Geography, History, and the Causal Chain of Events Resulting in the Football War

To many, La guerra de fútbol, or the Football War, contributes little more than humor to history. Though one country invading another over the results of a sports match might seem like one of history's foibles, The Football War does, in fact, contribute far more than humor to history. A study of this short war in terms of geography, a theory of economic pressure, and diversionary war reveals striking implications for the effects of historical imperialism and borders as well as natural geography on the modern system.

I. A brief summery of events of the war

In 1969 tensions were growing within the South American state of El Salvador. Poverty, hunger, and a myriad of other sociopolitical maladies could not be relieved by the government, which was wading knee-deep in its populace. El Salvadorian overcrowding was alleviated only through the illegal passage of El Salvadorians to neighboring Honduras, where a large expatriate population had congregated.

This population, like the situation of Alsace-Lorraine nearly thirty years earlier, did not envision itself as part of Honduras, but as a part of El Salvador-at least in the sense of cultural loyalties. Little evidence suggested that the relocated populace was unwilling to work for Honduras and abide by Honduran laws. In fact, much the opposite has been suggested-that the stifled peoples were simply relieved to emerge into living quarters that allowed them enough room to breathe.
Nevertheless, the El Salvadorans' presence provided Honduras' president, Oswaldo Lopez Arellano, with a convenient group upon which to cast the Honduran social problems of the era. With this motivation, Arellano enacted an agricultural policy which was meant to create hardship for, and eventually evict, the El Salvadorian illegal emigrants. Convinced this group was causing its social unrest, the Honduran population widely supported Arellano's actions, and the effort succeeded in increasing nationalism within the hearts of the Honduran peoples.

The same pattern was occurring in El Salvador as well, although in the opposite direction. Reports of Honduras' anti-El Salvadoran sentiment crossed the boarder, along with news of the legislation Arellano enacted. Incidents of human rights' violations and violence against the El Salvadoran population by the Hondurans incited El Salvadorans to their own increased nationalism. The two states were pulsing with opposite charges; when the qualifying matches for the 1970 World Cup incited a riot between both nations' sports fans, the spark finally flashed.

On July 14th 1969 that spark started a fire; El Salvadoran forces began air strikes against Honduras while the ground war was launched with attacks along the states' bordering road and the Honduran islands. El Salvador expected a rather short war, and was rational in doing so; its army was much larger and better prepared than its neighbor's. Honduras, however, had anticipated this, and had used air force to destroy the El Salvadoran storage facilities and oil refineries early on in the fighting. With their fuel shortages, El Salvador was unable strike with the ferocity of their initial engagements, nor to conquer to Hondurans in a quick fashion, as they had hoped.

In fact, El Salvador was not able to conquer Honduras at all. The end of the war can be attributed to the Organization of American States, which pushed for a cease fire shortly after the conflict began. Though El Salvador refused cooperation initially, the incentive of threatened economic sanctions as well as safety for those El Salvadorans still living in Honduras proved to be enough of an incentive for the state to withdraw. The result of the war was economic turmoil for both states in addition to the Central American Common Market. Eleven years after the fighting began relative stability was once again achieved.

II. Causes and Arguments

The Football War is not one whose cause can be narrowed down to a single factor. The conflict certainly cannot be attributed to the results of a sports match, as its name might suggest. Rather, pressure mounting on either side of the El Salvador-Honduras border as early as 1967 undoubtedly lead to the spark that started the fire. It is the cause of that pressure, however, that must be assessed to determine the root causes of the war and whether or not, by these causes, the war was justifiable.

The real phenomenon of the football war was, however, not necessarily what happened during the conflict or why the war happened, but where it happened-on the "peaceful continent"-Latin America. In fact, when compared to the other continents, Latin America barely makes the graph measuring the militarization, morality, and intensity of historical conflicts. (Centeno, 123) Most of the continent's wars that deserve mention consist of revolutions or civil wars, which are usually revolutions that failed to succeed. There is little debate over the justification of these wars, most of which occurred in the 19th century, as they were overwhelmingly wars of independence. Little interstate conflict has been noted, the Football War an obvious exception, making an understanding of why it occurred all the more significant. Miguel Centreno calls the wars of Latin America "geographically and historically concentrated." Turning first to the geography of El Salvador and Honduras, one can observe that the war had its roots in systemic situations that neither state could control.

