Factions of the Shi'ite Insurgency: Who's Who in Iraq

The author has labored to explain over many articles the simply number of Sunni insurgencies that sprung up in Iraq following the interim government's ineffective attempts at stifling early violence. It would appear natural that the Sunni political factions, having been displaced by the successful ousting of the Ba'ath Party in 2003, would make up a large number of the dissidents to oppose both the United States and the new predominantly Shi'ite government. However between the ambitions of figures such as Muqtada al-Sadr, the increased sectarian aggression spurred on by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2006, and the instigations of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and other Persian factions, a whole new and relatively unexpected force had entered into the insurgent fray in the form of Shi'ite radicals and militias.

Many of these militias got their starts as simple bands of armed men hoping to stave off aggression that was spurred on by the al-Qaeda in Iraq factions. With the bombing of the Askariya Mosque (considered the holiest place in Shi'a Islam) and the rampant tit-for-tat killings it became imperative for the relatively unarmed Shi'ites to defend themselves against the trained and now experienced Sunni insurgencies that were plaguing the country side. This appeal to security was expanded upon by firebrand cleric Muqtada al-Sadr whose anti-American sentiments took hold on many younger, radical Shi'ites.

As the Iraq Study Group attempts to put something of a powerful spin on Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army, reports have consistently poured in that this faction is anything but the all powerful, centralized Shi'ite force against the United States many have come to believe. Initially this organization, which draws its name from the apocalyptic figure known as the 13th Imam, or al-Mahdi, rose in early 2004 to intimidate citizens of Baghdad and try to elevate their leader, Muqtada al-Sadr, as a kind of Shi'ite replacement for Saddam Hussein. Between national resistance to this idea and the inability to generate any great strength, the Mahdi Army has been unable to accomplish that goal, however they did enjoy a brief hiccup in number and powers following the 2006 outburst of sectarian killing.

While the Sunni Insurgent groups have proven to be remarkably numerous - although a Sunni Insurgent group could amount to little more than twenty armed thugs - ranging from the 1920s Revolutionary Brigade (who now supports the United States) to al-Qaeda in Iraq, there have been only two largely public Shi'ite factions between the Mahdi Army and the Iranian formed Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI).

Following the Baghdad Security Plan, which has proven disastrous for the Mahdi Army, there was a severe breakdown in the chain of command. Muqtada al-Sadr himself fled to nearby Iran (which claims to not assist him) and ordered his soldiers to hide from Americans, to "keep a low profile". With the seams of his faction coming apart and fracturing he was forced to return to Iraq in something of a mending mission. Slowly but surely, even in spite of al-Sadr's best efforts, the more radical factions felt that the low profile campaign was disruptive of the overall objective of cleansing Sunnis and paving the way for the Mahdi - whom some suggest they believe may very well be al-Sadr himself.

Furthermore, with a second bombing of the Askariya Mosque, it became clear that the Mahdi Army would be insufficient to protect Shi'ite holy places - giving favoritism to the Badr Brigade, a faction which borrows its name from Muhammad's most well known battle against a Meccan caravan turned ambush.
With al-Sadr with increasingly little control over his militia, it fragmented itself into smaller, almost autonomous cells that took on the position of defending holy places such as Karbala - which later turned into a bloodbath when Mahdi forces fired on Badr Brigade body guards during a pilgrimage there.

While there are more declared Sunni factions than Shi'ite, it's important to consider that many Shi'ite militias operate under the radar and with no official affiliation. For example it became commonplace for Shi'ites in Baghdad to unite in small, armed bands that they called "militias" or would sometimes even call the Mahdi Militia, turning into what the West refers to as "Death squads", where they would find, torture, and murder Sunnis they came across.

Fortunately with the increase in the Baghdad Security Plan, the "death squads" have all but disappeared - and now even the Mahdi Army has declared its desire to cease fighting with American forces.