Jean Baudrillard, the Hyper-Real, and Scientific Realism in Philosophy of Science

A recurring theme in this course has been the question of scientific realism, namely, whether the scientific enterprise reveals 'reality'. In my last paper I took a strong antirealist position because of my views on Kantian realism. However, the writing of Jean Baudrillard throws the entire realist-antirealist debate into question. This is achieved by challenging the validity of the distinction between what is 'real' and what is 'unreal'. In this paper I shall discuss the way in which this distinction is challenged by Baudrillard, provide some contemporary examples of the abandonment of this distinction, and show some of the consequences the loss of this distinction would have for modern science. Specifically, I will try to show that science can and does still thrive in a world in which the real-unreal distinction is lost.

One needs only to look about to discover a plethora of simulations in the world today. From video games to amusement parks, and from the internet to virtual pets, our world is full of increasingly accurate representations of "reality". A simulation is good if it produces the same effects and "symptoms" as does the object of that simulation. However, as the simulations get better and better, the effects of those simulations become more indistinguishable from those of the "reality" it was intended to simulate. However, simulation is not meant to be taken as simple reproduction. As Baudrillard says:

"It is no longer a question of substituting signs of the real for the real itself, that is, an operation to deter every real process by its operational double, a metastable, programmatic, perfect descriptive machine, which provides all the signs of the real and short-circuits all its vicissitudes." (Baudrillard, Simulations)

Baudrillard claims that simulation is to claim to have what one hasn't. In other words, simulations that present themselves as progressively more and more real, in the end will only show that they are existing to hide the fact that there is no reality any longer. For any sense of reality in a world so infiltrated by increasingly real simulations must stem from the lack of reality embodied in the simulations themselves.

Baudrillard labels this state of affairs, in which simulation renders reality artificial, the 'Hyper-real'. Perhaps the best example given of the broad scope of the hyper-real given by Baudrillard is that of Disneyland and its effect upon the surrounding environment. Disneyland was created at a time when it was probably least needed, i.e., in the 1950's when the economy was doing wonderfully and every family was a happy one. Out of this atmosphere grew 'The Happiest Place on Earth'. But when the turbulence of the 1960's began to occur, and people realized that the "perfect" society was not so perfect after all, Disneyland grew in prominence and remained 'The Happiest Place on Earth'. What is always presented to be merely a fiction exists to hide the increasing absurdity and fiction that is all of the surrounding area. Indeed the Los Angeles area, with its connection to Hollywood, is known for its ability to manufacture illusions.

What is to be noticed in this Disneyland example is the way in which Disneyland is presented to be incontrovertibly and obviously a fiction. It is this presentation of fiction that leads Baudrillard to his claim that within the Hyper-real there must lie a very strong 'reality principle'. This reality principle is the pervading notion that there is in fact a distinction between the real and the unreal, when this is merely an illusion that is prevalent in the hyper-real to hide the fact that this distinction is not actual. And not only does the reality principle become very strong in the hyper-real, but also such dichotomous oppositions as good-evil, republican-democrat, or even philosophical concepts such as free will-determinism and empiricism-rationalism, etc. Nothing in human experience is safe from the hyper-realist interpretation.

What bearing does the loss of the reality distinction have upon the scientific enterprise in general and the question of realism-antirealism in particular? There is a problem in answering this question because of the broad scope of application that the hyper-real may have. If one were to say that the hyper-real has a profound and upsetting impact upon scientific knowledge, then one is obviously siding with Baudrillard about the metaphysical and epistemological crisis that would follow. If, however, one were to say for example that the hyper-real is somehow more epistemological in scope, therefore allowing us to keep some notion of the 'real' that is independent of simulation, iit seems just as impossible to escape Baudrillard's conclusions about the universal scope of the hyper-real. This is because of the way in which the hyper-real demands a strong reality principle. In other words, by attempting to hold on to the notion of the real in any way, shape, or form, one is already deeper within the hyper-real than if he/she were to side with Baudrillard from the beginning. It is precisely because one is so deeply immersed in simulation that one is able to have such a strong notion of the real in the first place. Given this insight it begins to be apparent that escaping Baudrillard's conclusions is difficult at best, for it is possible to construe any argument against him as simply a supporting statement for his position by claiming that the maker of that statement is deeply immersed in the hyper-real.

On the same token, it is the requirement of a very strong reality principle that allows science to flourish in the hyper-real, and not to be diminished. For a scientist living in the hyper-real, nothing could be plainer than the fact that his discoveries do indeed reveal some sort of reality. And the great majority of the people who are also living in the hyper-real and are not scientists would correspondingly be more than willing to accept the scientists' claims as true and representative of things-in-themselves. Science in such a world would invariably be revered more than any other discipline because of the strength of the reality claim it makes, which is exactly what has happened in our own world, providing empirical evidence for Baudrillard's claims. Science purports to reveal reality in some way, which only furthers the promotion of the reality principle, and in turn those who are deeply immersed in simulations have elevated science to the level it has attained in our society.

Thus, from within the hyper-real science does not seem to lose any of its force, since the reality principle is fundamental to life within the hyper-real. It is only when one has a vantage point from outside the hyper-real that one can sacrifice finally the reality principle, and hence something that so strongly supports the notion of the hyper-real. However, Baudrillard claims that we are so deep into the hyper-real that we shall henceforth be unable to remove ourselves from its grasp, for anything that had once been 'real' in the past has long since been forgotten in favor of simulations, which are by definition indistinguishable from anything that had once been real. But now, everything is "always already reproduced." It is possible to give a hyper-real account of practically any aspect of our world today, science included. Does this mean, however, that Baudrillard must have the final word in philosophy? It does seem so, for once one heads even a bit down the road of postmodernism, he/she begins a path down a slippery slope that has the hyper-real at its end. However, other methods of doing philosophy that have a stronger reality principle will always be a part of the hyper-real, because of the necessity of a reality principle in the hyper-real. Science falls under this category, I believe. Therefore, although Baudrillard may have the final word when it comes to philosophy, philosophy and science will not undergo a major crisis as a result. From a vantage point from outside the hyper-real, it is easy to see that Baudrillard has heavily criticized the notion of scientific realism, but from within, that realism may be just as strong, if not stronger, due to the hyper-real itself.

In conclusion, then, it may be seen that Baudrillard has provided inescapable criticism of science. However, pragmatically speaking, and as a result of the necessity of a firm reality principle, I believe science can rest easy from the threat of the hyper-real.