How Nato Made America an "Empire"

In his book, The Long Entanglement: Nato's Fifty Years, Lawrence S. Kaplan puts forth the assertion that American involvement in NATO "saved...the world from a United States gone isolationist"[1] and indeed, it had been the habit of America to not only demobilize after a war, but to also tend to ignore events outside the Western Hemisphere. But after World War Two, America could no longer afford to turn a blind eye to the needs and politics of the world. But a problem existed for the American government as to just how to convince the American public to go along with far-reaching and extensive involvement in European affairs such as participation in NATO; an agreement that could prove terribly problematic since it called for the permanent stationing of troops in Europe and enormous financial burden. What the Truman Administration had to do then was to educate the American public about the dangers that faced Europe, especially if America did nothing about the situation, and to also play off the American sense of charity and generosity. The combination of fear of a Communist plot to overthrow freedom and the appeal to the American altruistic sentiments proved very effective as the ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty sailed through Congress and was quickly implemented in 1949. This paper will examine American perception of the Soviet Union's intentions in Europe as seen by the America as well as America's attitude toward Europe in the wake of the Second World War, as seen through the lens of NATO.

Dwight D. Eisenhower once said, "Neither a wise man nor a brave man lies down on the tracks of history to wait for the train of the future to run over him"[2]. Participation in NATO was America's way of being brave and wise. Events that occurred shortly after the end of the Second World War had eroded American trust in Soviet intentions, particularly after the Berlin Blockade and the subsequent airlift that thwarted it. No longer would America see Joseph Stalin as "Uncle Joe", but instead they would come to view the Soviet Union as wary, distrustful, paranoid and absolutely devoted to the expansion of Communism. If Communism was the wave of the future, as espoused by their proponents, then it was vitally important to the western leaders, particularly the Truman administration to begin proactively countering the Soviet threat in Europe. Originally, American attitude was that of the "hard-nosed horse-trader"[3], making deals with the Soviet in a fair, but firm, manner.[4] Unfortunately, Soviet mistrust of Western motivations was so deep and entrenched that George F. Kennan once observed that, allaying Soviet fears would require "Nothing short of complete disarmament, delivery of our air and naval forces to Russia and resigning of powers of government to American Communists...(and even then they would probably)...smell a trap and continue to harbor the most baleful misgivings"[5]. Instead, Kennan argued, the United States needed to "contain" the soviets within their sphere of influence, a philosophy shared by the British[6] which was much more palatable to the West than the idea of continued appeasement of Stalin. John Lewis Gaddis, in his book Strategies of Containment, comments that given Stalin's actions in the Czech coup, Berlin Blockade, purges both within his own government and in Eastern Europe and a lengthy list of erratic and anti-western tirades by his representatives in the United Nations, "The effect of these actions (on the West) was not to produce an atmosphere conducive to negotiations"[7]. Fearful of Soviet intentions, the European countries decided that it would be in their best interest to form a cooperative defensive organization and invited American involvement in what would later be called the North Atlantic Treaty. To those influenced by Kennan's famous "long telegram" that had initially encouraged the United States to pursue a policy of "containment", the formation of NATO seemed the perfect opportunity. American policy makers and military heads had long seen the defense of Europe, now in the form of NATO, as "a vital part of the defense of the United States"[8]; the only hurdle left was for the Truman administration to sell the idea of continued American involvement in NATO as part of the effort to curb communist aggression while simultaneously ensuring European stability. In a statement to the press, Truman encapsulated the growing need for NATO:

"In Western Europe, there are about 350 million people, tremendous industrial capacity and a highly skilled and educated population. Why, General Eisenhower asked, since Europe has all of these resources, is there so great a fear of Russia? Why should Europe be afraid of 190 million backward people?

