Explanation of Freges' Begriffscrift: Relationship Between Objects & Names

In Freges' Begriffscrift he asks himself whether identity is a relationship between objects or between names of objects? He concluded it's a relationship "between names of objects." In on "Sense and Reference" Frege goes deeper into the topic distinguishing "A=A"

The ability to speak is acquired at a young age, and a great gift. Humans are genetically born with the ability to hear, see, and move. The beginning of time marked the commencement of thought, which began with our natural born abilities: seeing actions, hearing words and imitating moves. Our senses spark learning. There is no possible way to reverse evolution, the evolution of animals, words, sounds or intelligence. Relationship between sounds and objects began when a caveman made noise by striking two sticks. Producing that sound, the human (cavemen) mind automatically associates that sounds with that 'thing,' or object. When a baby a baby is conceived it starts a nine month process of physical development in order to be fit/healthy (when the baby enters the) enough when so the barer can take care of it from the time it comes out of the womb, and into the world (the baby would not survive very long if it was a two month old fetus out of the womb). But as a baby the only development that is going on are physical (human body) because the brain is there, but the babies mind isn't ready to start grasping bits of memories to put forth logic, or realization. Frege was able to bring linguists to another level in history as he contributes his thoughts.

By recognizing identity, another world of logic reveals itself, and a relationship between objects and name unravels. Logician and mathematician Gottlob Frege is a philosopher is known for his controversial thought on language. Frege acknowledges that ordinary language is and misleading. He along with other linguists acknowledge that there are imperfections in our current language will constantly humanize with time.

The only way there can be a connection between the sign, reference and sense is a series of definite reference with definite sense. Sense is a linguistic expression that means how a competent speaker understands natural language. A proper name on the other hand expresses a sense and refers to an object, and if it "stands for," "refers to," or "designates an object." "Sentences are compound proper names whose referents are either the Truth or the False which are objects (Murphy, Tovey)." The sense of a proper name is than the mode of presentation. When sense and sign come together everyone will need to recognize them both in order to communicate with everyone else. Frege continues by assuring that our natural language the complete totality of signs corresponding to a definite sense (Frege 45-46). Reference in a sentence does not automatically mean that there is sense. Reference is a function involving two terms that have the same sense, and refers to the same object. Sense is presumably available to the speaker. It illustrates something broader above Frege. His great project was to reduce arithmetic to logic (worried about the foundation of numbers).

Frege in "On Sense and Reference" challenges question about identity using ideas and personal experience. The idea of identity is the first thought that comes into mind. All of these ideas start off as ordinary language picked up and put into thoughts. Identity is a relationship between objects or a relationship between names and signs of objects? Frege works through his examination in "On Sense and Reference." Reading through work we've come to recognize that 'a=a" and 'a=b' have different cognitive value. For instance, "a=a" and "a=b" differ in cognitive value if "Superman is Superman" represented "a=b," and "Superman is Clark Kent" represented "a=a." If "a=b" only concerned the objects "a" and "b" than they would not differ in cognitive value. The object is identical with itself.

He goes onto explain whether "a=a" and "a=b" holds a relationship. Frege states, " Now if we were to regard equality as a relation between that which the names 'a' and 'b' designate the same thing, so that those signs themselves would be under discussion; a relation between them would be asserted." Automatically he assumes that "a=a" holds truth a priori. A priori being something that is knowable with independent experience. If "a=b" were true than and only will "a=a" be relative to "a=b." The relationship between objects would mean that "a=b" doesn't differentiate itself from "a=a." There we would suggest that the object is identical to itself. If there was a relationship between signs, and for some reason we lost meaning to what the signs stands for, again, "a=b" would be different from "a=a." The relationship would be expressed that it would be related to itself; the thing would be related to the thing.

In ordinary speech you have an indirect reference and the customary sense (Frege 45). The customary sense is from indirect sense. Indirect references would commonly come from its customary sense. For instance, to speak about the sense of "A" you have to say "The sense of expression "A" so that the reader knows that you are talking about what another person had already said. In other words, it was not your original idea (Frege 47). The sense of a proper name is understood by everybody that speaks the everyday language. Prior knowledge of any reference is hard to already know because it requires knowledge that we don't have.

Sign can be considered a name, combination of words or a letter (Frege 45-46). How sign is interpreted depends on how it's written (Form, or shape). By containing actual knowledge it should assumed that there is a connection between sign and a reference. The reference of the sign is what the sign, refers which is the sense of the sign. The mode of presentation is in the sense of a sign. "The evening star" and "the morning star" are identical but the reference 'the evening star' would be considered the reference. The two statements generally have equal validity but are not found to be the sense (Frege 46).

