Governmental Political Misinformation and Its Effects

On more than one occasion in American history, the U.S. government has utilized misinformation to push the country into a war. The U.S. government, in the past, has provided the American people with fragments of information, and compiled them in a way that Americans would be more likely to support the idea of war. The mentality of the government was to compile information strategically to make U.S. citizens feel threatened. War would eliminate the sense of threat that the government wanted citizens to feel. The government has deliberately used politically influenced misinformation as a segway to war.

The escalation of the Vietnam War is an example of governmental misinformation inflaming a situation. The Escalation of the Vietnam War occurred as a result of the Tonkin Gulf Incidents in 1964. The report of the incidents undisputedly escalated the war, however the incidents as they were reported may not necessarily be how they occurred. On the nights of August 2 and August 4of 1964 something happened in the waters of the Tonkin Gulf. The question is whether or not it was a Vietnamese attack, or a U.S. orchestrated incident to escalate U.S. Military action in the region.

Despite the desires of the country and its citizens at the time President John F. Kennedy, and his successor, President Johnson both understood that a wartime economy can be much more stable than an economy outside of war. The amount of money that can be earned through the selling of armaments is enormous, and the United States, being the superpower that it was, was able to supply several foreign markets with the desired arms. Dwight Eisenhower warned the nation of corruptibility war for economical benefits. He said that the United States has a Military Industrial Complex in that its lust for profit could take those in power so far as to work at sustaining a war if it would support the countries economy (Fallows 46).

There are facts and discrepancies in regard to the Tonkin Gulf incidents that discredit the story relayed to U.S. citizens and Congress. The Joint Chiefs reported without question that on two separate occasions the U.S. experienced hostile activity from the Vietnamese. The People's Navy of Vietnam's records however, stated that the closest the torpedo boats came to the destroyer was seven miles, a location that would give them the ability to move in to attack quickly, but not close enough to perform an attack. They moved into position, because the United States was teetering on the edge of hostile activity by maintaining their location in the Gulf. One of the reports supplied to Congress in regard to the first incident was presented on August 5^th, 1964.

The Vietnamese were ready to attack if the U.S. took one step over the line. However, the other evidences supplied at the after action report made the situation less clear. The reports testimony was that torpedo boats emerged from the Hon Me. It says they were approaching U.S. destroyers at approximately fifteen knots, a speed that is seen as hostile because it is an attack speed. The testimony was that the shortly after the torpedo boats were acquired on radar, they dropped off the radar; however the U.S. instrumentation logs do not support this.

The logs from the destroyer, Maddox, also show inconsistencies with the movement chart that was constructed by the People's Navy. Timing was also inconsistent between the two testimonies. The U.S. reported that the torpedo boats were acquired on Radar at 1257G but, the movement chart from the People's Navy has the three PT boats and their two Swatow boats at Hon Me until 1400G (Moïse 72).

The actual attack, which is said to have taken place after 1400G, is also mystery. The official history of the People's Navy reports that it received an order to attack the U.S. destroyer Maddox at 1350G. However, there was no record of who gave the order which opens the scenario that possibly the U.S. government ordered the attack. The message was relayed to the torpedo boats by one of the Vietnamese Swatow boats and the attack ensued. However, when it was realized that the order may have been unauthorized, the People's Navy tried to recall the order, but the message did not reach the torpedo boat until the attack between it and the Maddox was almost over.

What is even more peculiar about this story is that there is a record of the order being intercepted by the U.S. comvan. It would have taken very little time to translate such an order, and so little time would have been required to understand the order and deduce that the destroyer was the object of the attack. The U.S. should have had no problem preparing itself for such an attack, but somehow the U.S. still managed to place itself in the wrong place at the wrong time (Moïse 74). It is hard to understand why a battle ship filled with well trained soldiers would not better react to the data its equipment is providing them with, especially when doing so would mitigate the effects of a attack.

It was reported to the U.S. citizens and congress that the U.S. sustained an unprovoked attack based on the confusion that was attached to the incident. This kind of series of misinformation has led to wars both before and after this event. The government realizes that tragedy, or the foresight of tragedy, usually influences United States citizens to move toward a proactive defense. World War I and the current war in Iraq are both results of government misinformation influencing the American people and U.S. Congress to move toward war.

Another instance of governmental misinformation, prior to the Vietnam War, would be the panic the government instilled in the public over the Zimmermann Telegram. During World War I President Woodrow Wilson really pushed for the U.S. to enter the war. Despite the fact that multiple U.S. ships were reported to having been sunk by German submarines, congress was still resistant to the idea of declaring war. Wilson needed to do something extravagant to convince congress to declare war, because the circumstances of the telegram convinced Wilson that America should go to war, but would not be strong enough evidence to convince Congress.

