Globalization: Kantian Peace or Source of Violence

I am inundated with news of violence everyday, whether it's a television update on the ever-growing number of American soldiers killed in Iraq, a newspaper article about genocide in Darfur, or even community indignation in response to violence that occurs locally. It is a sad fact that violence, or at least the innumerable reports of it, are ubiquitous. Indeed, many people believe that violence has escalated as the world becomes more politically, economically, and culturally integrated. Has there been a recent increase in violence, or is information about violence in all ends of the world simply more accessible? What is the relationship between globalization and violence?

Some critics maintain that globalization breeds violence. By aggravating economic inequalities, spreading a culture of violence through increased media and communication flow, and expanding trade in industries like firearms and drugs that propagate violence, globalization has both caused and reinforced the upward trends in global violence (Buvinic and Morrison 2000, 63). But maybe violence today is misunderstood. Many scholars contend that the political and social ties that accompany economic integration and the democratic drive result in a more stabilized, peaceful world. What is globalization's effect on international and civil violence? As proponents of globalization repeatedly maintain, does this global process of market, social, and political integration lead to a more peaceful world? Or, are globalization's critics on the right track - that globalization fosters violence?

It is important to separate any analysis of contemporary violence into two spheres. International violence can be defined by any conflict or war between two or more countries; the two global wars that plagued the world from 1914 to 1945 are infamous examples of international violence. Civil or domestic violence is a conflict that occurs within a state, such as civil war or guerilla movements. It is true that some violence transcends this partition of international and civil violence. Violence that is fueled by cultural and ethnic hatred, religious intolerance, and racism are difficult to classify because such conflict can explode within the domestic sphere and escalate into international disputes. Or, such violence can be expressed through terrorism, a transnational hostility that mirrors the worldwide movements of globalization itself.

Academic explorations on the relationship between globalization and violence are characterized by contradiction and discord. Scholars can roughly be divided into two major fields: the realists and the liberals, although other academic spheres do exist. Liberals endorse the idea that the main facets of globalization - democratization, global economic integration, and international organizations - provoke peace and prosperity (Oneal, Russet, and Berbaum 2003, 372). The liberal approach is shaped by the Kantian system, illustrated by a triangle in which democracy, economic interdependence, and international organizations are the three features that point to peace (Oneal and Russett 2001, 35). Realists are of a more critical disposition. Realist analyses of world politics emphasize that because we have no supranational government and our international system is one of anarchy, the world has the characteristics that Hobbes attributed to a country undergoing civil war (Oneal and Russett 2001, 22). Realists challenge the liberal view by raising questions about the true benefits of democratization, international economic integration, and intergovernmental organizations.

Realism and liberalism are sometimes presented as antithetical understandings, but Kant and other classical liberals did not deny the realistic viewpoint in attempting to understand and avoid war (Oneal and Russett 2001, 90). Still, when comparing liberal and realist studies, one may be faced with a bewildering phenomenon: two different authors raise the same question, but after an analysis of data, conclude with entirely different, indeed contradictory, interpretations. This lack of unity can be attributed to differences in statistical methods that heavily alter results. These variations in statistical technique both reflect and promote the pre-existing biases of the authors.

Liberals contend that international violence has decreased as democracy, economic integration, and international organizations have spread with globalization's boundless sprawl. Dissenters find issue with each of these factors and their validity as peaceful and stabilizing components of globalization.
One major consensus about globalization is that states are urged into democracy. For a country attempting to be successful in today's international market, democratizing is beneficial because of political and economic pressure from other democracies. Liberals contend that democratization is a natural endpoint for countries adapting to the globalized world because growing economic prosperity leads to pressure on the state to democratize, and after a state adopts democracy, the doors are opened for even more prosperity and stability. Democracy is a government that generates peace culturally because of the emphasized role of shared democratic principles, which usually causes the resolution of political disputes without resorting to violence (Oneal and Russett 2001, 53). Democracy is structurally peaceful, too, because it imposes institutional constraints on decision makers through a separation of powers (Oneal and Russett 2001, 53). Governmental checks retain stability. In the liberal argument, an added benefit to democratization is that it is accompanied by alliances with other democracies, either because of formal agreements, or informally through relations that configure because of increased political and economic ties. The current tendency of democratization enforces an international peace because democracies rarely fight each other; "the likelihood of a dispute is lower for two democracies than for two autocracies" (Oneal and Russett 1997, 289). Globalization promotes democratization, which facilitates a more peaceful world.

