Free Will According to Frankfurt - Easy for Some, Struggle for Others

Frankfurt's conception of free will is sound and defensible, despite the objection that recognizing the locus of free will in second order desires is arbitrary. This objection, however, is not entirely without weight, for Frankfurt's defense of his own position against the arbitrariness objection - that a person's "decisively" committing to wanting a certain will makes impertinent further considerations of hypothetical higher orders of desire - is a little fishy. Ultimately, it seems that from Frankfurt's reasoning, some people have free will as he defines it without difficulty, while others may not so easily come to it; and it is in such cases where the accusation of being arbitrary might have some ground.

Frankfurt's argument begins by defining the basic types of our desires. Plain desires for something or to do something (this desire to perform some action will be our primary focus, as it is Frankfurt's) he calls first-order desires. My desire to eat beef jerky is first-order. Accordingly, the desire to have a certain first-order desire - to want to want to do something - is second-order: after eating my fill of jerky, I want my appetite to return so I will want to eat more. Frankfurt continues to elaborate that our will is to be identified with "an effective desire - one that moves (or will or would move) a person all the way to action." (Frankfurt p. 14, italics his) That is, the first-order desire which determines, is responsible for, brings about a person's action is his will. My desire to eat beef jerky is my will, and it explains my action of eating beef jerky.

These concepts make way for the identification of a special sort of second-order desire, that a particular first-order desire constitute one's will; such a desire Frankfurt distinguishes as a second-order volition. If I wish that it were my will to eat an apple rather than jerky, for I too often find myself giving in to the desire to partake of that less healthy snack, the desire to want to eat an apple forms my (unsatisfied) second-order volition. Frankfurt holds that it is this ability to form volitions of the second order that is key in defining a being as a person. This is to say that the outstanding, crucial, and defining quality of personhood is a concern about the desires which motivate our action. He posits from this the possibility of a being, even a human being, with second-order desires but no second-order volitions. To such beings he gives the name wanton. "The essential characteristic of a wanton is that he does not care about his will", Frankfurt explains.

His desires move him to do certain things, without its being true of him either that he wants to be moved by those desires or that he prefers to be moved by other desires. ... Not only does he pursue whatever course of action he is most strongly inclined to pursue, but he does not care which of his inclinations is the strongest. (Frankfurt p. 16-17)

All this at last brings Frankfurt to his postulation of the definition of free will: "A person's will is free only if he is free to have the will he wants." (Frankfurt p. 24) To illustrate wills that are, in Frankfurt's terms, free and not free, let us turn from snacking to Millais' painting of an Errant Knight. Clearly it is the knight's will to cut the maiden's bonds; we may attribute to him a virtuous character, and safely say that his first-order desire to free the distressed damsel is in accord with a second-order volition to want to want to do chivalrous deeds such as this. His will is free.

But what if the conscientious knight had not happened along, and instead the bound lady had been come upon by a traveling merchant? This fellow is, more often than not, a classic Frankfurtian wanton. Generally his first-order desires are for money, rich food, fancy clothing, and beautiful women. He has desires of the second order: most commonly, he wants to want to become wealthy. This desire is often his will, indeed, but when mealtime comes, he visits the tailor, or when he beholds a fine lass, the first-order desire behind his action changes, without his giving it any thought. In this instance, upon seeing the bound maiden, he wants to cut her bonds, but this will does not arise from a second-order volition - he does not want to want to free her; it is just his first-order desire (to free the maiden in hopes of garnering her favor) which motivates him, since at that time it becomes the strongest of his desires. His will (and Frankfurt holds, the wills of all wantons) is not free.

Putting aside our medieval menagerie for a moment, we may now take up the objection to Frankfurt here to be treated. Its basis is that fact that Frankfurt's conception of our desires admits of the possibility of third or fourth or fifth, that is, nth-order desires; we can at least theoretically conceive of wanting to want to want to eat an apple, and so on. The so-called arbitrariness objection is simply that it is arbitrary to limit the desires pertinent to defining free will to the second order. Why may not desires and volitions of higher orders come into the equation of whether one's will is free, especially in the instance of conflicting second-order desires (which Frankfurt on page 21 notes is where the issue is particularly prominent)? Frankfurt's own defense is that it is possible to end such a chain of higher and higher order desires
without cutting it off arbitrarily. When a person identifies himself decisively with one of his first-order desires, this commitment "resounds" throughout the potentially endless array of higher orders. ... It is relatively unimportant whether we explain this by saying that this commitment implicitly generates an endless series of confirming desires of higher orders, or by saying that the commitment is tantamount to a dissolution of the pointedness of all question concerning higher orders of desire. (Frankfurt p. 21-22, italics his)

This defense at once seems to vindicate Frankfurt's argument as to what makes a will free, and raises the question of what is meant by a decisive commitment to a particular will. Indeed, this decisive commitment is the key to the defense. Let us return to our knight. In his case, a decisive commitment has been made: he finds the bound maiden, wants to want to do the gentlemanly deed of releasing her, and the first-order desire to cut her bonds becomes his will. It is the will he wants to have, thus it is free; and in Frankfurt's words "The fact that his second-order volition to be moved by this desire is a decisive one means that there is no room for questions concerning the pertinence of desires or volitions of higher orders." (Frankfurt p. 21) Or, again, "The decisiveness of the commitment he has made means that he has decided that no further question about his second-order volition, at any higher order, remains to be asked." (Frankfurt p. 22)

For the knight, clearly, considerations of higher order desires simply are not relevant whatsoever, and it is fair to say that there is no arbitrariness in pointing to locus of his free will in his second-order volition. However, if we consider another character - not the merchant, for as a wanton, considerations of free will have no place - a peasant, the case may not be so clear. The peasant is not a wanton; his frequently finds himself with the second-order volitions of wanting to want more children to help in the field, and wanting to want to go to Mass on Sunday, for example. However, he is not so clear about his greater purpose in life as our knight; the peasant has not the advantage of chivalrous oaths to orient him as unshakably as the knight.

Thus, when the peasant encounters the trapped nymphet, he is conflicted: one the one hand, as a more or less good fellow, he has a second-order volition that freeing her be his will; yet, on the other hand, he is unable to overlook his own tail, and he also has a second-order volition to do nothing that might ignite the jealousy of his wife. Maybe there is even another volition of the second order to do nothing which might draw the ire of the fief's lord, who perhaps has condemned this lady, or even another, to take the opportunity to perform an act of charity by giving this poor soul clothing and shelter. To resolve his maelstrom of volitions and determine what shall actually be his will, the peasant may need to examine third or higher-order desires, and in such an instance, since the peasant's will is free (if arrived at with difficulty), it is arbitrary to say that defining free will needs no recourse to desires higher than the second order.

Free will proceeding from second-order volition, therefore, is seen to be an easy attainment for some people, but rather more difficult for others whose wills we are still inclined to say are free. The accusation of arbitrariness against Frankfurt is justified inasmuch as not all persons will always make decisive commitments of identification with volitions no higher than the second order. To be fair to Frankfurt, however, he did not assert otherwise; and in instances where a decisive identification is made, it is not arbitrary to discount considerations of higher-order desires, for there is nothing there to consider. He simply has not addressed the issue of persons like our peasant, who are presently do not know what will they want to have - that is, who have conflicting second-order volitions.