General Eisenhower said the answer was simple; there is unity on the part of Russians and disunity on the part of the West. Russian unity is forced unity, it is unity at the point of bayonet, but it is still unity."[9]

The Soviet, or rather Communist threat, was essentially a political and economic one, particularly to the devastated countries of Europe, many with populations seemingly dissatisfied with so-called democratic forms of government that had led them all down the path to two disastrous wars within the first half of the twentieth century. Instead of combating ideologies directly, Communism was quickly converted into the more tangible military threat of Soviet enslavement of the West. The formation of NATO served to direct the economies of the European countries into international defense that would, as well as maintain the Wartime mentality of the American people. NATO, the American public was assured wasn't intended to "win the next war", but instead "to prevent it."[10]. Americans were reminded that the basis of their government, their culture and their laws stem from the ideologies and innovations developed in Europe, and that the desires of Americans for freedom, justice, equality and religious values are identical to European desires[11], therefore their shared desires makes shared defense not only militarily desirable, but socially natural. The purpose of the Truman administration's stressing of the commonalities of Europe and America, according to Kennan, was to engage with the Soviet Union in "a sort of long-range fencing match in which the weapons are not only the development of military power but the loyalties and convictions of hundreds of millions of people...it may be the strength and health of our respective systems which is decisive and which will determine the issue. This may be done - and probably will be done - without a war."[12]. Despite the desirability of cooperative defense vis-�-vis NATO, there was still a desire in some quarters of American society that felt that a return to isolationism would be in the best interests of the country. To these elements within society, Truman directed his most scathing critiques "Another thing we have learned (from World War Two) is that no country can expect peace if it decides to look after itself and forget about its neighbors. In the past, more than one of us have tried to find peace through neutrality and isolation. It didn't work. It never will work."[13], an obvious reference to American neutrality that allowed the Third Reich to gobble up most of Europe in the late 1930's and which further led to disastrous consequences in terms of man and material. But NATO was not only a military endeavor; Americans were told, but an opportunity for Americans to assist their European allies in a charitable, Christian way.

One of the Founding Fathers, Benjamin Franklin once said, "God helps them that help themselves"[14], a statement of Protestant, and subsequently American values. European rehabilitation had been started under the aegis of the Marshall Plan, and would continue under the NATO agreement. It was important to the Americans that the Europeans be seen as doing their own fair share to ensure their own freedom from Soviet aggression. Like the earlier Marshall Plan, the United States reserved the right to dictate how much, and in what way, the European countries would meet their obligations[15], and indeed it was observed that the European countries would not only meet their obligations, but would incur heavy budgetary costs in doing so[16]. The role of NATO, Americans were told needed to have "strong armies, strong economies, strong governments, and strong hearts"[17] to successfully counter the Soviet menace in Europe. Since America was the only superpower, it would have to take on a large share of the budget of NATO until such time as the European community had a stable and strong enough economy to bear greater burdens. Until then, Americans would be the ones supplying the manpower and the tax money to ensure European, and therefore world, defense. The costs of military participation in NATO would be at or beyond World War Two budgetary levels[18], but would reap additional benefits in the growing of all the western economies[19]. By directing the European economies into rearming a coalition of nations devoted to international security, the Americans could be assured that old nationalist rivalries, particularly between France and Germany, would be set aside in a more concrete way than even the Marshall Plan, or even the French-proposed European Coal and Steel Community, could guarantee. In a statement to the press by President Harry Truman, noted, "General Eisenhower (as first supreme commander of NATO) said he conceives his job as being in large part an effort to bring about a unity in the defense of Western Europe."[20]. Perhaps with unity of Europe in mind in countering the Soviet Union, George Kennan gave a lecture at the Naval Academy in 1947 using chess as an analogy for the way in which NATO could deal with Russia:

"It is through the way in which you marshal all the forces at your disposal on the world chess board. I mean not only the military forces you have, although that is very important, but also all the political forces. You just have to dispose of your pawns, your queens and your kings in such a way that the Russian sees it is going to be in his interest to do what you want him to do, and then he will go ahead and do it."[21]

NATO, therefore would supply not only the physical pieces for Kennan's chess analogy, but also supply a sophisticated game plan that would encompass military, political and economic strategies to counter the Soviet threat.