Critics question the benefits of democratization that liberals have so fully embraced. Although the majority of authors agree that democracies are more stable and peaceful in the long run, a democracy's transition period is rocky at best, and often explodes in civil violence that could escalate to international instability and conflict. After the collapse of a government is followed by efforts to establish democracy, "the interim period of relative anarchy is ripe for ethnonational or ideological leaders who want to organize rebellion... Political violence is frequently coupled with democratization," (Hegre et al. 2001, 34). The newly installed democracy is almost always bound to be unstable, and this insecurity can tempt neighbors to threaten or attack. It was the instability of Iran's revolutionary government seems to have enticed Saddam Hussein when he attacked Iran in September of 1980 (Oneal and Russett 2001, 117). However, I observe a relative acquiescence between globalization's scholars that democratization is ultimately economically and politically rewarding in the long run, and, simultaneously, internationally stabilizing.

Free trade and economic interdependence were advocated as remedies to international conflict early in history, even before democracy was a viable option for most countries (Oneal and Russett 1997, 268). The liberal argument strongly contends that globalization increases prosperity because the merging of many markets trans-nationally promotes economic efficiency through comparative advantage, specialization, and division of labor. More tangibly, because globalization's internationally integrated states are economically tied to each other, a stable political situation is conducive for all parties. This heightened desire for stability, accompanied by increased costs of war because of a dependence on transnational economic linkages, leads to an international peace. Protectionism and isolationism, alternatively, leads to less wealth and more war.

Many liberal-minded scholars put more emphasis on international stability as enforced by "peace by trade," rather than stability by democratization (Weede 2004, 170). Globalization, with the spread of free markets, leads to a protection of economic freedom and inhibits unfair restraints created by leaders. As the authority and power of the government wanes, this depoliticization creates protection against exploitation. The "capitalist-peace strategy rests on a policy of depoliticization," but the liberal argument acknowledges, too, that the state must retain a minimal degree of power to enforce property rights and the execution of contracts (Weede 2004, 178). Though this decrease in state control certainly has its benefits, realists recognize that it has drawbacks as well. In conjunction with depoliticization, "the threat posed by drugs, terrorism, transnational crime, and environmental degradation has been intensified... the security solutions to these problems in terms of enforcement or containment increasingly are ineffective through national means" (Cha 2000, 394).

Liberals unite behind the idea that trade between rich and poor countries creates more prosperity in poor states, and technology, also, creates the opportunity for faster growth for developing countries. Openness to foreign trade and investment, paired with complementary reforms, leads to fast economic growth (Dollar and Kraay 2002, 1). The spread of free trade is important; free markets destroy unfair privilege and open economic opportunities by providing the window to succeed and the possibility for people to access their targets (Bhagwati 2002, 1). It is in this reasoning that the liberal argument roots its analysis of globalization as economically equalizing and poverty reducing.

Critics acknowledge that symmetrical trade relations between countries may foster peace, but asymmetrical trade relations can create tensions that bloom into international conflict. Both the importance of a trade relationship and the symmetry, or balance, of a trade relation must be considered in examining if economic interdependence can obstruct international conflict (Barbeiri 1996, 31-32). For countries on the worse end of a trade relation, costs of trade can outweigh the benefits. Trade ties may not result in mutual benefits but rather a lack of freedom to escape from an unfair trade alliance. Unequal trade alliances can lead to the continued impoverishment of less powerful, less prosperous nations, and also, with the destruction of their own political, economic, and social institutions, these states can become too dependent on others. In Katherine Barbeiri's 1996 study on economic independence, she found "extensive economic interdependence increases the likelihood that dyads engage in militarized dispute," and that even beneficial symmetrical trade relations are offset by the vast expansion of asymmetrical interstate linkages; "extensive economic linkages, be they symmetrical or asymmetrical, appear to pose the greatest hindrance to peace through trade" (Barbeiri 1996, 42). However, the liberal argument directly contradicts this theory of conflict provoked through asymmetrical relations. "The benefits of trade do not depend on the states' being of similar size... economically important trade between large states and small states increases the prospects for peace just as it does for states of equal size," (Oneal and Russett 2001, 147). Perhaps the economic domination of small states by larger states is so complete that acts of resistance are simply not attempted, or more probably, trade truly does benefit both parties of the relation. Ultimately, trade is voluntary; the entrance of a state into a trade agreement implies that the trade relation is mutually beneficial.

