provide myself with food and it will generally be true) though of course with religious beliefs if you had something completely firm and solid within reason you would have faith in the religion because you knew it to be beneficial to believe in it; but suppose we believed in it not because of commitment, but because it would mathematically be more beneficial? Take Pascal's wager as an example, he stated that based on probability we should believe in God, due to there being no benefit if the non-believer is right, but for there being a benefit for the believer if the believer is right, and a punishment for the non-believer if the believer is right. Now although this may be considered by some a good reason to believe in God; would this be considered an ethical reason to believe in God, in the eyes of God him/herself? Surely a God would not want you to have faith in them just because based on probability it would yield the best results? It would be like giving your parent an expensive present for their birthday purely in the hope that they are more likely to give you an expensive present for their birthday; the intentions aren't as moral as they could be and could be considered in some cases as selfish. What's more the wager could be considered as reductionist, the four points of the table are mainly based around the faith of a single God (which is in this case the Juedo-Christian concept of God) but in reality there are multiple concepts of God, most of which have different rules of faith and worship to the others; whence if you worship another God you may be considered of worshipping a false idol and hence may receive a punishment. Therefore for the wager to be more accurate you have to separate the "believing in god" part of the wager into all the separate faiths; and if only one truly gets you the reward for believing in it, the odds would be significantly lower if we assumed that we were taking into account this. We could easily have faith without this mathematical logic. Although some may argue that faith is about a reassurance of a benefit after committing to it in life, regardless of whether there truly is mathematical knowledge or not (e.g. would someone have faith in a religion even if they believed or knew it would have absolutely no benefit to them in the afterlife? If we think of the social contract nature of society where we agree to certain rules because we feel they will benefit us (e.g. disagreeing to the death penalty means you are less likely to be killed if you are wrongly accused) that because of this we may commit to faith purely because we will eventually benefit from what comes out of it (and this is before taking into account Pascal's Wager) ignoring the logic of science or reason because it doesn't benefit us after death whilst religion and spirituality possibly could.

Taking the idea of benefits later on in life we should look at what else affects our ideas on faith. If someone is able to associate certain emotions to a situation, then they may feel those certain emotions in that specific situation (also known as classical conditioning) regardless of whether that emotion is truly there it may emulated. So if someone felt a feeling of love and unity whenever they were in a place of God or spirituality (which is a reason why some people enjoy doing things with church groups as the link between the emotional ties of God are sometimes felt within those said groups). Because everyone's experiences of the world and the emotions that they associate with certain situations could be considered as subjective, this may explain why some are able to commit to certain beliefs (e.g. the emotional attachment of unconditional love can make some people go against logic itself) while others aren't. The way we emotively associate anything can create a massive difference in how we perceive something; however, some may state that our absolute belief in faith and/or commitment is not based purely on religion. We need to take into account environmental factors such as upbringing (e.g. if you were to be raised in a spiritual environment would this effect your attachment to spiritual ideas?) and even in some possible cases we could look at genetics. There are some diseases and disorders that are hereditary (e.g. Tubular Sclerosis, Huntington's Disease) so could it be possible that there is a specific personality or synapse in the brain that is inherited that allows people to commit to religion and spiritual ideas more easily? Though this may seem rather obscure (and unnecessary to some as it would state that God has genetically disallowed some to have faith in his ideals; which is somewhat illogical to the attributes of God himself) if we consider this to be genetic then it wouldn't necessarily be a form of commitment; as it is part of their brain/DNA to be dependant on having faith in something spiritual of religious (though the idea in itself is very debatable as not all genetic traits are passed down and yet again, it would be illogical from a religious stand point for a creator to create such a belief as genetic; though from an atheist point of view it could be considered as a hereditary delusion to committing to something without scientific reason).

Whilst emotions and other external factors may affect faith, we need to ask ourselves: what if our faith is wrong? If the faith was truly wrong then the whole point of faith, regardless of what affects it, would be made redundant. Aquinas states that both faith and reason should cohere, and if there was something with faith and reason we would all be satisfied with a rational faith. Judging by this logic we must assume that there are some who are generally uncomfortable having faith in something that is irrational; which we may be able to see from W.K. Clifford's response to faith. Clifford believes that any belief in faith with insufficient evidence is wrong, and weakens our cognitive powers. In objection to this view we have Plantinga, who states that not all faith or belief requires absolute evidence to be true, as this would mean that every belief would have to be based on other beliefs to be true which may lead to an infinite chain of beliefs that would never end. Hence it may be that people need to believe in something without any scientific evidence or reasonable logic at all; Plantinga believes that beliefs must be basic and simple, thus requiring a lot of commitment and accepting the premise of the belief without absolute self-evidence. So looking at it from this view, if there was evidence to a specific idea of belief or faith (as would be required for W.K. Clifford to even consider accepting it) then would this require a commitment at all? If we know something to be true and are not making "a leap of faith" regardless of what the consequences are if there was an error then is there as much commitment? Also we need to take into account certain knowledge that we do take into account without knowing the evidence before hand. When you were first told "1+1=2" did you question this? Most rational and/or innate logical implications are taken into account without question, but yet when we accept other a priori beliefs we reject them? If we can commit ourselves to the laws of maths and science without questioning their credibility then what is stopping us from committing to the laws of believing in God? Some may say that this is down to a lack of commitment and belief; and if Plantinga is correct about these beliefs needing to be basic then these leaps of faith would at least require some commitment to be required for the faith (though based on Plantinga's logic, only if they have are basic and are lacking in empirical evidence).

