Idealism and Free-Will: Believing the Unbelievable

De Cleyre's The Dominant Idea poses an argument in defense of idealism and an attack on materialism. This idealism manifests itself in two important ways for de Cleyre: the Dominant Social Idea and the Dominant Individual Idea. The purpose of this essay is to look closely at these concepts and how they contrast to the materialist conception of existence which de Cleyre finds so troubling, and see where it can take us. Following the brief introduction of de Cleyre's argument I will then posit the assumptions and mistake de Cleyre has made in making her points in defense of idealism. First, a close examination of the dominant idea is in order.

The Dominant Idea for de Cleyre can be likened to the Will. The essay then serves as a defense of idealism in that she is positing an aspect of human beings that goes beyond the matter of the body and the physical world. This Dominant Idea is synonymous to a type of drive or motivation for living with the capacity to alter one's own existence-something a material concept of existence certainly denies us. She illustrates this point in the example of the dead vine plant blooming, even after circumstance has rendered it weakened and damaged (113). If we were to believe that this plant is only the product of circumstances, then it could safely be assumed to have long-lost its capacity to bloom and demonstrate its livelihood. However, this is not the case; for the idea within, which can be best described as the individual will of any living thing, manifests itself through desires and aspirations to overcome circumstances. Thus, the example of the blooming vine plant serves as an illustrative example of the Dominant Idea.

The dominant idea can best be understood as the individual's own will to react to its environment (or circumstances) and eventually overthrow it. The dominant idea does not exist out of nothing, for de Cleyre argues that it is the synthesis between man's existence as a product of circumstance (modern materialism) and man's creation of his circumstances (idealism). These two concepts whose existence is quite contrary, but nonetheless important:

I contend that both these things are true up to a point where the combating powers are equalized, or one is overthrown. In other words, my conception of the mind, or character, is not that it is a powerless reflection of a momentary condition of stuff and form, but an active modifying agent, reaction on its environment and transforming circumstances, sometimes slightly, sometimes greatly, sometimes, though not often, entirely (115).

However, the dominant idea is not merely the manifestation of individual will, but can be adopted as a social one as well, such as the modern materialism, which has rendered a dominant social idea of consumption, love of the material things, and dedication to production for the sake of production. She contrasts this to the dominant ideas of the past in which men created many great things, instilled virtuous ideas of working together, creating beauty, the endurance of the human spirit (116). There often exists a contradiction between the dominant idea of society and that of the individual. "The dominant idea of the age and land does not necessarily mean the dominant idea of any single life," (119) indicates the rebellious nature of the individual will to oppose the dominating and condition aspects of whichever circumstances man finds himself. This holds true for de Cleyre's contemporary conditions, where "Thing worship," as she calls it, is the keystone idea for modern society. For de Cleyre, the strength of resisting this cancer upon man can only be maintained through the idea, for the materialist will only find himself drawn into the dominant social idea by denying his own will and thus becoming a product of his own circumstances.

At this point it's essential to clearly assess the attack on materialism. De Cleyre does not deny the importance towards society that a material conception of existence has made. However, she makes perfectly clear that in ascending beyond the dark and brutal idealism of Christian theological domination, man has positioned himself into passive acceptance of his social background (115). She asserts this position by elaborating on the inevitable deterministic foundation of materialist conceptions of history, "Materialistic Determinism has produced shifting, self-excusing, worthless, parasitical characters, who are this now and that at some other time." The principled life is no longer feasible in this understanding, for it removes the very strength of the idea for man to alter and ultimately revolutionize the conditions for which he finds himself.

For de Cleyre, the weakness of materialism lies in its relation to the dominant social idea. The dominant idea of modern Western society is materialism, but of a different kind. The materialism that contrasted the old medieval theology has brought forth a materialism that denies man's individual will and renders him a determined automaton under the "tyranny of circumstance." She cites this as a clear weakness of taking a materialist approach on the left. The inevitable conclusion for the materialist-determinist is the passive acceptance of the dominant social idea. De Cleyre implies that materialist outlooks in general are inadequate for the task of overthrowing the dominating social idea because it is not (in its essence) thoroughly opposed to the social idea at all. That is why many materialist-determinists who once upheld visions of revolutionary change were so quickly and easily absorbed into the system itself - it follows then that only the dominant individual will is capable of separating the consequent of the social idea (thing worship) from its sources (materialism) (121).

Amidst her criticisms of materialism and the positing of the dominant idea, lies a passionate belief in the freedom and self-determination of the individual will (or soul). It is on these grounds of recognizing the inner-worth of your own individual will against the grains of the dominant social idea that one can experience freedom:

But if you choose the liberty and pride and strength of the single soul, and the free fraternization of men, as the purpose which your life is to make manifest then do not sell it for tinsel. Think that your soul is strong and will hold its way; and slowly, through bitter struggle perhaps the strength will grow. And the foregoing of possessions for which others barter the last possibility of freedom will become easy (122).