These geographic conditions began with a shared boarder. Alone, this situation dramatically increased the statistical probability of the two states' engaging in conflict with one another, as "most wars occur within geographically contiguous states (Ray 37)." Starr and Most, in their article, The Substance and Study of Borders in International Relations Research, even suggest a perpetual security dilemma among such states, a situation involving their governments' consistent fear of war (584).

El Salvador's and Honduras' shared boarder was, however, complicated by another geographic issue, that of population and land quality. A Time Magazine article written just ten days after the Football War began accurately articulates the situation:
The crucial difference is population density. The 3,300,000 Salvadorans, who are multiplying at one of the world's highest growth rates, are jammed into a volcanic land no larger than the state of Massachusetts. The 2,600,000 Hondurans are spread thinly over rich territories, fragrant with pine, and five times as big as El Salvador. Such is the land hunger among Salvadorans that in the past two decades 275,000 of them have spilled over into Honduras.
Thus, the unfortunate geographical situation of close proximity, or of a shared boarder, was heightened by the population unrest.

But the problem of population unrest could not be simply confined to the systemic level of analysis. Concerning the domestic level of analysis, El Salvador's and Honduras' economic maladies had their roots in El Salvador's overpopulation. In his book, Scarcity and Survival in Central America, William H. Durham argues that, "population in the West lagged or was restrained behind the slow growth of output for centuries; otherwise, per capita income could not have reached the levels it did (2)." Durham goes on to compare the population growth in wealthy states with that in underprivileged states, finding that the population grew much slower in the wealthy states, and implying that overpopulated states will naturally experience economic pressure.

Though Durham applies his theory to all of Central America, the problems of overpopulation are most easily observed in El Salvador's situation. The large population consisted primarily of impoverished families who could not afford to consume the state's manufactured goods. The El Salvadoran economy, therefore, had to rely on foreign markets for economic security-foreign markets that consisted largely of Honduras. When the population problem began to affect Honduras, trade between the two countries became unreliable. Myron Weiner isolates this type of situation in his article entitled, Security, Stability, and Migration. "Societies may react to immigrants because...their numbers are so large (or so poor) that they place a substantial economic burden on society....This sense of threat can be particularly acute if the government of the sending country appears to be engaged in a policy of population 'dumping' by exporting its...surplus population at the cost of the receiving country (550)." Honduras was obviously threatened by El Salvador's "population dumping," which, indeed, deposited large numbers of poor in a way that caused "a substantial economic burden." Thus, for two years preceding the war, both El Salvador's and Honduras' economies were at a virtual standstill, a standstill caused, in the eyes of Hondurans, by "population dumping," the threat of which could have been stringent enough to warrant a war on its own.

Or was it? At this point, could diplomatic efforts have intervened, alleviating the pressure on both sides of the El Salvador-Honduras boarder? Some would say yes, if it the outbreak of war had not been so convenient for Honduran President Arellano. Honduran landowners were beginning to place blame for the El Salvadoran squatters, and the deteriorating economic conditions they brought with them, on the Arellano, his government, and Honduran elites. Political unrest and economic turmoil were mounting in the wake of a recently passed municipal election, which was characterized by blood and illegality. By passing acts detrimental to the squatters, Arellano hoped to win back some of his support, but the action only made matters worse, as violence began to erupt between Honduran citizens and the El Salvadoran squatters. With the proclamation of war, came a surge of nationalism on the part of the Honduran citizens. "Nationalism...[creates] sense of common interest in a nation, a concept of the national interest as the highest value, and an intense commitment to the well-being of the state (Levy 658)." For Arellano and the Honduran elites, this sense of statehood before one's self took pressure away from the failing economy and internal political pressures, allowing Arellano to prove an attack from El Salvador, producing a successful diversionary war.

The situation was not much different in El Salvador. El Salvadoran President Hernandez had given up his pursuit of finding a legitimate cure for the overpopulation ills. His best policy had been "population dumping" in Honduras. El Salvadorans were sick and starving, but when they heard about violence against their representatives in Honduras, they were moved to action, and to nationalism. In this case, the war served as diversionary in order to draw attention away from Hernandez, and the failing social conditions under his regime.