The telegram was sent from the Foreign Secretary of the German Empire, Arthur Zimmermann, on January 16, 1917, to the German ambassador in Mexico, Heinrich von Eckardt, at the height of World War I (Murphy 15). The telegram spoke of increasing the amount of Mexican submarines, and stated Mexico's desire to use the United States territory as apart of their war path. However, the note without question, states specifically that it was the intention of Germany to leave America neutral, but they would react if America chose to step outside of the boundaries of neutrality. The text of the note was "On the first of February, we intend to begin unrestricted submarine warfare. In spite of this, it is our intention to endeavor to keep the United States of America neutral. In the event of this not succeeding, we propose an alliance on the following basis with Mexico: That we shall make war together and make peace together. We shall give generous financial support, and an understanding on our part that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in New Mexico, Texas, and Arizona. The details of settlement are left to you" (Zimmerman 1).

The government published the telegram immediately after President Wilson read it. Doing so heightened the anti-German and anti-Mexican feelings in America. These feelings being raised made it much simpler for Wilson to convince Congress to take the steps necessary. The government was able to allow the American people to overlook the second line of the telegram and push the country into a supported war. Wilson reported that the telegram stated that Germany, allied with Mexico, intended to pass through America and that they would attack if they saw fit. This way of presenting the situation kept Wilson, as well as his supporters, from having to lie, but also helped them obtain their desired reaction. Wilson asked for and received a declaration of war on 6 April 1917.

The next instance, one that proves that America does not learn from history, is the war in Iraq. There are two takes on this situation. The first is that Congress was informed that we had intelligence notifying us of the existence of "weapons of mass destruction" in Iraq. It is possible that our intelligence was wrong. Since much of our foreign information comes from spy reconnaissance or candid imaging, it is difficult for the United States to accurately obtain its intelligence all the time. The government needs to take the fragments of information that it can gather, and piece it all together to make the best educated guess it can, a frequent limitation with spying.

A third example of governmental political misinformation would be President Bush's informing America on a frequent basis that Iraq has Weapons of Mass Destruction, or WMDs. This term implies any weapon that can be used to kill a large number of people in a given area. Biological warfare, chemical warfare and nuclear warfare are all forms of WMD.

It is possible that President Bush was using this terminology as a scare tactic. An American hearing that a "terrorist nation" has the ability to potentially injure several thousand Americans with a single blow is enough to help them support a war. It appears to the American people that President Bush was trying to avoid war. In 2001, President Bush appealed to Sadaam Hussein stating that if Hussein does not prove that Iraq does not have possession of any WMDs that America will target Iraq next in its effort to eliminate terrorism (Koring).

Hussein would not consent to UN inspection, so the U.S. invaded Iraq. However, the U.S. found no evidence of WMDs ever being in Iraq ("Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq"). The U.S. did not pull out of Iraq after their inspections came up empty, even though WMDs were the foundation for the U.S. Invasion. The U.S. remained in Iraq for over six years. The war consisted of America moving into Iraq, removing Hussein as leader, implementing a new government, and remaining there to protect its new government from an elite group of Iraqi's whom are opposed to the change.

All in all this amounts to the fact that America went into Iraq with the public intention of eliminating WMDs and instead carried out its private intention of removing Iraq as a potential future threat. This misinformation has led us into the six year campaign, from which America has seen little positive result.

America is a nation based on the ideals of equality and democracy. The United States government, knowing it cannot declare war when the U.S. citizens do not want war, will often find a way to make the nation feel that war is necessary for self preservation. Scare tactics such as inflammatory vocabulary when reporting foreign affairs, leaving entire points out of a note from a foreign nation's military, or staging attacks in order to confuse our own soldiers into swearing war was provoked. These are just a few examples of the United States government creating a means to bring our country into war. If people and governments were fair and just all the time, there would be no wars to speak of anyway.

Works Cited

Fallows, James. "The Military-Industrial Complex." Foreign Policy Oct/Nov 2002: 46.

Koring, Paul. "Bush warns Hussein; Iraqi leader's stores of biological, nuclear; weapons put him in direct conflict with U.S. President." The Globe and Mail 27 Nov 2001: A8.

Moïse, Edwin E.. Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996.

Murphy, Dennis M., and James F. White. "Propaganda: Can a Word Decide a War?." Parameters: US Army War College Fall 2007: 15-27.

"Weapons Of Mass Destruction In Iraq." CQ Congressional Testimony. Congressional Quarterly. Curt Weldon. CSPAN, Washington, D.C.. June 29. 2006.

Zimmerman, Arthur. "Zimmerman note, 1917.." Zimmerman Note, 1917 1997: 1-2. Military & Government Collection. EBSCOhost. Melville. 29 Oct 2007 .