Fairness and Free Lunch: Are Economic Rights Moral Wrongs?

Most search queries for "human rights" on the internet point to a concept of entitlement established by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a document adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948, stipulating "a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations." It thoroughly listed civil liberties and protections not unfamiliar (especially to Western ears), but it introduced a newer, different kind of guarantee: the economic right. Article 3, for example, states "everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person," a very recognizable and broadly accepted statement of civil right.

On the other hand, Article 23 proclaims "(1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment." Furthermore, Article 24 declares "everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay." This relatively new formulation- not of any kind seen in the U.S. Constitution, notably- created the idea that all humans are entitled to these things, be they food, water, education, shelter, or good health. Because they are rights, those which are the duty of government to enforce fully, they are guaranteed and therefore must ideally be granted. Unfortunately, this noble pursuit has a cost, not to be paid by imaginary government dollars, but the taxes (labor) paid by other individuals to fund human rights-oriented programs. Invariably, "there is no free lunch."

It is frequently suggested that it is "unfair" that many persons do not have access to amenities such as healthcare and education while others do. The proposed solution is, just as frequently, that governments (domestic or foreign) should step in and provide the services necessary for the impoverished. However, to cite "fairness" implies justice, and in order for economic rights to have logical merit, justice must accommodate one's claim against the property of another. Without making any assessments about what actually composes justice, one thing is clear: property rights can not logically coexist with economic rights. Individuals can not both claim a right to the fruits of their own labor and a right to economic well-being (better said, the fruits of others' labor) because, as we will always find, there is no free lunch.

Many have argued for a national healthcare system, state-regulated monopolies, and regulatory institutions on the grounds of the "national interest," and some of these plans have demonstrated excellent planning and forecasted bright futures for their performance. Nonetheless, this case has been made by many philosophers before, and I will make it again: a deed that is unjust in act is always unjust, irrespective of efficiency and utility in result. Slavery penalizes few to the great benefit of many, but even a staunch utilitarian would hesitate to defend it, or even revise his calculus to discredit it. A 1% tax on top income earners for the purpose of redistributing wealth also penalizes few to the benefit of many. Yet, furthermore, what logical barrier exists between this paltry amount and one that is "too much"? Why not 2%?

Why not 25%? Who determines that someone is "too rich"? Without abolishing the idea that individuals (if they are poor or unfortunate enough) are entitled to the wealth of other individuals (if they are rich enough), the only non-arbitrary conclusion is the bottom of the slippery slope: complete and total equality of distribution. Even in holding this fallacious, but commonly accepted premise that there is no injustice in only partially taxing the products of labor, there still remains no reasonable system existing in between the poles of wealth redistribution that does not fall to brute pragmatism.

The United States, if its citizens and the world want to believe it or not, is as much a socialist country as any other. Government expenditure as a percentage of GDP, after all, is only an illusory measure of "leftness," a morally arbitrary number that happened to be the consequence of some decisions. Citizens of certain strata, whether they are regional, racial, ethnic, or (mostly) class, are always vulnerable to the costs of "greater good" policies. If the hard-working citizen does not want to pay 10 percent more in taxes for socialized healthcare which he does not need, it is unfortunate for him that his vote lost. Naturally, the quick defender of democracy would say "the system is about compromise. You don't always get what you want." Granting the popular vote the power to determine social spending policy, directly or indirectly, is a hazardous road for freedom. What stops a politician from promising 60 percent of the electorate a program that guarantees their vote, but taxes the remaining 40 percent for it? Is the answer, "that's democracy, sometimes you win, sometimes you don't"?

It is definitely not unprecedented behavior. In Venezuela, leftist leader Hugo Chavez garnered 58% of the vote to defeat the right-leaning opposition, after beginning extensive social programmes and seizing property from wealthy landowners and foreign companies for the lower classes. Does the fact that he was "democratically elected" carry as much weight after this fact? To some it may, but to many others, especially in Venezuela, it demonstrates the final destruction of property as a valid human right. And most surely, it sends a message to the rest of the world: "if you want your lunch to be free, take it from someone else."