Iraq: Is a Withdrawal Too Soon?

From the very beginning, Iraq has been at the center of a long debate. President George W. Bush has led our country into Iraq on the notions that the dictator Saddam Hussein was hiding "weapons of mass destruction" and supporting al Qaeda and other terrorist groups.

Fighting in a country torn by the effects of war and past tribulation from totalitarian rule, progress has been slow and costly. President Bush has hope and plans to stay the course, but wishes to gain international support from allies to alleviate some of the burden Iraq has had on our country. At the Cato Institute, a non-profit foundation dedicated to the research of public policy, the director of defense policy studies, Charles V. Pena, suggests that a withdrawal from Iraq is necessary. He argues that a strategy should be implemented so that Iraq will become independent within one year. An editor of Newsweek International, Fareed Zakaria, argues that a quick withdrawal will only lead to failure. He claims that support from the United Nations is essential to the success of the mission. In my opinion, Iraq would need to have the ability to keep insurgents under control and have the funding to keep reconstruction efforts going in order to become independent. Therefore, a year to withdraw may not be sufficient time to make Iraq a fully-functioning, democratic nation.

According to President Bush, "the former regime sponsored terror, possessed and used weapons of mass destruction, and for 12 years defied the clear demands of the United Nations Security Council" (9). The claim that Saddam Hussein had ties to al Qaeda has yet to be proved, and no weapons of mass destruction have been found. However, the fact remains-the insurgents in Iraq are a threat to America:

Some of the attackers are members of the old Saddam regime, who fled the battlefield and now fight in the shadows. Some of the attackers are foreign terrorists, who have come to Iraq to pursue their war on America and other free nations. We cannot be certain to what extent these groups work together. (Bush 9)

It was found that Iraq did have a connection to terrorism, but it was never connected to Saddam Hussein's regime: "The Secretary of State Colin Powell presented evidence at the United Nations connecting al Qaeda operative Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi to the Ansar al-Islam terrorist group operating in northeastern Iraq" (Pena 13-14). Regardless, Pena states that the unfounded claims have "generated considerable debate over whether the administration exaggerated the threat posed by Iraq (in particular, how close Iraq might have been to developing a nuclear weapon)" (13). Zakaria agrees; however, he believes that "the fundamental purpose behind the invasion of Iraq-more important than the exaggerated claims about weapons of mass destruction-was to begin cleansing the Middle East of the forces that produce terror" (4). The "cleansing" is far from over, but that doesn't put an end to the demands for America to withdraw.

The only reason to remain in Iraq, as indicated by Pena, is if there is a threat to the national security of our country: "If there was previously a threat, that threat has been removed. That being the case, the United States must devise an exit strategy" (14). President Bush believes that a withdrawal is exactly what the terrorists want:

The terrorists have a strategic goal. They want us to leave Iraq before our work is done. They want to shake the will of the civilized world. In the past, the terrorists have cited the examples of Beirut and Somalia, claiming that if you inflict harm on Americans, we will run from a challenge. In this, they are mistaken. (10)

He believes that Iraq has become the "central front" and that the "enemies of freedom are making a desperate stand there" (10). By fighting the insurgents in Iraq, Bush believes that it will stabilize the Middle East as well as our own security. The "coalition forces now face an average of 15 to 20 attacks per day," adds Zakaria, "important parts of Iraq-including its central city, home to 20 percent of its people-are insecure" (1). It becomes evident by the bombing of the Jordanian embassy, the numerous murders of civilians, and the deaths and casualties of our troops that the threat is far from over. Bush claims that "the north of Iraq is generally stable and is moving forward with reconstruction and self-government" (10). Despite all the terrorist attacks in the region, Bush claims that the south is following suit. Pena interprets these attacks as "warning signs" that Americans have overstayed their welcome (14).

The overthrow of the totalitarian government has led to the ongoing transformation of "a place of torture chambers and mass graves into a nation of laws and free institutions" (Bush 9). Bush proudly announces that "we are rolling back the terrorist threat to civilization, not on the fringes of its influence, but at the heart of its power" (9). Many of the followers and leaders of Saddam's old regime have been captured or killed (10). He also claims that through several successful operations, we have seized "many caches of enemy weapons and massive amounts of ammunition" (10). The transfer of power to the Iraqi people has been started with the development of the Governing Council. The reconstruction of Iraq is well underway and is thus far proving to be successful:

Already more than 90 percent of towns and cities have functioning local governments, which are restoring basic services. We're helping to train civil defense forces to keep order, and an Iraqi police service to enforce the law, a facilities protection service, Iraqi border guards to help secure the borders, and a new Iraqi army. In all these roles, there are now some 60,000 Iraqi citizens under arms, defending the security of their own country, and we are accelerating the training of more." (Bush 11)

Zakaria recognizes the flourishing efforts in reconstruction, but notes success depends on Iraq obtaining more "diplomats, political advisors, engineers, agronomists, economists, educators and lawyers" (3). Pena complains that the troops are trained for war and not peacekeeping duties. He states that as a result, there have been incidents where soldiers "have fired on crowds and killed civilians in Mosul and Fallujah" (14). He spends no time discussing the achievements and the Governing Council, key elements in the transfer of power and steps toward a democratic Iraq.