The reference and sense of a sign are to be distinguished from the associated idea. If the reference of a sign is an object perceivable by senses, my idea of it is an internal image, arising from memories of sense impressions which I have had and acts, both internal and external (Frege 47).

Reference, sense, or a sign are different from an associated idea (Frege 47). Direct experiences are considered the reference of a sign if and only, if the object is an observable sense. The observable sense is Freges' idea of an "internal image" that comes from a memory which could be feelings (internal) or physical acts(external). In most cases everyone has been exposed to a black and white picture that displays two images. The one that everyone is most familiar is the black and white picture that shows a lady with the black colors, and a champagne glass if you look at the white. The human mind either sees one or both of the images at first unless someone makes a distinct reference that there are two images present. "The same sense is not always connected, even in the same man, with the same idea Frege." The same idea can be applied to senses. One picture can inspire various ideas associated with the same sense. Another way to look at it is "one man's idea is not that of another (Frege 47). Freges' example from the text is:

There result, as a matter of course, a variety of differences in the ideas associated with the same sense. A painter, a horseman, and a zoologist will probably connect different ideas with the name 'Bucephalus.' This constitutes an essential distinction between the idea and the sign's sense, which may be the common property of many and therefore not a part or a mode of the individual mind (Frege 47).

Don't let the idea that two different ideas takes away from the value of sense. If you have one idea you must state where it came, who said it, and at what time (Frege 47).

Picturing the same thing is considered you own idea. It gets a little confusing at this point, but to clarify. The same sense can be felt by two men looking at the same picture. It is impossible for them to feel the same thing, or even replicate/think word for word, what came to thought. If you substitute terms with the same sense cognitive, value can be preserved.

Frege also observes "Oratio Oblique." Reading this text clarifies indirect and direct context. It gives a little more information on how senses are the constituents of thought (Gedanke). If you have substitution for a co-referential singular term it preserves the truth value and not the cognitive value. For instance, "Hesperus = Hesperus" is trivial and non-informative unlike "Hesperus = Phosphorus"which is informative. Here you would automatically think that the cognitive value would differ, but it doesn't (Murphy, Tovey). Freges solution to this problem is that "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" expresses two distinct senses. This of course points to the modes of presentation of the referent, so when Venus is associated with both terms they are different (Murphy, Tovey).

The central focus when knowledge of grammar is the main topic are according to Chomsky are: What constitutes knowledge of language, how is knowledge of language acquired, and how is knowledge of language put to use? Chomsky goes on by stating that the answer to the first question is a "a theory concerned with the state of the mind/brain of the person who knows a particular language." The second answer is given by universal grammar, the theory of "initial state." The third answer goes through a theory that expresses how "knowledge enters into the expression of thought and the understanding of presented specimens of language, and delicately, into communication and others special uses of language (Chomsky 4-5)"

Chomsky defines universal grammar as a property of the mind is a specific characteristic that all humans share. The study of language and universal grammar lets the possibility that the current state of knowledge includes reference to the nature of language (Chomsky 14-15). For instance, there could be a word used in the context of a sentence to two very different people and the both of them will be unsure of reference for the word. Using their own extension of knowledge they would both then use the base of their social nature of language (Chomsky 15). The description Chomsky uses for grammar "is a description of theory of a language, and object constructed by a linguist (Chomsky 16)."

Chomsky proposed two distinct differences between I-language and E-language, similar but not identical. I-language, which Chomsky favored referred to mind state/brain. It is the main study of linguistic theorists when examining the knowledge of native speakers. External language (E-language) embodied all other notions of what language actually is. For instance, a common language understood by an entire community (behavioral habits). He argues that E-language can only be studied if they are treated as mental objects. Most of the language and affluent speaker knows they didn't know. A good example would be when the rat figures out how many taps it takes for a pellet to come out. Experimentally it doesn't take long for the rat to figure it out (two taps not three). Linguists keep the study of mind and brain consistent to software of a language. How is it possible for a child to come up with words? Chomsky doesn't think he has arithmetic device. When a human child goes into the linguistic arena the child already has the software.

Chomsky's I-language contract: What falls under having a heart? Humans and animals both have something similar to a heart and a kidney, but all the humans and animals that fall under having and heart, have a kidney too. Prepositional logic, all you have are sentences (you can reduce arithmetic to logic) with p and q. E-language is appropriate for the formalization of arithmetic and prepositional logic or predicate logic because E-language is regarded amorphous (Chomsky 3-42).

Works Cited
"Gottlob Frege" - by Edward Zalta
"Frege's Logic, Theorem, and Foundations for Arithmetic" - by Edward Zalta
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
n Sense and Reference, Gottlob Frege
Gottlob Frege - by Kevin C. Klement.
Frege and Language - by Dorothea Lotter.