Is There Advice for Democratizing?

If any place and point in history could confirm the validity of the advice given to democratizers by Samuel Huntington in The Third Wave and Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter in Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, it would unquestionably be Czechoslovakia in late 1989, primarily because other nations in the region recently had shaken authoritarian regimes. In The Magic Lantern, Timothy Garton Ash suggests that the democratization process went smoothly and quickly for this reason; the Czech activists were able to learn from Poland, Hungary and East Germany (127-9). Because they had the opportunity to cull knowledge from the other Eastern European situations, the revolution in Czechoslovakia is an excellent standard by which to gauge the usefulness of such theories. Overall, the instructions from Huntington and O'Donnell and Schmitter to democratizing states correspond well with the realistic account of Czechoslovakian democratization detailed by Ash.

By Huntington's terminology, the situation in Czechoslovakia was most certainly a transplacement, a negotiated transfer balanced between the government and opposition, and he labels it as such in The Third Wave (151). Federal Prime Minister Ladislav Adamec was willing to negotiate with Havel and the reformers, who had multitudes of supporters, with neither side thus holding a dominant advantage in overall power (Ash 83-4). Huntington enumerates four specific points of advice for democratic opposition in a negotiated scenario, and the individuals working from the Magic Lantern theatre exhibit and abide by every single one of these instructions.

Command number one is to organize public marches and protests, but to exercise caution so that negotiating partners in the regime are not damaged (Huntington 162). The people of Prague held rallies and gathered in the square almost every single day, so there certainly was no problem mobilizing democratic supporters. The obstacle was preventing their opposition from gaining power, the President and other high Party officials, from gaining strength out of it. The adherents for democracy understood this, and compensated for it by attempting to directly show Adamec to have the support of the masses (Ash 100).

Also required is for the opposition to "be moderate" and "appear statesmanlike," primarily because, he would argue, radical, uncompromising manner causes the gulf between negotiating sides to further, a development counterproductive to all when there are members on both sides who find it advantageous to cooperate (Huntington 162). The advocates for Czechoslovakian reform were most certainly not extremists. Democracy was a nonnegotiable end, but they sought, above all else, to act "gently, tolerantly, without hatred or revenge" (Ash 121). There was little or no talk of boycotting negotiations. Whereas what "statesmanlike" behavior exactly entails is somewhat debatable, the members of the Civic Forum undoubtedly acted within the realm of acceptable political discourse. They constantly held press conferences, organized negotiations, public speeches and peaceful demonstrations. All and all, the Civic Forum likely appeared as "statesmanlike" as possible given the haste of the situation, their makeshift headquarters, and the sheer fact that police brutality "was the spark that set Czechoslovakia alight" (80).

The third and fourth key points directed solely to democratizers are to negotiate anything except free elections and to act with respect to the likelihood that those elections will be victories (Huntington 162). The Civic Forum consistently demanded free elections in their listing of demands (Ash 110; 121). What they further did to bolster their own position and to enhance the democratic stability desired by the majority was to place a sort of interim government in office, sworn in on the day that Husak resigned, consisting of many names favorable to their long-term cause, such as Dienstbier, Klaus, and Miller. This group was then able to lay down a more constitutional form of government that could guarantee lasting stability in a Republican form of government (123-5). While this is not exactly the practice recommended by Samuel Huntington, the reformers respected the basic rationale behind it. They were not ignorant of their responsibilities and never risked the future of their people or their own positions in power.

Huntington furthermore lists five commandments for both the ruling government and the opposition to follow (Huntington 162-3). Again, Havel and the Czechoslovakian democratizers adhered to these directions. After a revolution that took only a few weeks, no one in their right mind could accuse the Czechs of delaying or failing to "seize the opportunity" (163). The other rules mostly concern reaching accords and negotiating, and the Civic Forum held effective, constructive talks just about every opportunity they could.

