Godfried Liebniz and the Problem of Evil: A Critical Evaluation of a Logical Argument

Religious teaching and several philosophers, such as St. Anselm have taught that God exists and is the height of perfection in the universe. St Anselm used the notion of perfection as a basis for his argument that God exists. However, a question arose that directly confronted the notion of a perfect being. This issue declared that God has three criteria for perfection as declared by religious doctrine; God must be all powerful, all knowing, and all good. However, evil does exist in the world, almost everyone would agree on this. The question raised asks how an all powerful being who knows all and is absolutely good can allow evil to exist in the universe; this question is known as "the problem of evil." Either God is helpless to do anything about evil, which means the God is not all powerful, God does not know evil exists, which means God is not all knowing, or God chooses to allow the existence of evil, which means God is not all good. All these criteria cannot be true at the same time when it is accepted that evil exists in the world. This question raises serious doubts on the notion of God as a supremely perfect being. If God is not supremely perfect, what is God? If God is not supremely perfect, does God even exist?

Although the problem of evil appears to show that the theistic notion of god is incorrect, there is an answer that preserves the belief of God as supremely perfect. Gottfried Liebniz wrote an essay that brought up this answer. In "God, Evil, and the Best of all possible Worlds, Liebniz accepts the argument that there is evil in the world, but offers an alternative view of evil. Whereas the problem of evil assumes that evil is in no way beneficial to the world, Liebniz argues that evil is necessary in order to achieve the highest order of goodness. Where the problem of evil assumes that evil is harmful and the world would be best without it, Liebniz argues that the world as it is the most perfect that it could be. In relation to God, Liebniz argues against the problem of evil by declaring that God could eradicate all evil, however the world would not be better, but far worse; God knows this and in his supreme goodness, has chosen to allow some evil to exist in order to achieve perfection in the making of the world. An example Liebniz uses to illustrate his point is that of a general; "A general of an army will prefer a great victory with a slight wound to a condition without wound and without victory." Generals commonly make the decision to go into war with the understanding that a number of soldiers will die, but this evil is needed in order to win the battle. If a general refused to lead the soldiers into war because evil will have to be done, this general would lose the battle and allow the enemy to achieve victory and would further invade the land being defended. By eliminating evil, God may be creating a world that is not as perfect as the one we live in.

Liebniz presents us with an argument that declares that God's creation is evil. The argument declares, "There is more evil than good in intelligent creatures, then there is more evil than good in the whole work of God." This argument declares that intelligent beings are more evil than unintelligent creatures, thus the God's creation, the world, has more evil than good. Liebniz denies the whole argument, stating that the premise is given without evidence and stated as though everyone is aware of this claim. Even if Liebniz were to accept the premise, would it follow that the world is mostly evil; "Is it true that the value of the latter is greater, but in compensation, the others are beyond comparison the more numerous, and it may be that the proportion of number and quantity surpasses that of value and quality." In other words, there are far more creatures in the world that are unintelligent and therefore less evil than intelligent and mostly evil creatures; so the sheer numbers of unintelligent, "good" creatures would balance or surpass the amount of evil in the collective of intelligent, "evil" beings, and so the world is not evil. However, Liebniz does not admit this claim because, if we apply it to humans, "there is no need even of granting that there is more evil than good in the human race, because it is possible, and in fact very probable, that the glory and the perfection of the blessed are incomparably greater than the misery and imperfection of the damned, and that here the excellence if the total good in the smaller number exceeds the total evil in the greater number." Here Liebniz shows that, even if it were granted that there are more evil people (which has not been granted), the power of those who are good may outweigh the power of those who are evil, even thought the evil ones are more numerous. This may be because the power of good in a single person is far greater than the power of a single evil person.

Liebniz solves the problem of evil by showing that evil can be viewed in a different way, as something that may foster a greater good. This shows us that our notion of evil and good may be too simplistic; evil, though unpleasant, may serve a function in the larger picture, the greater good, and this may be the way that an all powerful, all knowing and supremely good God intended the world to be.