"The final element in Kant's vision of 'perpetual peace' is international law, which, building on an understanding of the legitimate rights of all republics and their citizens, provides a legal framework for the peaceful resolution of interstate conflicts" (Oneal and Russett 2001, 157). Intergovernmental organizations are multilateral institutions usually established by treaties or other agreements between states. IGOs have a substantial impact on reducing the likelihood of conflict; in fact, "IGOs make an additional contribution to reducing the frequency of disputes above and beyond those of democracy and trade" (Oneal and Russett 2001, 172). Proponents of intergovernmental organizations maintain that IGOs work towards peaceful world solidarity.

However, criticism of intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations, the Word Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank is rampant. Instead of viewing IGOs as peace forces laboring towards the elimination of violence, some scholars describe IGOs as exploitative and representative of the interests of developed countries rather than the developing. Some critics reject the idea that IGOs have an ameliorative effect on issues that are crucial in world politics, and others propose that IGOs are used by privileged states to maintain patterns of economic and political dependence for underprivileged countries. In studies by Singer and Wallace in 1970 and Rittberger in 1971, results showed unequivocally that no negative association exists between measures of international organization building and measures of incidence of international war, but instead, measures of international organization and measures of magnitude and severity of international war are positively correlated (Rittberger 1973, 219).

Since the 1950s, international organizations have been granted increasingly prominent roles in the strategies of developing states. These struggling states are generally presented with two options: one, adopting a model of socio-economic development that reflects more the interests of the Western powers than those of the developing countries itself, and which thus means continued economic penetration by, and dependence on, the capitalist West; or two, charting individual development adapted to its own needs, accompanied by economic and political isolation for that country, surely resulting in poverty and failure (Rittberger 1973, 221). "Careful and systemative investigations of the operation of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund would quite probably reveal how international organization can be made to prevent under-developed countries from achieving their full socio-economic and political potential" (Rittberger 1973, 221).

In addition to such spurious criticism, critics have charged intergovernmental organizations like the UN with being inefficient when it comes to making any crucial changes in global affairs. The effects of IGOs remain a hotly debated issue. Meanwhile, nongovernmental organizations and humanitarian groups that are not linked to the interests of hegemonies are often advantageous. However, many nongovernmental organizations reflect only a diminutive segment of a population, and NGOs often have little independence from governments (Hoffman 2002, 3).

Although dissent continues to burgeon, the majority of scholars advocate democratization and global economic integration as ultimately more peaceful than the alternative: isolated, protectionist states with antithetical governments and smaller, less efficient markets. "Liberals have claimed that democracy and free trade not only increase individual liberty and prosperity but also ameliorate international conflict. Our analyses indicate they have been right: the pacific benefits of both democracy and economic interdependence are evident and substantial" (Oneal and Russett 2001, 154).

An analysis of civil peace and globalization invariably becomes more complicated, though. Aspects of domestic peace are not as cleanly divided into democratization, economic integration, and IGOs, rather, facets such as ethnic hatred, religious intolerance, and backlashes against hegemonic forces must be considered as having more influence in the civil sphere than the international world. Because so many states are in the process of adapting to globalization, there are a multitude of messy situations. Why can some states prosper in peace, while others seem to be constantly enmeshed in acts of violence?

