How We Won in Vietnam Described in Woodruff's UNHERALDED VICTORY

An interesting point of view on the Vietnam War from someone who was there - rare enough in itself - who disputes the conclusions drawn by better-known critics.

Mark Woodruff maintains that the Viet Cong were soundly defeated in the Tet Offensive of 1968 and their forces decimated. After that the war reverted to the North Vietnamese who he says were defeated by the time Americans withdrew in 1973. Only their violation of the terms of the Paris Peace Accords with a full-scale invasion allowed them to take Vietnam, after Congress had cut off funding for American support of the south.

Woodruff's interpretation of those chaotic times is enlightening. General William Westmoreland has gained a reputation as a conventional soldier who focused on beating the enemy in a set-piece battle in Khe Sanh, reversing the fortunes of the French at Dien Bien Phu. As the story goes, Khe Sanh became a distraction from the VC prepraations for the oncoming Tet juggernaut.

Woodruff disputes the interpretation. Westy had his hands tied from the first, defending South Vietnam while leaving neighboring "neutral" Laos and Cambodia out of the equation. There were good reasons for this, but the infamous Ho Chi Minh trail wound winding through those neighboring countries which permitted the North Vietnamese to set up entrances at any point along the border they chose, untouched by ground or air until crossing the border.

Further, Khe Sanh was blocking an anticipated North Vietnamese route threatening the two northernmost South Vietnamese provinces. In fact, General Vo Nugyen Giap was against the Tet Offensive entirely, thinking it was premature. He only got some control of the situation after the leading pro-Tet supporter died. Giap let everything else go as scheduled, but altered the situation as it effected the two northnmost provinces to accomodate a major North Vietnamese Army (NVA) invasion through the western border area. That particular route, by the way, was the only major route on the Ho Chi Minh trial in use at that point so Khe Sanh was directly blocking it. Later, when LBJ announced a sustained bombing halt, engineers were able to expand the trail to allow entry into the country through numerous points and Khe Sanh became pointless and was paved over to prevent NVA photo ops and abandoned.

But just before the Tet offensive, Khe Sanh came under heavy fire from the NVA. During Tet, the imperial capital of Hue nearby on the east coast, was quietly infilltrated and almost entirely taken. Anticipating NVA reinforcement, the captors expected to hold Hue indefinitely.

Instead, Marines and South Vietnamese Rangers gradually regained control and Khe Sanh continued to hold against the besieging NVA, who eventually detached badly needed battalions to reinforce Hue, although without preventing its loss.

Elsewhere, as Giap expected, the Viet Cong were destroyed ending their role as an effective force.

I've always wondered at one aspect of the conclusions on the Tet Offensive as masterstroke. I'm aware that the Tet Offensive's massive impact lost the war politically. But was it really part of Giap's strategy, as some suggest, or simply serendipitous? Woodruff opts for serendipity, saying the the NVA and, especially, VC, having lost so much in their ill-fated venture, were amazed and delighted that it was perceived as a victory by the public who naturally distrusted the military and the Johnson Administration. Their view: we were led to believe that we were winning so where did all these guys come from? This was the beginning of the end for the US.

The last section of Woodruff's book focuses on some of the myths surrounding Vietnam, the blue collar make-up of the Army vs. white collar, college educated press and students, as well as prominent anti-war figures who lied about their service in Vietnam.

I would like to have seen Woodruff spend at least one chapter putting into perspective with his viewpoint the role of the South Vietnamese army -- the difficulties in dealing with a legendarily corrupt system where rank depended on graft, not just for personal gain but for distribution to those to whom you are beholding and the resulting poor leadership of the common soldier.

Overall, very informative book, well worth reading for the unpopular other side, the side that says, militarily, we knew what we were doing, considering the political limitations, the press (which was unable to report the other side making for seriously unbalanced coverage...a continuing issue to this day), and the enemy.