George Custer Armstrong: (1831-1876)

It is highly ironic that Custer's Last Stand - an affair involving a mere 250 dead, precipitated by the idiot conceit of one of the worst commanding officers ever to mishandle a regiment - should be as well known to the man in the street as Hastings, Waterloo, or the D-Day landings. To place the incident in its correct perspective, it might be as well to preface this entry by remarking that in January 1879 the Zulus wiped out 1,450 British and Natal infantry at Isandhlwana; that in March 1896 the Abyssinians killed some 5,300 Italian soldiers at Adua; and that as recently as July 1922 the Rif Berber tribesmen of Morocco killed General Silvestre and more than 12,000 of his Spanish troops at Anual. Even as a blunderer Custer does not rate very high.

Custer was born on 5 December 1839 near New Rumley, Ohio, and entered West Point in July 1857. His years at the Academy were remarkable for the number of his accumulated demerits, and for his hairbreadth escapes from dismissal. In a class much reduced in size by cadets heading south for a Confederate commission, he passed out thirty-fourth of thirty-four in June 1861, and was commissioned second-lieutenant in the 2nd U.S. Cavalry. He was present at the First Battle of Bull Run, but did not fight. Transferred in August to the 5th Cavalry, he was promoted first-lieutenant in July 1862; but since the previous month he had been serving as an aide to General McCellan, with the temporary rank of captain. He remained with McCellan until March 1863, and in June of that year was appointed brigadier-general of volunteers at the age of twenty-three. He distinguished himself in command of the Michigan Cavalry Brigade at Gettysburg two days later, leading a charge of the 7th Michigan which he later described in his report in these terms: 'I challenge the annals of war to produce a more brilliant charge of cavalry.' Custer served with the Army of the Potomac throughout the 1864 campaign, and gained further distinction in the Shenandoah Valley battles. He ended the Civil War as a major-general of volunteers leading a cavalry division, a flamboyant young showman with long red hair and a taste for velvet jackets with gold braid from wrist to elbow. He had an instinct for publicity, and adored the limelight; he had become much more widely known to the public than many officers of much greater age, experience, and skill. He was autocratic and conceited; and had no proper experience of that most essential school for an army officer - the undramatic routine of the junior company officer, learning about men, making mistakes, and taking orders.

Custer's first post-war command ended in the disbandment of the 3rd Michigan Cavalry after a mutiny caused, at least in part, by his heavy-handed discipline; it was a time when many volunteer regiments were pressing for demobilization, and Custer had attempted to recall the troopers to his conception of their duty by the use of the lash. He mustered out of the volunteer service in February 1866 and reverted to his substantive army rank of captain - although he and his supporters tended to continue using the wartime title 'General Custer'. He negotiated briefly with President Juarez about the possibility of his taking the chief command of the Mexican cavalry; he was offered, but refused, the Colonelcy of the Negro 9th Cavalry; and in July 1866 he took up the lieutenant-colonelcy of the newly-organized 7th Cavalry. This was a de facto regimental command, as two successive colonels of the Regiment spent much of their time on detached duty.

In early 1867 at the conclusion of an indecisive expedition under General Hancock, Custer was ordered on a long scout with several companies of the 7th. His behavior during this independent operation led to a court martial's finding him guilty later that year of absenting himself from his command without leave and using some of his troopers as an escort while on unauthorized personal business; abandoning two men reported killed on this march, failing to pursue the Indians responsible, and failing to recover the two bodies; ordering a party sent after deserters to shoot them dead, with the result that three were wounded and one killed; and unjustifiable cruelty to the three wounded men. He was suspended from rank and pay for a year. Lack of an experienced substitute led to his reinstatement before the sentence was completed, but ill-feeling divided the officers of the Regiment for several years thereafter. Over the next two years some parts of the Regiment saw minor skirmishing with Indian bands; Custer was not present on these occasions, although his published accounts greatly exaggerate the size and drama of the clashes. The 7th saw much hard riding, but had little contact with the Indians until the Battle of the Washita in November 1868. This was an attack on an encampment of Black Kettle's Southern Cheyenne in which Custer reported killing 103 warriors and 'some' women and children. The Cheyenne called him 'Squaw-Killer' from the Washita onwards, and one is tempted to doubt his arithmetic. Further bad feeling was caused within the Regiment during this action; a major, the sergeant-major, and fifteen other men were cut off and killed, apparently due to negligent orders. There was no further fighting for the 7th in this campaign, and in 1870 the Regiment was moved to the South to support the civil power at a time of unrest.