Thus, the diversionary war theory, when applied to the football war, allows one to analyze the onset of conflict via the individual level of analysis, while simultaneously allowing one to become acquainted both nations' rolls in bringing about the war. While useful and true, the theory does not give us the best explanation for the onset of the war; neither does the economic pressure theory associated with the state level causes of the war. While both the diversionary and economic pressure theories, as well as the soccer match between the two countries, give accurate depictions of the proximate causes of the war, it is the geographical conditions that made up the systemic level of analysis that provide the most plausible reason for why the pressures on either side of the El-Salvador-Honduras border erupted into war.

The geographical explanation for the war far surpasses the domestic economic pressure theory, primarily because it was the geographical conditions that caused the economic pressure in the first place. So as not to fall into the fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc, a causal chain of events must here be labeled. First, the borders of El Salvador and Honduras were drawn by Spain to facilitate their colonial intentions, rather than for purposes that would have served the two independent states that eventually emerged. The saying, "the grass is always greener on the other side," was, in fact, true for El Salvador, whose terrain is a rocky mess of volcanic soot, and at the time, was inhabited by over three million people. Honduras, in contrast, was spacious and fertile. Second, after independence, the geographic situations of both countries spawned economic problems. Neither country was in possession of a large quantity of any highly desired natural resource. For this reason, their primary markets were agriculture, with trade occurring mostly between themselves and the United States. Thus, though Honduras possessed the land, the country was in no economic shape to give voluntary aid to the still overpopulated El Salvador. El Salvador was in no shape to wait for Honduran aid; its population naturally grew outside its geographic borders and into neighboring Honduras. Third, the first border dispute happened in 1967, two years before the war, as this stress from El Salvador expanding beyond its boundaries became apparent. The dispute ended with thousands of El Salvadorans still encroaching on Honduran territory, Honduras unable to sustain them and El Salvador unable to recall them. Thus, it is easily observed how the economic pressure theory was directly caused by the systemic geographic conditions, making the geographic conditions a more accurate cause of the war.

Similarly, it is easy to prove that the economic conditions caused by geographical conditions lead directly to both states' individual leaders' desire for a diversionary war. The relative stability of Honduras, even today, is noted by J.M. Ruhl in his article, Agrarian Structure and Political Stability in Honduras. In a brief history of the stability of Honduras, Ruhl remarks that agrarian society plays a plays a larger role in Honduras than in El Salvador (38). This is not remarkable, given the terrain of El Salvador, but Ruhl goes on to suggest that this agrarian population has lead to the political stability of Honduras both in history and today. Honduras, says Ruhl, "appeared to be capable of absorbing not only its own rapidly growing population but also the massive influx of Salvadorean immigrants...(38)." It is clear, however, that Honduras was not able to support this "growing influx" created by El Salvador's tight quarters. This was a fact that threatened the relative peace within Honduras' borders, and that threatened its ruling elites, a threat that was confirmed during the tumultuous elections preceding the war. Knowing its military inferiority to El Salvador, a preemptive strike was not an option, but Arellano knew a war might help rally his nation behind him. Seeing as the El Salvadorans were happy to let their expatriates remain in Honduras, until human rights abuses began to occur, and seeing that Honduras, the same day the war began, struck El Salvador's storage and refinery facilities, handicapping its opponent immediately, it is not preposterous to suspect a provoked diversionary war on the part of Arellano. The need for a diversionary war, however, was created by economic strife imposed by the El Salvadorans-economic strife that existed only because of El Salvador's geographic border and population problems. Geography, therefore, was directly responsible for this proximate cause of the Football War, the diversionary war theory.

With the classification of the war being ultimately distinguished as geographical, judgments can now be made as to which country, if any, was primarily at fault and to what degree the war was justifiable. As mentioned earlier, both Honduras and El Salvador made moves as the war grew nearer that hint at their guilt. El Salvador can easily be blamed as the aggressor, as it was El Salvador who launched the premiere attack. Honduras can be accused of provoking war as its peoples abused El Salvadorans within its borders. In actuality, a geographical war of this complexity cannot be placed on the shoulders of either state, but on the environment in which both states existed.

