Historical Look at the Conclusion of the Asia-Pacific War

The actions undertaken by the Japanese ruling elite during the last days of the war can be useful in understanding why surrender was delayed. Indeed, it wasn't until August 14th, 1945 that Hirohito and the Japanese leaders accepted the American terms of surrender; and subsequently, the official surrender documents were signed on September 2nd, 1945.

1 There was a number of contributing factors that were crucial to Japan delaying surrender. Despite the devastation the Japanese people, military, and homeland had endured, the leaders used these justifications to attempt to endure the war for as long as possible. It is within the context of this paper to address these reasons, and understand the role they played in delaying the surrender of Imperial Japan.

The tide of the war had drastically turned against the Japanese, particularly in their occupied territories where soldiers of the Imperial Army were fighting a hopeless war against guerilla forces. Despite these hardships, there seemed to be a sense of optimism that retained the belief that Japan still had a chance to affect the outcome of the war, in a favorable fashion.2 The relative success of the kamikaze forces, and the mobilization of future divisions and the stockpiling of war materials further developed a sense of false security that the Japanese leadership were retaining in their hopes of a positive outcome to the war.

The contemporary rhetoric of the leadership outlined by members of the ruling elite conveys this sense of delusions of success. Wakatsuki advised that the enemy must be pushed into seeing the futility of continuing the war. Makino stated similar sentiments by asserting that Japan must develop a perceived advantage in the war effort, as to make surrender favorable to Japanese interests.3 Other leaders and advisers voiced similar points of view, advising the war to continue. This approach appeared to remain the popular consensus amongst the leadership; with only Prince Kanoe (amongst ruling elites) to voice an opinion of dissent.

Indeed, it was Prince Kanoe that represented the voice of surrender out of concern for the kokutai and the status quo. He feared that continuing with the war might spark internal revolution, particularly that of a communist nature. On February 14th, 1945 a report from Kanoe to Emperor Hirohito stressed the inevitable defeat of Japan in the Asia-Pacific war, and that it was time to end the conflict as soon as possible before the monarchical system collapsed. Kanoe believed that furthering the war effort and delaying peace would only lead to the "communization" of Japan.4

These prophecies of communist revolution taking place in Japan were not entirely unnoticed by Hirohito; however, the emperor affirmed the same beliefs that the Soviet Union would somehow need Japan in its future confrontations with the capitalist West. Hirohito responded to Kanoe with the claim that it would be too difficult to end the war at that point, and that another military difficult would make peace possible.5

Outside of this delusional optimism, there existed a sense of supremacy of the Japanese spirit over the eroding material conditions that plagued Japan and its war efforts. In effect, Japan sought to strengthen its position and force the West to take on a more conciliatory approach to surrender. Part of this erosion was in the form of the Yalta Conference, which signified the unity held by the three main Allied powers (Britain, United States, and the Soviet Union). Despite this monumental event, Hirohito firmly believed that the Soviet Union would not detract from the Neutrality Treaty of 1941.

The role played by Soviet forces in securing a Japanese surrender was undeniable. In the spring of 1945, when the Soviets rejected to renew the Neutrality Treaty with Japan, the situation grew even grimmer. Hirohito and the military command saw the best opportunity of avoiding an "unconditional surrender" was in fact to mediate through the Soviets, at least, this was the official line.6 The emperor's goals were to eventually negotiate a peace that would leave the imperial system completely intact. This was a misleading belief however, as the Soviets rejected such talks. Despite this failure, numerous attempts had been made at formulating a peace with the Soviet Union.

Such talks had been initiated on July 12 by Kido and the Emperor himself in the form of sending Prince Kanoe as the emperor's special convoy for peace to Moscow. The Soviets rejected this convoy and the situation became imminent that something would have to be done soon.7 Once it became clear that the Soviets were not going to help Japan, the official rhetoric calling for surrender stated, "this matter of protecting the national polity…one of domestic nature and therefore excluded from the terms of a peace treaty." This freed Japan from looking towards external forces in order to secure the status quo/imperial system. This meant surrender would no longer have to be delayed in order to best serve the interests of the Japanese monarchical state.8 This line of reasoning was espoused by Sato, similar in nature to the line of arguing that had been put in place by others like Prince Kanoe since as early as February.9

There were numerous concluding factors that played into the role of a delayed Japanese surrender in 1945. The threat of losing the national polity-the kokutai, was the prevailing impetus for holding out for as long as possible. The Japanese leadership sought not to end the war to end the suffering of their people, but to bide their time and wait for the opportunity that their own interests could be secured both at home and abroad. The Japanese leadership had been looking for a means of mitigating the situation, and with the dropping of the atomic bombs and the Soviet declaration of war, the leadership elite could precede with its own prerogatives. Indeed, these conditions of maintaining the imperials system were considered to be the bare essentials of any peace talks-which had also concurrently been the reasoning behind the delay of accepting "unconditional surrender."10

The conglomerate of reasons that forced the Japanese leadership to accept the terms of The Potsdam Declaration clearly indicate self-preservation, rather than serving the interests of the people, as the primary concern of the ruling elites. The shock and destruction of the dropping of the atomic bombs, coupled with the Soviet entry into the war only furthered fears of an internal uprising that would result in the termination of the imperial system.11 This demonstrates the mentality that subordinated the needs of the people to come second to the preservation of an idealistic autocracy bent on preserving its own existence. From this point, the Allied powers (mainly through General Macarthur) assisted the Japanese in preserving remnants of the old system by making Hirohito an idle emperor and not trying him for war crimes.12 Despite the Emperor having took a pro-active involvement in the war, the Japanese leadership had at the very least protected their interest insofar as avoiding internal revolution, in exchange for a reformist government via the occupation forces. The kokutai would never remain the same as it had been prior to 1945, and it becomes increasingly skeptical that the essentials of the Japanese ruling elites' conditions for surrender seriously materialized at the cost of so many lives.

Notes
1.Gordon, Andrew, A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 224
2.Bix, Herbert P., Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2001), p.488
3.Ibid.
4.Bix p.489
5.Ibid.
6.Bix p.506
7.Bix p. 507
8.Ibid.
9.Ibid.
10.Bix p.510
11.Bix p.511
12.Bix p.519