Though Western governments largely embraced the formation of NATO, some remained critical of such an action, viewing it as a huge mistake. William A. Williams, in his book The Tragedy of American Diplomacy believed that "It was the U.S. that refused to offer any clear and unequivocal basis for...fundamental negotiations (with the Soviet Union)."[22]. Williams' opinion that it was America's insistence upon demonizing the intentions of the Soviet Union was radical in its viewpoint, but even George Kennan, whose famous telegram sparked the "strategy of containment", questioned NATO's purpose. Kennan believed that Europeans were mistaking a political threat for a military one, that there were questions about how far the treaty would extend, and that the formation of such an organization would only lead to a permanent division of Europe[23]. Though Kennan believed that the permanent division of Europe would be detrimental to relationships between Communists and the Western Governments, it actually had the reverse effect; neither side was willing to initiate a war over small chunks of land in Europe, instead focus shifted to contests by proxy in Asia, Latin America and Africa[24]. NATO's function, which President Truman said was to "promote and preserve peace"[25], provided a framework for the U.S. and other Western countries to deal not only with the Soviet Union, but with each other as well. The promotion of closer military, political and economic ties through an American "empire by invitation"[26] that allowed much more freedom, disagreement and unity than NATO's counterpart, the Warsaw Pact ever did. Because of NATO America, for better or worse, remains involved in world affairs, Europe has grown so close economically that it now utilizes a shared currency, and the famous "Iron Curtain"[27] made so famous by Winston Churchill has rusted and crumbled into nothingness. The military build-up required by NATO's medium- and long-term plans, combined with the economic push from defense spending allowed NATO countries to treat the disease of Communism, not just its symptoms[28]. The structure and philosophy of NATO was, and remains so strong and flexible, that since the demise of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, its former allies have applied and been accepted into NATO as full participating

[1] Lawrence S. Kaplan, The Long Entanglement: Nato's First Fifty Years (Westport: Praeger, 1999)

[2] Dwight D. Eisenhower, as quoted in Time 6 OCT 1952

[3] J.L. Gaddis Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (Oxford: Oxford Press, 1982)

[4] John L Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Oxford Press, 1997)

[5] Quoted in J.L. Gaddis We Now Know, 1996 from a telegram sent by Kennan 20 MAR 1946

[6] J.L. Gaddis We Now Know

[7] J.L. Gaddis Strategies of Containment

[8] Memorandum for Secretary Johnson from the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 13 JUL 1950; obtained at

[9] Statement to the Press, APR 1949 obtained at

[10] Draft Statement for President Truman on the NATO Anniversary Celebration, obtained at

[11] See 9 and Truman Address to United States Congress 12 APR 1949 obtained at

[12] J.L. Gaddis Strategies of Containment

[13] Statement to the Press, APR 1949

[14] Benjamin Franklin, Maxims Prefixed to Poor Richard's Almanac 1757

[15] J.L. Gaddis Strategies of Containment

[16] Memorandum for Secretary Johnson from the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 13 JUL 1950; obtained at

[17] Statement to the Press, APR 1949

[18] Statement to the Press, APR 1949:"peace and security just can't be bought at a fire sale."

[19] NSC 68

[20] Statement to the Press, APR 1949

[21] Quoted in J.L.Gaddis Strategies of Containment

[22] W.A. Williams The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: W.W.Norton & Company, 1959)

[23] J.L. Gaddis Strategies of Containment

[24] John Soares, paraphrased in a lecture given at the University of Cincinnati, 14 NOV '02

[25] Memorandum to the press 23 AUG 1949, obtained at

[26] William I. Hitchcock France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe1944 - 1954 (Chapel Hill N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1998)

[27] Quoted in J.L. Gaddis We Now Know

[28] Kennan, as paraphrased in J.L. Gaddis Strategies of Containment