Is the Aid Distributed by International Non-Governmental Organizations?

The relationship between NGOs and donors has always been at the centre of debates on development and agenda-setting. However, shifts in development thinking over the course of the last 20 years have seen NGOs replace recipient states as the main actors through which development aid is channelled and distributed. In fact, the first study on the size of the global NGO sector, analysed 37 nations and found "total operating expenditures of US$ 1.6 trillion" in 2002 and pointed out that "if nonprofits were a country, they would have the fifth largest economy in the world" (John Hopkins University, 2005, in Wallace et al, 2006, p53). It is evident that non-governmental organisations are now key players in development politics. This essay shall contrast the moral case for aid with the belief that aid is part of the wider political agenda through the control of knowledge and funding. The argument shall be made that the aid donation of international NGOs are in fact part of a political agenda set up at an international level, rather than a benevolent donation.

In order to understand the current influence and agenda of NGOs, it is necessary to examine the recent history of development thinking. Crucial in NGO-development thinking is the shift during the mid-1980s to what Robinson (1993, in Hulme & Edwards, 1997) called the "New Policy Agenda". This shift involved a shift move from traditional state-led development policies to an agenda organised around the twin poles of neo-liberal economics and liberal democratic theory. Two main changes became evident. Markets and private initiatives came to be seen as the most efficient mechanisms for development. The role of governments was minimised, and NGOs (supported by official agencies) rose into the gap. Furthermore, these NGOs were seen as vehicles for 'democratisation' and 'civil society", being able to counter weight state power through communication and participation. Development NGOs have prospered with the "associational revolution" (Soloman, 1993, in Hulme & Edwards, 1997, p3), increasing in number from 1600 in 1980 to 2970 in 1993, as well as doubling their spending to US$ 5.7billion during the same timeframe (Hulme and Edwards, 1997). NGOs are now very important actors within the politics of development.

A key question for development thinkers is "why should people in prosperous countries provide aid to foreigners" (Burnell, 1997, p46). Democratic logic dictates, that if moral conviction moves society to call for official aid programmes, then Government should comply, unless a stronger counter-argument can be provided. The Commission on International Development (or Pearson Commission) argued in 1969, that the simplest answer to why prosperous states should donate aid, is "the moral one: that it is only right for those who have to share with those who have not" (Burnell, 1997, p46). Research by Roger Riddell showed that there are five key moral arguments in favour of aid donation (1987, in Burnell 1997), which provided a "stated course of action or inaction".

First of all, religion provides a strong moral argument for development spending. Religion and morality are inextricably intertwined, faith requiring we help our fellow human beings. Although Western thinking focuses on Christianity, this argument is applicable to most, if not all religions of the world.

A second key argument is that all human beings possess certain natural rights, know today as human rights.. The most basic natural right is the right to life, but they may also include the right to subsistence or security (Vincent 1986, in Burnell 1997), which provide a moral basis for development aid. The foundational document for contemporary natural rights in the UN Declaration of Human Rights (1948), which states that "everyone has a right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family" (UNDoHR, Art25).

Thirdly, the language of need and the obligation of humanity to relieve suffering and distress provides a moral aid argument. This approach rests on the concepts of sympathy, a sense of injustice, of shared humanity, and a brotherhood of man holding that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it" (Singer, 1977, in Burnell 1997, p48).

Fourthly, Jeremy Bentham's philosophy of Utilitarianism provides a motivation for redistribution separate from the concept of natural rights. The 19^th century English philosopher believed that "nature has placed us under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do (Bentham, 1948, in Burnell, 1997, p48). Thus the greatest happiness of the greatest number provided the ultimate good. Sangrepta (1993, In Burnell 1997) applied this philosophy to development thinking in arguing that 10% of the world's riches income generates negligible utility at home. If only one tenth of this 10% were given as Official Development Assistance then $170 billion aid would be justifiable.

Finally, John Rawls, in his 1973 "A Theory of Justice", argues that all primary social goods (i.e. rights, liberties, power, opportunities, income and wealth) should be distributed equally, unless an unequal distribution would benefit all individuals involved (in Burnell, 1997). Rawls' believes that the 'difference principle' is rational and morally obligatory. He holds that if each individual were asked about their personal situation from behind a 'veil of ignorance', they would endorse the 'difference principle'.

However, these moral argument fail to fully explain aid donations. Religious motivations, due to the inherent nature of religion itself, are not applicable to everyone, whereas there to no general agreement upon which rights can be considered natural. The aids and needs argument is undermined by the lack of empirical evidence suggesting that aid actually improves conditions, possibly even having a negative effect (Yeoman, 1986, in Burnell 1997). Such evidence would even contradict the aids/needs argument, as one could question whether it is moral to keep people alive in ways that do not solve their long-term problems (Morten, 1996, in Burnell, 1997). Furthermore, Utilitarianism and Rawls' 'A theory of justice' are purely theoretical constructs, which, given the immeasurability of utility, and the existence of socio-economic conditions (rather than the 'veil of ignorance') (Opesham, 1996, in Burnell, 1997), cannot account for the current extent of aid donations.