The Iraqis are dependent on American support to rebuild their country, so it would seem logical that they would be in support of American occupation. The troops are the ones training the Iraqis to be effective police officers and various other roles. The Iraqis are obtaining freedoms they had lost through dictatorship and maintaining that freedom through their Governing Council. Pena insists that "thousands of Muslims, both Shiite and Sunni, protested against the American military presence," and it is important not to anger them so we may avoid further conflict (Pena 14). "There have been no large-scale revolts nor the much-feared civil war between various sections of Iraqi society," which suggests the Iraqi people are in support of our occupancy, argues Zakaria (1).

The huge amount of funding poured into the Iraq effort is no doubt overwhelming for the United States' budget. It is an enormous price to pay, when the occupancy is costing $3.9 billion per month (Pena 15). It is no secret that "Iraq needs money; lots of it. The fantasy that the country would quickly pay for its own reconstruction can now be put to rest. For the next year or two, while Iraq's oil facilities are brought online, it must live on foreign aid" (Zakaria 3). In 2003, President Bush sent a request to Congress, asking for $87 billion to "cover ongoing military and intelligence operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere" (Bush 12). Although Bush has requested the assistance of the United Nations and other countries in the reconstruction and security efforts, "the United States is currently providing 95 percent of total aid to Iraq and 90 percent of the troops, and suffering 90 percent of the casualties" (Zakaria 3). President Bush's request, which was approved, brings "the total the United States is spending on the war and its aftermath to about $150 billion" (Pena 15). It becomes clear that alone the United States cannot shoulder the cost and must influence other nations to join the effort.

The occupation of Iraq has the potential of becoming lengthy, like the commitment made to the reconstruction of Germany after World War II (Pena 15). "We lifted up the defeated nations of Japan and Germany, and stood with them as they built representative governments," a worthwhile cause, emphasizes President Bush (10). We continue to share a strong friendship with those countries, as we can in Iraq. President Bush's plan is to continue to rebuild Iraq's infrastructure and train the Iraqis. He recognizes the need for international support in the affair and has called upon the United Nations. He hopes they can overlook the past disagreement over the decision to attack Iraq and instead see the situation as it stands now (11). Pena, unlike Bush, believes that such a long commitment is not necessary and that Iraq can be made independent within a year. He recommends that the Iraq government to be set up within six months, and at that point, the troops could start withdrawing over the next six months. Pena stresses that our "government's first responsibility is to the American public, not the people of Iraq" (16).

Zakaria emphasizes the need for law enforcement to curb the extremely high crime rates, as well as the need to restore water and electricity, which is something that will take time (1). He suggests that sabotage is partly to blame for the slow reconstruction efforts. The Iraqis are in need of assistance to reach a level of peace and learn the ability to maintain it. Withdrawing too soon may cause the Middle East to become "an exporter of violence and terror," rather than "a place of progress and peace" (Bush 9). Zakaria states that the current action in Iraq needs improvement, suggesting that "the administration needs to have a clear, long-term commitment, the backing of the United Nations and more than a little help from its friends" (1). Zakaria proposes a probable solution:

Turn the rebuilding of Iraq into a great international project, in which all the major countries in the world were invested. To accomplish this, other nations would have to be given some control over the future of the country. Giving the United Nations more of a hand in Iraq's political affairs would actually help. The United Nations has developed skills and expertise in nation-building over the last decade that are worth having. (3)

Reviewing the arguments of Pena, I notice that he recognizes that there have been several attacks, yet claims that "the threat has been removed" (14). His arguments are fairly weak, emphasizing that the huge financial expense is one of the reasons why we must withdraw. He does not take into consideration that other countries could contribute to the effort, thus easing the amount spent, not only in billions of dollars but in lives as well. He does make a good point when he says that Iraq is not our government's responsibility. However, Iraq does indirectly affect our country through oil and possible threats from terrorist groups and insurgents still remaining within the borders of Iraq. President Bush and Zakaria both make more thorough arguments. They base their reasons on the progress made and the financial need to continue rebuilding. They both suggest that international support is needed, both financial and military. Zakaria proposes a strong presence of the United Nations to assist with the formation of government. His argument is well supported. President Bush's argument is slightly weaker than Zakaria's, as he does not go into detail about actions he feels should be taken. He does mention that international assistance would be very beneficial.

I must say that I mostly agree with President Bush and Zakaria. It seems possible that if we were to withdraw our troops, the Middle East would probably become unstable and the insurgents would gain control of central Iraq, despite the foundation of a government and the formation of a police force and army. Our troops are keeping insurgents at bay and a withdrawal will lead to those insurgents, not only in Iraq but neighboring countries, to push their way back into control. Iraq's government is weak like an egg; one wrong move and it will crack and break apart. To withdraw is to leave Iraq vulnerable. I also agree with Zakaria and President Bush that there needs to be international involvement. Iraq is recovering from a long period of repression and it will take time to undo those damages. Only with time will we know if the fight and investment have been in vain.

Works Cited

Bush, George W. "The United States Must Remain in Iraq to Fight Terrorism." How Should the United States Withdraw from Iraq. Ed. Neal J. Pozner. Detroit: Greenhaven, 2005. 8-12.

Pena, Charles V. "The United States Should Withdraw from Iraq as Soon as Possible." How Should the United States Withdraw from Iraq. Ed. Neal J. Pozner. Detroit: Greenhaven, 2005. 13-16.

Zakaria, Fareed. "What We Should Do Now." Newsweek 1 September 2003: 22-25. Ebsohost http://web.ebscohost.com> [1-4].