In truth, the geography had set the stage for a series of events, a causal chain, the result of which was only war. The Football War was never a war of conquest. El Salvador simply had nowhere for its people to go. What were the other options? The government could have participated in exterminations or ethnic cleansing, the ethical consequences of which are mortally severe. A birth control system like the one currently operating in China could have been put in place. But the geographical situation of El Salvador never allowed a government stable enough to enforce that type of widespread policy. El Salvador could have appealed to some international body or humanitarian organization for help. This would have been merely a temporary solution, though, as overpopulation was the root cause of poverty. An international organization could have helped feed the people, and could have engaged in talks with Honduras, but Honduras was already unwilling to give up its borders or allow the El Salvadorans to have part of its land. Talks would have erupted into some sort of conflict, regardless of their efforts.

Both states had a reasonable claim to the Honduran land on which the El Salvadorans resided. "The land follows the people," wrote Michael Waltzer in his book Just and Unjust Wars. "The decision...by right belonged to the people who lived on the land." When he wrote these words Waltzer was discussing the situation of Alsace-Lorraine, a historical precedent already noted as similar to El Salvador's and Honduras' situation. A distinction between the two cases exists, though, that must be noted, and that distinction is the issue of sovereignty. As this case did not call into question sovereignty, but simply sought a right for El Salvadorans to live on the land, contributing to the Honduran economy, El Salvador is even more justified in their claim. If "the land follows the people" El Salvador was justified as the El Salvadorans in that area were using and living on the land. As were the Hondurans, who had been working on the land until the El Salvadorans pushed them out, and who were adamant about their rights to the land. Thus, both nations had a justified right to the land. War was justified from either side.

The Football War having been determined an inevitable conflict caused by geographical conditions and justified on both sides, one can conclude that it ended well. Four days of violence incurred around four-thousand total casualties, but without the war thousands would have been killed in the rioting and humanitarian abuses already occurring between the public. The cease fire orchestrated by the Organization of American States provided for those people's safety in the aftermath. Additionally to die in battle is arguably better than being killed in a routine extermination to reduce population growth. Original boundaries were maintained, and no country succeeded in politically holding the other hostage. Honduran nationalism increased and the Honduran government grew strong again. Over the years Honduras proved to be an ally to El Salvador in its resistance to leftist guerilla movements from within. El Salvador is still faced with overpopulation, and still disputes territory along its border with Honduras. This dispute is being handled through the Organization of American States and International Court of Justice, rather than through means of conflict. Increasing nongovernmental aid in Central and South America promises hope to both El Salvadoran and Honduran governments, still captured in the border dispute.

Although the war ended well in that it did not change any international border lines or subject citizens to further inhuman treatment, the resolution implies that there is not much we can learn from this war. The implications for geographical, economic pressure, and diversionary causes of war, however, are extraordinary. Though the war may not have changed the status quo, it has helped scholars understand how colonization, geography, and borders drawn nearly a hundred years previous, can aggravate modern domestic and individual variables, bringing about a war.

Works Cited

Ray, James Lee. "Does Democracy Cause Peace?" Annual Review of Political Science 1 (1998): 27-46

Starr, Harvey; Most, Benjamin A. "The Substance and Study of Borders in International Relations Research." International Studies Quarterly 20:4 (1976): 581-620

"Population Explosion." Time Magazine 25 July 1969

Durham, William H. Scarcity and Survival in Central America: Ecological Origins of the Soccer War. Stanford University Press, 1979

Betts, Richard K. "Security, Stability, and Migration." Conflict after the Cold War. Myron Weiner. Pearson Education, 2005: 541-556

Rhuh, J. Mark. "Agrarian Structure and Political Stability in Honduras." Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. 26:1 (1984): 33-68

Waltzer, Michael. Just and Unjust Wars. New York: Basic Books, 1977

Lopez-Arias, Julio, and Varona-Lacey, Gladys. "War in Latin America: The Peaceful Continent?" Latin America: An Interdisciplinary Approach. Miguel Centeno. New York: Lang, 2004: 121-134

Levy, Jack S. "Domestic Politics and War." Journal of Interdisciplinary History. 18.4 (1998): 653-673

Collier, Simon, and Harold Blakemore, and Thomas E. Skidmore. The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Latin America and the Caribbean. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985