Liberals contend that globalization's push for democratization asserts peace in the domestic spectrum in addition to the global arena. Established democracies possess legitimacy, and effective governance in a democracy requires leaders to cater to a wide range of societal interests (Oneal and Russett 2001, 53). Democracy is politically and socially equilibrating. This equilibration, along with the cultural institutions that accompany democracy and the structure of democracy itself, promotes domestic peace. "States that are thoroughly democratic and those democracies that are effective experience the least amount of violence within their borders," (Oneal and Russett 2001, 70). Simultaneously, liberals applaud the fact that globalization erodes the importance of the political state, and instead emphasizes the importance of the market. The decreased importance of the political state diminishes the desire to take control of that weakened entity. States, in their diminished capabilities, are less likely to respond with repression to popular dissent, possibly exacerbating a spark that could erupt in revolution and civil war, in fear of scaring off international investment. Instead, with democratization, any discontent is channeled into elections and non-violent protests. In a democracy, violent revolution is unnecessary.

Alternatively, realists claim that though globalization's push for democratization may be seen as internationally peace inducing, democratization has complex implications for the individual state. For a state transitioning to democracy, the change can be explosive. The in-between government that is in the process of transforming from autocracy to democracy, a semidemocracy, is especially volatile; "semidemocracies exhibit a higher propensity for civil conflict than either extreme... semidemocracies are partly open yet somewhat repressive, a combination that invites protest, rebellion, and other forms of civil violence" (Hegre et al. 2001, 33). A country's shift to democracy does not automatically end any pre-existing dissent or revolutions, and the persistence of conflict can jeopardize the survival of democracy. Democratization, though usually ultimately pacifying, easily can descend into a violent environment during the transition period.
Though depoliticization is frequently cited as a benefit of globalization by opening economic doors for the public and creating barriers against political and economic exploitation, critics argue that perhaps the diminished capacity of the state is not so beneficial, especially in developing countries that are still relatively unstable. Undermining the coherence and sovereignty of the state leaves it with a reduced capability to allocate and redistribute resources, decreasing the welfare of the poor. States, in their waned abilities, can become impotent and unable to address the public's grievances. This futility can spark frustration with the public, resulting in conflict and violence (Mason 2003, 23).

Proponents of globalization assert that the process promotes development and prosperity with the spread of free markets. For weaker states, this can mean the growth of a middle class, an increasing desire to retain the status quo, a decreased desire for revolt, and a more powerful sense of structure and control. More specifically, proponents of globalization list the general increase in exports for developing countries as a major benefit of globalization's economic integration. Often guerilla movements, revolts, and conflicts in developing countries center around violence-inducing exports like illegal drugs, firearms, and diamonds. With a dependence on only a few exports come power struggles over those few extremely valuable exports, causing tension and conflict (Barbeiri and Reuveny 2005, 1231). Additionally, "diffusion of industrial production to the Third World will make their economies less dependant on raw material exports and less vulnerable to market fluctuations in the price of those exports" (Mason 2003, 20).

Critics disagree that the diffusion of industrial production to the Third World is really so beneficial. In impoverished countries, people are often dependent on monopolistic multinational corporations for income. Because of their largely unchecked power, these corporations can control wages, and have the ability to supply insignificant funds as income. Although globalization incorporates the third world into the global system of production and shifts low-wage manufacturing jobs there, this promises little or no improvement in the standard of living for the poor. These jobs are dismal, mindless, and low-paying, and most importantly: they are temporary, because these manufacturing jobs are targeted for eventual elimination through automation and new technology (Mason 2003, 21). The shift of these low-wage employment opportunities to developing countries is no permanent solution. Meanwhile, agriculture commercialization induces vast landlessness, over-urbanization, and deterioration of the environment. The export of jobs and multinational corporations to poor states may create employment opportunities for the poor in developing countries; however, these jobs are often insufficient to support a reasonable standard of living and are ultimately nonpermanent.

Though liberals tend to argue that globalization reduces income inequality and also decreases the possible harmful and exploitative state control of the economy, critics of globalization consistently maintain that this global spread of free-markets and the accompanying omnipresent sense of self-interest widen income inequality. One must only look at the economic separation of the periphery and the core in each state (Barbeiri and Reuveny 2005, 1232). In our world, rich elites are favored over the impoverished masses; wages are often not enough for the basic needs of the poor while, simultaneously, wages in the "core" are much higher. Even in fully developed countries, there exists the "core" of the affluent and the surrounding "periphery" that contains the poor. The core/periphery model is a paradigm of the inequality produced by globalization.