This is the climatic point in The Dominant Idea where de Cleyre concludes that the true worth of human beings lies in their freedom, and from this it follows that one should live in a way where at the end of his life he can say, "I have not been dominated by the Dominant Idea of my Age; I have chosen mine own allegiance, and served it" (123). This demonstrates de Cleyre's commitment to individualism, but of a different kind. What is most peculiar is that de Cleyre finds it necessary to reconcile this sort of individualism with something greater than base egoism. For de Cleyre, the manifestation of the dominant individual idea is the recognition of purpose in one's life for living for something greater than oneself (120). Rather than become consumed by the dominant social idea of thing-worship, and rather than fall down the pit of materialism, the only way in which freedom can become a reality is through giving ourselves to a cause.

So far I have only examined the key arguments in The Dominant Idea. However I have yet to cover the more implicit aspects of her posits. For de Cleyre, the strength of the ideal exists in contrast to the weaknesses of materialism. The argument for the dominant idea rests on a necessary condition that must be possible for some type of experience to happen. In other words, de Cleyre needs to prove that what exists as ideas must be somehow accessible to human faculties. Otherwise, she has only speculated another possible alternative to materialism. However, in The Dominant Idea, no such argument is given. De Cleyre attempts to make an argument using empirical examples, but these don't necessarily help her claim. The example of the blooming vine plant or the pilgrims who overcame circumstance are solely based on experience (albeit indirect), but they do not provide ample evidence to suggest that the idealism described by de Cleyre is justifiable. Nor is it sufficient to make claims about the determinism of materialism - regardless of how undesirable they may be. What is necessary here is a transcendental argument - one that explains the necessary conditions for the possibility of having a dominant individual idea.

The focal point of de Cleyre's essay, however, is not merely a criticism of materialism. Instead she has passionately tried to defend two things regarding individual will. First she argues for its existence, by arguing that there always exist some contradictions with the dominant social idea, which manifest themselves in rebellion and differentiation from the norm. Secondly, she puts forth a normative argument for the dominant individual idea as the transformation of the individual will towards a powerful and passionate motivation within us to achieve something higher than what is prescribed by the dominant social idea. She also makes this perfectly clear in her arguments against materialistic-determinism. Thus, the real power behind de Cleyre's argument lies in the foundation of an individual will at all, or at least one that is capable and plausibly expected to determine itself.

The weakness in this argument lies in this foundation mentioned above, which she only vaguely covers through historical examples. In some ways this is commendable since there really is no way of experiencing our freedom, but we can only assume it. The question isn't really whether such a free-will exists or not; rather, is this assumption too high a cost? Only through assumptions can de Cleyre's argument have any strength against materialist-determinism; otherwise we have no reason to believe that a free-will is possible or that any experience with the Idea is accessible to us. This assumption is not an easy one to take for there is a lot of empirical evidence to suggest against this. How free are we, and what is the maximum possibility of freedom that can be ascribed to humanity in general? The Dominant Idea only assumes that these questions have answers, and even still only ones which satisfy the conclusion put forth. How much of our lives can really be said to be free. If de Cleyre is right in the existence of a dominant idea (of the individual) then we as human beings must look to ourselves as "uncaused causes." We must think of ourselves as beings capable of causing events in the physical world; but where do we draw the distinction between causal events in nature and one's caused by our own free-will? Do circumstances really change because we Will them to (through the manifestation of the dominant idea)? These questions do not have answers, but they are nonetheless important. If de Cleyre wants to make an argument for the causal determination of the dominant individual idea, with a capacity to change circumstance rather than reflect them, then the assumption must be made that there is part of our existence that transcends the natural laws of causality in the physical world.

The Dominant Idea is a passionate and poetic argument in defense of the Idea against the apparent vulgarities of mechanism and radical materialism. De Cleyre's analysis of the "Thing-worship" as a dominating condition of the modern West, but her flaw is attributing this to ideas. Frankly, idealistic explanations require us to sacrifice too much and are only capable of making weak bridges between metaphysical concepts (the dominant idea) and the physical world. When de Cleyre states that the dominant idea is capable of resisting the dominant idea of any given age, she is going too far in assuming the reality of a causal relationship between the individual and his circumstances. The normative claim is strong and wholeheartedly agreeable - that we should live for a cause greater than our own. I cannot find fault with this, but this could equally be explained by materialism, not the tightrope between two worlds that is idealism.

Source:

de Cleyre, Voltairine. Exquisite Rebel: The Essays of Voltairine de Cleyre. New York: SUNY Press, 2005.