German Military Aviation and the USAF

In the aftermath of the First World War, Germany lay in shambles. Its population was decimated through famine, its military was on the brink of collapse, and its will to fight increasingly weak. To any observer, Germany as a world power was finished. Yet despite the restrictions of Versailles and the blow of a worldwide economic depression, Germany returned to the world stage. It is a testament to spirit, resilience, and ingenuity that Germany's remilitarization and military success in WWII were carried so far. Against superior odds, the German military, and especially the Luftwaffe, held on for over half a decade. The influence of German tactical and strategic aviation was a strong factor in the development of military strategy around the world, and the lessons of the Luftwaffe experience and technology continue to echo in today's air forces.

The experience of the First World War was a mixed one for the Luftstreitkräfte, or the Imperial Air Service. Despite the dominance of German fighters and the usage of bombers and zeppelins in what could be termed strategic bombardment (of civilian targets), the ultimate effect of the Imperial Air Service was limited, unable to produce a decisive change in the war. However, it was the lessons of World War I that produced a fundamental development in the grand strategy and future of military aviation. German innovators followed upon the ideas of Douhet of strategic bombardment and the idea that "strategic air power was an instrument capable of delivering quick victory".[1] This laid the groundwork for the principles of strategic aerial warfare in the future, where total war is not out of the picture, and supremacy in the air determined the victor.[2]

However, the lessons for different nations held various conclusions for each. The German WWI strategy, focused upon the removal of one opponent and then another before the combined weight of her adversaries could be brought against her, did not implicate the necessary use of airpower as a strategic means to an end. In the wake of Versailles, and a humiliating imposed peace which prohibited a German air force, the strategy was forced to undergo change. The end product of secret military development, the misleading civilian programs, and the independent planning within the Weimar military establishment was one in which speed and precision were valued above anything. In the aftermath of the First World War, German strategy had evolved from one still molded in the traditions of 1870 to one of blitzkrieg, of rapid knock-out blows, and the heavy use of tactical aviation.

The idea of close air support had been present for some time, demonstrated by "trench-strafing" in the Great War by all sides, and before then, the Italian use of airplanes in Libya.[3] The German remilitarization program, kicked off by a new Nazi government, provided impetus for the tactical focus of this doctrine. The new strategy focused around the rapid initial advance, followed by paralysis of the enemy, and creation and destruction of the encircled pocket, it called for extensive coordination between air and ground forces, with traditionally slow artillery now replaced by the ground attack aircraft.[4] The Luftwaffe, constituting the volunteer Condor Legion which had been sent to Spain for the baptism of fire, had emerged with a doctrine and modus vivendi far ahead of its time.

Indeed, the stunning success of close air support in Poland, France, and the first half of the war in the Soviet Union spoke for itself. Enabled by its dominance in the air and the speed of movement, the Luftwaffe, characterized by its gull-winged Stukas and the high pitch of their sirens during a dive, strode through victories in the first half of the war. It is down to the significance of the coordination between air and ground, and the tactical resourcefulness of German commanders that lengthened the height of the war effort, and delayed eventual defeat to the Allies. The contribution of German close air support to the maneuvers and operations on land proved crucial, and something that the Allies weren't able to match until late in the war.

Within this saga, the Allies themselves have achieved much within the limited time after the outbreak of war. While the strategies and tactics of the Wehrmacht were learned and countered on the ground, the story in the air saw a gradual decline in the superiority of the Luftwaffe. Marred by the decline in veteran pilots ever since the Battle of Britain, German efforts in the air were also countered by the massive Allied superiority in production and resources. Even by 1940, it was apparent that the JU-87 Stuka, the best ground attack aircraft in the early war, was incapable of flexing the same muscle when faced with problems such as lack of fighter cover and speed.[5] In the fighter spectrum things appeared awfully similar, as the German aircraft no longer enjoyed the technical superiority they had at the start of the war. Numerically deficient, short on fuel, and faced with a situation on the ground that can no longer be salvaged from the air, the Luftwaffe was a shell of its former self by 1945.[6]

While the Me-262 and the Vengeance weapons were seen as desperate, late, and futile efforts to change a result long forsaken, they were nonetheless important in the overall historical context and significance. While other countries had similar programs in development, the Messerschmitt 262 and the its faster, rocket-propelled brother the Me-163 were watershed moments in aviation history, as the first jet fighters. The US Air Force saw such importance in German technology such as the Me-262 that a special program, Operation LUSTY, was even formed to obtain information and technology.[7] Similar accounts can be retold about the V-1 and V-2 models, which proved critical to cruise missile and ballistic missile research, respectively. Each, the product of Germany's wonder weapon campaign, eventually became predecessors of modern weapons.

The contributions of German military aviation during WWII marked an important leap in air forces around the world, and the way war is fought today. The technological aspect is not lost upon the rest of the world, as cruise missiles, ICBMs, and space research are common if not household names, as German technological research pre- and during WWII sped up the worldwide military technological revolution. The way the Luftwaffe operated is of similar critical importance to the rest of the world. The test pilots for the A-10 Thunderbolt II, at the time called the A-X Project, were required to read Hans-Ulrich Rudel's memoirs as a Stuka pilot on the Eastern Front.[8] Even earlier, during the war and in Korea, Allied commanders saw the German model for air-ground coordination as something to learn from. German pioneering in the field of military aviation and the strategy behind it proved important to aerial technology and the tactics behind it today.

[1] Shiner, J.F., "Reflections on Douhet," Air University Review, January-February 1986, URL: http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1986/jan-feb/shiner.html [cited 28 March 2008]

[2] Cubic Applications Inc., "Douhet's Theory," Air and Space Power Course, URL: http://www.iwar.org.uk/military/resources/aspc/text/theory [cited 28 March 2008]

[3] Gustin, E., "Armour of the Air," Emmanuel Gustin's Home Page, URL: http://users.skynet.be/Emmanuel.Gustin/history/aoa.html [cited 28 March 2008]

[4] Coram, R. Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War. Back Bay Books, New York, 2004, pp. 333-7.

[5] Goebel, G., "The Junkers Ju-87 Stuka," In the Public Domain, URL: http://www.vectorsite.net/avstuka.html [cited 28 March 2008]

[6] Luftwaffe Fighters, "The Military History of the Luftwaffe during World War Two," Luftwaffe Fighters, URL: http://luftwaffefighters.co.uk/luftwaffe.htm [cited 28 March 2008]

[7] National Museum of the United States Air Force, Public Affairs, "Fact Sheet: Operation Lusty," National Museum of the USAF, URL: http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=1608 [cited 28 March 2008]

[8] Coram, 235.