Globalization's liberalization of markets often triggers greater inequality through cutting budgets for welfare programs such as food subsidies, public employment, education, and health care (Sandbrook and Romano 2004, 1012). In crises, welfare programs in poor countries collapse and the poor suffer more than the rich. This results in a further inequality of income, a displacement of rural population from their land, the resulting migration of the poor to the cities, and simultaneously, a weak state capacity (Mason 2003, 22). These changes create rising tensions among the public, which, when accompanied by decreasing state capacity, is a recipe for political disaster.

Relative deprivation is a more powerful motivator of violence than absolute deprivation (Sandbrook and Romano 2004, 1012). For example, a man in extreme poverty is angrier and more prone to violence when he can see how little he has in relation to the elites of the community than if everyone were equally poor. This phenomenon is encouraged by the easy flow of information in our globalized world. Global communication networks facilitate revolution and the flow of information benefits grassroots organizations, enabling social and political protest that can easily evolve into violence. Globalization's open economy lessens the state's control; this lack of state control provides rebels with the opportunity to communicate, organize, and prepare, and so more crime appears with less state power (Barbeiri and Reuveny 2005, 1233). "The breakdown of implicit social contracts between rulers and ruled, the deepening of regional and social inequalities, the increase in economic insecurity, the challenge to local values and the waning of state legitimacy breed conditions conducive to extremist movements and political violence" (Sandbrook and Romano 2004, 1027).

In conjunction with violence triggered by political or economic frustration, violence often springs from differences in ideology. There exists a phenomenon of explosive collision among markets, democracy, and ethnic hatred that transforms the free-market democracy into an engine of ethnic conflagration, the phenomenon in which ethnic minorities who, under market conditions, dominate economically the surrounding ethnic majorities. The global spread of markets and democracy is a principal cause of ethnic violence because markets and democracy are not mutually reinforcing; rather, because markets and democracy benefit different ethnic groups in various societies, free-market democracy can produce unstable and highly combustible conditions (Chua 2002, 4).

Cultural backlashes against globalization reinforce one explanation of civil violence. Today, there is a ubiquitous tension between the importance of community, of culture, and group unity and the stress globalization implicitly places on individual autonomy and self-interest. Violence can erupt from this tension in the form of retribalization; culture pitted against culture in efforts to redraw boundaries and re-secure parochial identities (Barber 1995, 4). In the looming face of homogeneity, globalization's backlash is both desperate and terrified enough to resort to violence because the global penetration of mass media and values threatens entire ways of life and the extinction of whole cultures. In a multitude of nations, enclaves prevail where ethnic communities find themselves marginalized and profoundly disconnected; their struggle to perpetuate their traditions despite heavy pressures for assimilation often burst into violence (Riggs 2002, 43).

Terrorism is a formidable issue that is heavily associated with globalization. Ironically, terrorism - a violent anger directed at hegemonies and at globalization itself -is intrinsically aided by the processes of globalization. The flattening of barriers, especially the spread of global media, opens the window for the deprived and oppressed to compare their lives with those who are prosperous; furthermore, transnational terrorism is facilitated by today's technology and communication tools (Hoffman 2002, 2). Terrorism often buds in environments struggling with the tenets of globalization. The push for democracy clashes with traditional societal systems in many developing countries, and the stress on capitalism does not empower communities or cultures and does not innately facilitate social equity. "Insofar as globalization enriches some and uproots many, those who are both poor and uprooted may seek revenge and self-esteem in terrorism" (Hoffman 2002, 4).

Although I end on a somber note, terrorism is a fanatic extreme. Globalization does cultivate peace in many ways, especially within interstate relations; democracy, economic integration, and intergovernmental organizations all encourage prosperity and stability. In Triangulating Peace, the authors wrote, "we believe that the chances for peace are good, probably better than any time in history" (Oneal and Russett 2001, 272). Dissent is certainly not unfounded, though. Democracy is volatile and dangerous in its early years. States adjusting to democracy are rife with violence, and it is uncertain whether all nations become more stable as they adapt to democratization. Economic integration and increased flow of communication illuminates gaps between the world's rich and poor, the 'winners' and 'losers.' With globalization, rifts in income are all the more apparent. The tension between indigenous cultures and globalization's 'world culture' is tangible and explosive. This struggle is at the heart of much of today's violence.

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