In the spring of 1873 the Regiment was ordered to Dakota, coming under command of Colonel D. S. Stanley at Fort Rice. Stanley was assembling a large escort for a party of Northern Pacific RaiIroad surveyors on an expedition to the Yellowstone river. In August there were some sharp skirmishes with the Indians, all of them successful for the Army. Custer was placed under arrest for insubordination during this operation, but Stanley was persuaded by mutual friends to take the matter no further. In 1874 the Government sent a 'scientific' expedition into the Black Hills country, which belonged both by right of occupation and by treaty to the Sioux and Northern Cheyenne Indians. Custer led an escort comprising ten companies of the 7th, two infantry companies, sixty scouts, and a detachment of Gatling guns. His orders specified a reconnaissance connected with the planned construction of a fort in the Black Hills to guard future railroad extension. The size of the 1,200-man force sent on this expedition suggests other motives. Custer is believed to have played a large part in spreading stories of gold finds during this operation, leading to a civilian gold-rush to the Black Hills. The Army column was far too strong for the Indians, but Crazy Horse's warriors harried the lawless bands of prospectors who flooded into their hills after the reports spread. In 1875 the Government tried without success to persuade the Indians to sell the hills and withdraw to agencies. In 1876 the attempt at persuasion was abandoned, and preparations were made for a straight forward military campaign. The attacks on the prospectors - who had no right to intrude on Indian territory - were the excuse; the aim was to cow the Indians into agreeing to give up their lands. General Alfred Terry was given overall command of a strong mixed force, of which the main mobile element was to be the whole of Custer's 7th Cavalry, some 600 men strong. Custer was allowed to lead his Regiment on this expedition only after the intercession of the popular and kindly Terry. He was in disgrace, having angered President Grant, the Army Commander, General William Sherman, and his division commander, Sheridan, by his behavior in connection with a military-political scandal then rocking Washington. The issue was complex, but centered on alleged irregularities in the award of post trader-ships. Custer, available as ever to the Press, had talked a great deal about his inside knowledge of sharp practice in high places. Questioned under oath by a committee of inquiry, his testimony turned out to be nothing but lengthy and theatrically-phrased hearsay, most of which he later withdrew. He had embarrassed the Government and the Army, and did nothing to improve his standing with his superiors by leaving Washington against orders and returning to Fort Lincoln, After a stinging reprimand he was finally allowed to take the field.

Terry left Fort Lincoln on 17 May and proceeded to the Yellowstone river. Apart from the 7th, he had three infantry companies and a Gatling detachment, with numerous Arikara and white scouts. On the Yellowstone he met and took under command some 450 infantry and cavalry of another column under Colonel Gibbon. The Indian main force was thought to be somewhere to the south, but Terry's operations were complicated by the simultaneous manoeuvres to the south of him of General Crook. It was hoped that the two forces could converge and catch Crazy Horse's warriors between them, but Crook had been forced to abandon this plan by his severe handling at the Battle of the Rosebud.

The Yellowstone River runs roughly east and west at the point where the disaster occurred. Into it from the south run several tributaries: two of them, the Rosebud and the Big Horn (nearest to it on the west), run roughly parallel from the south-west. Some miles up the Big Horn the Little Big Horn flows into it from the south-east - the side nearer the Rosebud. The Indian camp was thought - correctly - to be in the valley of the Little Big Horn. On 22 June Terry split his forces. Custer was to ride south up the Rosebud, following the trail of a large force of Indians discovered by scouts; it was anticipated that at some point this trail would turn west over the hills towards the Little Big Horn. Gibbon was to move south up the Big Horn. Scout couriers were to keep Terry, Gibbon, and Custer in close touch. If the Indian trail turned towards the Little Big Horn, Custer was specifically ordered to continue south to guard against any possible break-out in that direction. A converging attack by the two columns would then be launched.

On 24 June Custer found that the trail did indeed turn towards the Little Big Horn. He chose not to follow orders, but to turn west along it. On the 25 June he halted on high ground from which he could see down into the Little Big Horn valley; many columns of campfire smoke could be seen, and a vast herd of grazing ponies. It was the encampment of the Sioux and Northern Cheyenne Indians, containing perhaps 5,000 warriors and 8,000 to 10,000 others. Custer's party was seen by Indian sentries, and he decided to attack immediately. He split his 600 men into three main parties and a small guard for the impedimenta. Major Reno was ordered to take three companies (112 men) into the attack at the southern end of the encampment, while Captain Benteen took three companies (125 men) off to the west. Custer himself planned to take five companies along the bluffs to the north, on the opposite side of the stream from the camp, and then swing down to attack the other end of the camp. He had no idea of the size of the enemy camp, or of whether there was a practical route down from the bluffs to the north. In fact the camp stretched unbroken for two miles, and Custer was never able to cross the stream. Reno's' force attacked as ordered, but was soon driven back, and only with difficulty made its way' back to high ground; this force was joined by Benteen, and managed to hold out on a hilltop until relieved by Terry the next day. Custer's men were driven back from the stream by Crazy Horse and his Oglala Sioux; they were trapped on a slope, cut to pieces, and overwhelmed by the Oglalas and a second group of the Hunkpapa Sioux led by Gall. In all, the Battle of the Little Big Horn cost the Army 250 dead and 44 wounded. The Sioux and Cheyenne Indians could probably have destroyed Terry and Gibbon as well, but they had suffered heavy casualties themselves and preferred to withdraw southwards, to celebrate and recover in the Big Horn Mountains.

There have been many attempts to explain Custer's behavior in acceptable military terms, but none are convincing. He deliberately disobeyed 'orders, and then split his small command in the face of an enemy of unknown but obviously considerable strength. His previous career leads one to the conclusion that his motives were strongly colored by a desire for personal glory. No doubt his luckless troopers sold their lives dearly - as do any soldiers worthy of the name when all hope is gone; but it takes a more-than-usually impressive exercise of willful blindness to historical fact to turn the Little Big Horn into anything but an unnecessary disaster.

Sources:
http://www.georgearmstrongcuster.com/
http://www.civilwarhome.com/custerbi.htm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Armstrong_Custer