Moral arguments for development aid are thus either delimited in their essence (e.g. religion, human rights,...) or theoretical in their nature (e.g. Utilitarianism, A Theory of Justice,...). A stronger case is argued by those who hold that aid is set up by a political agenda. According to Hunt there are three key political uses of aid: for commercial objectives (e.g. Australian aid to China), for foreign policy purposes (e.g. Japanese aid to countries for whaling support), and aid as a international response to crisis (e.g. Rwanda, East Timor,...) (2004). Jan Vandemoortele of the UN development Program stated, "in essence there are two major dimensions of ... [the] partnership [between rich and poor countries]: one is concerned with 'money changing hands', the other with 'ideas changing minds'" (Cornwall & Brock, 2006, p51). In the next part of the essay, these two dimensions, the knowledge-policy nexus and the selection-funding relationship shall be examined.

Different schools of development thought assign different importance to knowledge in setting the development agenda. The influence may vary from the IMF promoting its own development goals through the biannual World Economic Outlook (Hobden, 2004), via the introduction of PRSPs by international institutions to shift the policy focus from international trading conditions to national factors (Wallace et al, 2006), to the language and words used to set up the development discourse (Cornwall & Brock, 2006). International institutions, such as the World Bank, the IMF, USAID or DFID, have a considerable say in setting the knowledge agenda. According to José Antonio Ocampo, the UN Undersecretary General for Economic and Social Affairs, these knowledge systems affect "the questions that are asked and the filters through which reality is read." (Utting, 2006, p7) Knowledge can influence agenda setting in various ways, I have chosen to focus on two: the creation of knowledge, and the language of discourse.

First of all, Shalmali Guttal noted that political will is not an objective conditions. Rather it is shaped by material and economic interests as well as a "universalisation of specific forms of knowledge". Although, development policy has failed in the post-war period, despite the large knowledge base, the world is still unable to address 'the most fundamental crisis of our time' (Guttal, 2006, p26). Guttal holds that development theory is not a "disinterested body", but serves a particular class or societal interest. Therefore "there exists today a powerful knowledge industry that justifies the creation of the very conditions that development seeks to address" (Guttal, 2006, p27 & p26). Current development knowledge has actually made things worse, which the number of poor increasing according to the UNDP (Guttal 2006). Guttal argues that it requires considerable resources (investment, support, legitimisation, etc...) to move from idea to theory. Consequently, "the capacity to generate information and to enshrine it as knowledge is dominated by a small set of academic donor and international agencies" which make use of this powerful and lucrative capability (both: Guttal, 2006, in Utting, 2006, p7). A prime illustration of such an international institution is the World Bank. Along with its financial power, the Bank has developed a parallel power in the realm of knowledge creation, application and dissemination, establishing itself as 'the' premium international research institution. Furthermore, the World Bank, is a 'knowledge institution' as such that it employs thousands of top-trained staff and experts, which socialise with policy-makers and leaders worldwide, as well as publishes thousands of pages of Country Assistance Strategies, and other political papers. Also, the Bank is the world's prime creditor to debtor countries, thus has access to rare, sensitive and privileged information (all Guttal 2006). This power to create knowledge is further strengthened by the World Bank's spending on knowledge dissemination. The Bank's research is often the only source of information on certain issues, and is respected world-wide because of its political access and capabilities. The World Bank's policy making is "dominated by commercial and financial interests of ... [the G7] countries" (Guttal, 2006, p30), which contribute the largest part of the Bank's US$ 60billion in ODA to Southern countries. To summarise, "the World Bank produces knowledge that justifies its lending practices, project and programme designs and policy prescriptions" (Guttal, 2006, p31)