William James took this rationality to believe a step further with his idea of "The Will to Believe" stating that it is sometimes rational to believe in something without rational evidence when there is not enough evidence to absolutely decide on the genuine option (which in this case is "God exists" and "God doesn't exist") and if we look, as there is no absolute evidence to prove God's existence there is also no absolute evidence to disprove his existence, but one could only really believe in one or the other as they are both antonymous to each other. But with two different ways to believe or take this belief (at least to a point of certainty, agnosticism may have a different outlook) but what determines which genuine truth we aspire to? As mentioned above these genuine truths can be affected by our emotions which can determine how we see and perceive belief and faith and how rational it truly is. However, William James states that both the Atheist and Christian view are equally as rational as each other. If this were the case then how much commitment would there be to putting faith in God? Can we honestly say that everyone looks at things equally as rationally as others? Some would believe that the rationale that a specific idea has is subjective and differs on the person; especially if there is a possibility for different opinion (e.g. "abortion is wrong" could be taken many different ways, not just "I agree" or "I disagree") and therefore these rationales and genuine options could be susceptible to subjectivity and emotions which may still affect the amount of commitment you put into faith regardless of how much objective rationality someone claims there to be.

Some of these ideas on faith have treated it like a system; a system on which we get benefits for our commitment or belief in the faith. Kierkgaard objected to this way of thinking, stating that faith is not a system, but based purely on passion. To believe in God systematically as just another logical fact according to Kierkgaard is the equivalent of believe in God without faith, as faith is also based around how we believe in something instead of just what we believe in. It is important then (based on Kierkgaard's theory) to have some uncertainty when choosing to have faith in God; or what is known as "Objective Uncertainty" where we go into a commitment into faith without absolute certainty, in contrast to committing to something that we consider as absolute (aka an "Objective Certainty") where there isn't as much commitment due to their being more of an understanding and logic that we assume is fact. However, doesn't it take just as much commitment to reject faith as well as leap into it? Suppose everyone you knew was leaping into a religion and logically it would be more beneficial for you to alter your opinions and just leap into the faith that seems more convenient. We can not just assume that all who don't leap into a faith are lacking the ability to commit to a faith; sometimes the commitment to religions is much more convenient for people to leap as the rewards are reaped from their environment, whilst some who gain nothing are less likely to immediately leap into such a faith. However, this rule isn't necessarily the case as those who have reaped nothing from leaping into a specific faith and have still stayed faithful to that faith; but what is this a reasonable leap of faith? At what point is it ok to blindly believe in something? Suppose you had a leap of faith with certain malevolent religions that lead to occult ritual killings or sacrifices; should you just ignore any facts and take a leap of faith on the belief? If reason is immeasurable and needs to be uncertain to have absolute and full committed faith, then does that mean it's much better to believe in something you understand than something you do not? If you didn't understand a certain moral stand point (e.g. one that may believe that killing is good) should you take a leap of faith into that belief because you are certain of the result or benefits it may yield?

As far as committing to faith goes there are some points where we may consider faith as a commitment, possibly when we believe in something purely because we feel we should, regardless of the unknown and the uncertainties and what will happen beyond the belief. But when we look at those that believe in something for a benefit, because it's for the best, or even because they have been misguided by their reason to assume that it is an absolute fact, then it is not as much a commitment towards the faith. But is it all really as simple as that? To assume that the motivations or intentions are the same as how we perceive it may be considered reductionist. What some people may consider as egoistic reasons for believing in something may not be the same as others, what if you believe in a religion because they have the same values as your own? Would this be considered as too rational to be considered as a commitment? If we looked at belief in a consequentialist point of view then the consequence of believing in faith is the only thing that matters, regardless of the intentions of the belief. Of course for those who believe that the intention is necessary (e.g. Kantian ethics) then those who have faith due to an idea that is not due to commitment could be considered by some as untrue believers. If faith however is meant to be basic then should it be looked upon as something that requires commitment? Or for there to be a measure or a prerequisite of commitment? If we were to assume that the idea of faith or belief is a subjective idea that is already affected by our emotions and experiences then there may be no way to determine true faith or absolute commitment to said faith.