The actions of the ruling government notwithstanding, Vaclav Havel and his associates from the Magic Lantern theatre acted in harmony with Samuel Huntington's advice for those in their particular situation. Huntington also points out a few pitfalls that a group seeking regime change may stumble upon, one of which is that the democratic opposition must not fragment or break apart. However, he admits, this was no problem for the Czechs because the speed of the regime transfer was too high for such cleavages to form (158). All-in-all, the reformers held to Huntington's view. The central essence of his advice is that there must be concession, agreement, assurances, and open, cordial communication. In the end, the accepted accord came with the structure of the cabinet, as the prime minister and 8 out of 21 ministers were still associates of the Communist Party (Ash 124). This following of the main ideals behind Huntington's advice, as well as the knowledge gained from other Eastern European states, is one main reason the transplacement was so rapid.

However, Huntington based his rules for prospective negotiated democratizers primarily on a number of real-life cases, Czechoslovakia being one of them. Therefore, logical expectations would predict the Civic Forum to follow his rules. O'Donnell and Schmitter give a slightly different code for overtaking authoritarianism which seems to be more general and abstract. Yet, their interpretation of the paths that regime oppositions should follow holds a key commonality with Huntington's view: that of communication and negotiation. O'Donnell and Schmitter believe that it is best to achieve a set of pacts among important individuals or groups. These pacts safeguard against potential problems that might occur throughout the transfer from an authoritarian system to a democratic one.

A central point made by O'Donnell and Schmitter is that such a system shifts "the polity toward democracy by undemocratic means" (38). Timothy Garton Ash continually raises this point throughout The Magic Lantern (89, 114). Although not specifically detailed as direct advice, self-appointed authority and acting free of democratic controls has its decisive advantages, namely expedience and swiftness. By advocating such pacts as an advantageous system of breaking down authoritarianism, O'Donnell and Schmitter also are inherently advocating action by individual factions free of standard liberal democratic control. Thus, by acting as a "spokeman for the Czechoslovak public," making demands and negotiating without ever being elected, the Civic Forum confirms the implied advice of O'Donnell and Schmitter (Ash 89).

The political scientists then label three primary stages or types of pacts fundamental to democratization. Yet, they openly acknowledge that they "do not regard pacts as a necessary element in all transitions from authoritarian rule" (39). Accordingly, there is much variation as to what types of pacts are agreed upon, and which types are requisite in a given circumstance.

In the case of Czechoslovakia, military pacts are not as important as in other cases because of the way power was structured in Eastern Europe. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Czechoslovak government was backed by the Warsaw Pact countries, notably the U.S.S.R. After Poland and Hungary had their revolutions without the Soviet army interfering, the Czech opposition knew that the U.S.S.R. would not attempt intervention. Any such threats were further alleviated when the surrounding Warsaw Pact countries repudiated the 1968 invasion (Ash 122). Additionally, when the Communist Party dissolved their own militia, any compromising based on the military became unnecessary.

Another important mode of pacts protects economic interests. These, it could be argued, are irrelevant altogether in a regime attempting to exit from communism, as that system does not in theory have existing class or property interests that can be lost. O'Donnell and Schmitter claim that there must be concurrence among classes to promise "the bourgeoisie that its property rights will not be jeopardized" (46-7). But, in a society with theoretically no bourgeoisie, pacts of this nature are superfluous, since it would be unlikely or impossible to reduce existing property rights.

Thus, the key pacts for Czechoslovakia were ones of a political nature. Ash unfortunately and admittedly does not learn or record what happens at many of the important meetings where such agreements would have been forged. However, given the multitude of negotiating sessions, press conferences, and communication, there were likely a number of implicit and explicit political agreements. The final cabinet structure and the decision to give Havel the presidency and Dubcek the Federal Assembly Chair reflect political pacts made between different factions within the system.

With the military and economic aspects more or less mitigated, the central pieces of advice that flow from O'Donnell and Schmitter are to act in an oligarchic, factional manner and to compromise politically with respect to power. The bottom line, then, is really not disparate from Huntington's. Many dangers that the political theorists warn against were negated simply by the environment of Czechoslovakia, the specific details of its totalitarian regime, and the swift pace at which democratic government arrived. Yet, Vaclav Havel and the other democratizers of the Civic Forum still followed the basic directions laid out by Huntington and O'Donnell and Schmitter in a variety of different forms. Principally, they remained civil, made concessions and agreements when necessary, and remained resolute in having long-term free elections and secure democratic peace. All things considered, their relative success as depicted in The Magic Lantern verifies the strength of those suggestions.