A second effective way of setting the agenda is by determining the discourse of development policy. A discourse is a way to "frame certain problems" by distinguishing "some aspects of a situation rather than others" (Hajer, 2003, in Cornwall & Brock, 2006, p47). For example, the difference between 'poverty reduction', invoking measurability and poverty control, and 'poverty alleviation', which involves improving conditions for the poor. The consensus is represented by a mix of buzzwords, such as 'participation', 'empowerment', or 'poverty reduction' which are "warmly persuasive" and carry considerable normative power (Williams, 1976, in Cornwall & Brock, 2006, p43). These "images conveyed by simple terms are taken as reality, and words are increasingly loaded with ideological symbolism and political correctness" (Standing, 2001, in Cornwall & Brock, p45), which evoke and carry "the political values of the time" (Williams, 1978, in Cornwall & Brock, p44). The language of development determines the way of thinking about development, the way issues are framed; i.e. "who and what is included and who and what is ignored and excluded" (Gasper & Apthorpe, 1996, in Cornwall & Brock, p46). Gardner and Lewis seek to deconstruct this discourse, by revealing "what at first sight appear to be objective reality as a construct, the product of particular historical and political contexts" (2000, in Cornwall & Brock, 2006, p44). According to Goodman (1978, in Cornwall & Brock, p47), there are different "ways of world-making", which use different frames of reference, and can as such produce different views of what is right or wrong. However, Foucault has a more fluid view of discourses, seeing them as evolving "tactical elements or block". Multiple discourses exist at the same time, even within the same strategy, operating "in a field of force relations" (1979, in Cornwall & Brock, p46). Yet again, the World Bank is a prime example of how a major institution can set a development discourse. Since 1990, the Bank's discourse in its annual World Development Reports has led the institution to acquire a moral tone, shifted the definition of poverty to multidimensional, as well as introduced the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers as the standard instrument in the implementation of development projects (Cornwall & Brock, 2006).

The formation of knowledge is not an isolated process, and mostly coincides with important funding mechanisms. They are interdependent, in such that funding is necessary to reinforce the policy-knowledge nexus and that "funding patterns and practices change in line with political priorities, global strategies and current theories of how development can be best effected" (Wallace et al, 2006, p32). Funding is the crucial factor in terms of setting the development agenda. It is important to mention, that "the influence of funds goes well beyond simple finance" (Hulme & Edwards, 1997, p8). Agreements on what is to be done, how it this is reported, and who is to be held accountable, put the emphasis on certain ways of doing things and particular techniques. "As NGOs get closer to donors they become more like donors" (Hulme & Edwards, 1997, p8), consequently it is possible to argue that "NGOs have become the implementers of donor policies" (Smillie, 1995, in Hulme and Edwards, 1997). NGOs do remain diverse, but their diversity has been reduced by donor policies. However, these relationships are difficult to analyse, due to the lack of reliable and comparable data, and the wide range of different interactions (personalities, culture, educational,...) with donors (Wallace et al, 2006). Yet, there is evidence of increased NGO dependency on donor funding. In the 1980s, Christian Aid did not rely on any donor funding, whereas Oxfam only accepted 10%. By 2003, Oxfam received 50% of its funds from institutional donors (data: Wallace et al, 2006). Nevertheless, the UK's leading NGOs are not solely dependent on government. In 2004, Oxfam received £76 million (M) from individual donations £66.2M for shop revenues, and only £40.3M from government institutions (Wallace et al, 2006). However, "NGOs with large flows of untied public giving do not behave all that differently from those receiving donor funding tied to clear conditions" (Wallace et al, 2006, p53)

In order to illustrate the agenda setting power of funding in greater detail, I have chosen the exampled of the UK's Department for International Development (DFID). The International Development Act of 2002, legally required DIFD to work on poverty reduction, followed by acts tying its aid to the Millennium Development Goals (Wallace et al, 2006). DFID's original funding programme the JFS (Joint Funding Scheme) was established in 1994/95, and principally favoured five large agencies: Oxfam, Save the Children, VSO, Christian Aid, and CAFOD. These five NGOs received more than half on the institution's funding between 1997/8 and 2000/1, with rather loose accountability (Wallace et al, 2006). However, following consultation in 1999, DFID introduced Programme Partnership Agreements (PPAs) and the Civil Society Challenge Fund (CSCF) as new funding instruments. PPAs are given only to selected UK NGOs and provide substantial programme funding to that these may realise their potential and "make significant contribution to DFID's aims" (Wallace et al, 2006, p56). The £50M of PPA funding go only to 15 NGOs which adhere to the DFID's development agenda. In addition, the CSCF provides funds for "projects that meat DFID's development priorities" (Wallace et al, 2006, p56). However, the CSC Fund consists of only 8.7 million pounds, split between over 132 NGOs. The change in funding instruments has altered the funding flows, with a majority of donations going through PPAs. The new mechanisms have been accompanied by a "significant increase in all conditions" as "DFID continues to demand that NGOs demonstrate impact" (Wallace et al, 2006, p60).

As this essay has shown, aid donations to NGOs do follow an international political agenda. Moral arguments are too weak to explain all aid donations, whereas the concepts of "ideas changing minds" (knowledge) and "money changing hands" (funding) more than adequately explain the selection of NGOs and policy instruments. However, although most NGOs follow the lead of the main international institutions, which should (according to themselves) have the knowledge on how to provide development, things have actually worsened. The 2003, the UN Development Report noted that the actual number of people living in poverty had actually increased by 100 million, and that the richest 1% of the world receive as much income as the poorest 57% (in Utting, 2006). As Oswaldo de Rivero noted, " the success of the supranational high clergy is limited to its preaching and conversion work: it has not managed to obtain tangible results in terms of salvation from the nightmare of poverty" (2001, p57)

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