Human Nature Through Mary Shelley's Frankenstein and Oration on the Dignity of Man

Within Mary Shelley's novel Frankenstein the issue of human nature is explored, specifically through the character of the Creature and his subsequent development. Shelley's dealings with the Creature engage the critical situation of whether man's nature is fixed or not. Does man have a predetermined disposition, or is there within his reach the propensity for change? And if he can change, who or what mediates that change? These questions can be framed by the assertion of Pico della Mirandola in his "Oration on the Dignity of Man." Within that speech, Mirandola asserts, "All other things have a limited and fixed nature prescribed and bounded by our laws. You, with no limit or no bound, may choose for yourself the limits and bounds of your nature" (Mirandola 65). Mirandola forms an argument wherein man is mutable. He absolutely possesses the ability to change, but those changes are the product of personal choices. Mirandola does not seem to fully address those factors that influence the choices of the individual such as societal pressures and ostracism. In this way, the Creature offers both confirmations and complications to his claim. He illustrates the potential for tremendous change. But he also shows that additional factors can impose "limits and bounds" on one's nature such as prejudice against physical appearance and consequent social alienation. Shelley, however, does not take the next step in saying this eliminates personal liability. Instead, she seems to offer a conception of humanity deeply influenced by both circumstance and personal choice.

Mirandola's argument centers on the limitless possibilities available to mankind. "To you is granted the power of degrading yourself into the lower forms of life, the beasts, and to you is granted the power, contained in your intellect and judgment, to be reborn into the higher forms, the divine" (Mirandola 65). This sentiment is largely reiterated by the Creature when he poses the question, "Was man, indeed, at once so powerful, so virtuous, and magnificent, yet so vicious and base? He appeared at one time a mere scion of the evil principle, and at another as all that can be conceived of noble and godlike" (Shelley 80). In this, there is incredible overlap between Mirandola and Shelley. Both acknowledge man seems to have the capacity for unmitigated evil and equally unmitigated kindness or selflessness. Both authors even assert man's ability to transcend into some nebulous higher realm. Mirandola calls it rebirth "into the higher forms, the divine," while Shelley uses the language of nobility and godliness. And there is the corresponding attitude that man can make himself somehow less than human-beastly. Mirandola asserts man is endowed with this awesome potential, and it is his to use or abuse. But it is important to note he does not seem to acknowledge the influence of others over the individual. There is the feeling within his work that men develop independent of a social structure with no interaction between the individuals. However, there is not this corresponding sentiment in Shelley. The individual is not specifically singled out as the sole arbiter of his/her destiny. Men may be virtuous or they may be base, but Shelley does not follow Mirandola's leap that all the blame or glory should be bestowed upon the individual. Shelley seems to point to an individual that is a living, interacting and reacting part of a broader social scheme.

After all, the Creature cannot help his horrific disfigurement. And it was clearly this impediment that elicited scorn from others. "The unnatural hideousness of my person was the chief object of horror with those who had formerly beheld me" (Shelley 89). Men judged the Creature as beastly, dangerous and repugnant based on no other factors than his looks. Prior to his societal scorn and rejection, his stigma was purely physical. At this juncture, there were no grounds upon which to censure the Creature's temperament. He even demonstrates empathy and caring when he states of the family, "when they were unhappy, I felt depressed; when they rejoiced, I sympathized in their joys" (Shelley 75). He also performed small chores such as collecting wood in order to lighten their burden of work. The Creature appears extremely sympathetic during these scenes. He longs for nothing other than companionship and love, but his "friends" reject him in fear and haste. After this rejection, "finding myself unsympathized with, wished to tear up the trees, spread havoc and destruction...I declared everlasting war against the species, and, more than all, against him who had formed me, and sent me forth to this insupportable misery" (Shelley 92). By having the Creature declare "everlasting war against the species" Shelley illustrates an interesting point. The Creature does not associate himself with humans. They are an entirely different species. This species rejected him as a monster, and he could not see past that debilitating social label. This reaction illustrates something fundamentally lacking in Mirandola's argument. Sometimes the choices we make or the beliefs we hold are in part determined by external factors. Shelley offers no indication the Creature's drastic transformation was unprompted. He harbored hope people could overlook his physical deformities when they learned of his gentle nature and kind intentions (Shelley 77). With the utter disillusionment of this belief, his transformation follows directly. Had the family taken him in and displayed pity, there is no definitive evidence offered by Shelley that the Creature would have exhibited anything but love and kindness. In accordance with Mirandola, the Creature demonstrated both the epitome of love and self-interested revenge. However, contrary to Mirandola's assertion of humanity, the Creature's transformation seemed prompted in part by social factors informing his personal actions.

But it is important to note the Creature does not illustrate a conception of humanity solely at the whim of social pressures. Shelley clearly implicates and censures the callous and narrow-minded reactions of society (Frankenstein especially), but her censure does not stop there. The individual agent is still ultimately culpable for his/her actions. When the Creature addresses Walton, he asked, "Am I to be thought the only criminal, when all human kind sinned against me?" (Shelley 155). Even within a rhetorical question posed by the Creature, Shelley's exact wording reveals this dual culpability. Society is certainly accused and accountable for these crimes, but at the same time, the label of criminal rightly applies to the Creature. After all, his actions caused the deaths of many innocent people. But note it is neither society nor the Creature alone that is called the criminal. It is both, because both play a necessary role. Shelley reinforces the personal dimension of the Creature's character when he laments, "Oh, Frankenstein! generous and self-devoted being! what does it avail that I now ask thee to pardon me?" (Shelley 153). The Creature's social conditions have not changed. He has not been shown by man the kindness or love he so dearly desired. Yet he repents his actions. The Creature changes despite his social conditions, necessarily revealing a personal element to human nature.

If the nature of humanity can be understood in Shelley's terms as the complex product of social and personal interaction, that helps shed light on seemingly unfathomable crime and the perceived monstrosity of those perpetrators. Often it is only the crime itself that people judge but not the innumerable events preceding it. With Shelley's sensibility, using a label like "monster" might satisfy a visceral urge by putting distance between us and the monster, but it does not fully capture the situation. It helps us superficially understand what it otherwise incomprehensible, but it does not reveal that all we can safely assume is the criminality of the individual. In this way, Shelley's work illustrates and warns against the tremendous backlash from oversimplifying inherently complicated value judgments.

Works Cited

Mirandola, Pico della. "Oration on the Dignity of Man." English 202: Introduction to the Study of English Language and Literature Autumn Quarter: 2006. Ed. Leroy Searle. University of Washington: 2006. 65-66.

Shelley, Mary. Frankenstein. United States of America: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1966.