Kuhnian Paradigm Theory and Rational Science

If anything, rival scientific theories suggest that the existing paradigm regarding a certain anomaly and/or aspect of science is lacking in some respect. Furthermore, if more than one rival theory exists (to the existing scientific paradigm), then rival theories rival each other to be the most appropriate rival to the established paradigm i.e. a plurality of rival theories compete for the qualitative rivalness. Moreover, according to Thomas Kuhn, the consequent debates and theoretical and/or empirical arguments between the unestablished paradigms inevitably 'talk through each other' and become subject to equivocation in the process of competition. This paper will outline the premises and conclusion for Kuhn's above referred to thesis. The paper will also offer a critical reflection on Kuhn's (paradigm) about paradigms. Next, the paper will provide an argument that discusses 'rational science' and the impact of Kuhn's argument on the practice of rational science. Moreover, Kuhn's paradigm is useful only to the extent that it is empirical within the context of validation criteria/methodological strengths such as falsification, scientific method etc. Furthermore, for this same reason rational science can never be anything more than empirical because methodologies are limited as they extend beyond rationalism into speculative philosophy; thus, rational science is actually analytical-speculation.

PART A-KUHN'S THESIS ON THE PROBLEM OF PARDIGMS

Before beginning a summary of Kuhn's thesis about paradigms, it is first important to recognize what we actually mean by 'paradigm'. Moreover, when this word is used, it will refer to a numerical/symbolic model and/or template that explains a particular observation or set of observations within science. Furthermore, a paradigm is a belief about 'science' and its observations, that is held by a group of specialists within the scientific community. (Kuhn, p.294-297) According to Kuhn, one of the difficulties that face opposing paradigms is the notion that since they are opposing paradigms, they are not arguing for the same 'scientific truths' or 'hypotheses'. That is, although the differing paradigms represent arguments about similar problems, the approach to the definition and solution of the problem are not the same. (Boyd, Gasper and Trout p.157) For example, two different paradigms can exist to explain the anomaly of the quantum paradox in which the path of electrons to a particular point is unknown. (Ibid p.157)

Second, opposing paradigms perfect themselves in terms of their own paradigm and not that of the other. (Ibid p.157) Using the same quantum paradox, scientific community x can explain the phenomena of quantum paradox in terms of imagining the probability of an electron as made probable through directing the possible paths of the electron (two slit experiment); however, scientific community y can equally claim that their paradigm of a completely different means of attaining 'probability' is more probable/efficient at assuming probability.

Third, values used in different paradigms concerning similar problems in science, require varying external criteria outside of science. (Ibid) That is to say, since some paradigms question the existing paradigms of science, they draw new concepts, both theoretical and empirical to their attention, and explain a particular phenomena through observation experiments of such theoretical and empirical reality. For example, the emergence of relativity had to utilize the external criteria of time relative to speed. Furthermore, prior to Einstein, such concepts went largely unconsidered.

Last, Kuhn's fourth premise is that a historical materialism or historical development of the sciences tips the balance for existing paradigms in that they preserve existing power structures and involve mere acceptance of that which is irrational or not rationally explained (anomalies). Furthermore, until some recognizable benefit to that power structure emerges in a proposed paradigm explaining an old anomaly (i.e.strong 'physical' evidence, patents, theoretical/empirical security, technology, research grants etc.) then new paradigms will not emerge past the 'stage of extraordinary science' to the 'emergence of new paradigms'. "In particular, people (scientists) may resist acknowledging and interpreting evidence if it conflicts with their existing theoretical beliefs and be inclined to disregard the evidence and base a response instead on their own theoretical views." (Kuhn, Amsel and O'Laughlin p.56)

PART B-THE STRENGTH OF KUHN'S THESIS

Kuhn's argument itself is a valid one, but more importantly, what is the criteria for such validity? i.e. if Kuhn's argument is strong, then which methodology makes it so? and which methodologies can be used against Kuhn's thesis. Furthermore, how valid are Kuhn's methodologies in terms of rational science. To begin a list of methodologies is helpful, such items include testability, falsifiability, verifiability, logic and metaphysical content, all in terms of Kuhn's above thesis.

Despite Kuhn's perspective on reality, the paradigms that Kuhn discusses are empirical and his reference to them i.e. only refer to possible experience of reality, and difficulties with them are also empirical. Moreover, any empirical argument is subject to being labeled fallacious to some extent because of the 'methodological standards' that are so often applied to the empirical laws that are debated in paradigms. Moreover, Kuhn's argument is nothing more than that which it argues because in arguing an object, the subject itself argues in reference to those objects, thereby rendering elements of the object (other paradigms) within the subject (Kuhn's critique). In other words, if two farmers debate about who's crops yield greater harvests, and a third farmer mediates, the third farmer must mediate that which is being debated, and consequently accepts and/or assumes some of the assumptions made by the two arguing farmers. Now, in transposing this same scenario through 'correspondence' i.e. rules of resemblance's, (T.Kuhn p.306) to scientific paradigms, Kuhn becomes the mediating farmer of science. So, it is evident that Kuhn's argument itself is empirical through correspondence with other paradigms.

Furthermore, is Kuhn's argument falsifiable? i.e. in reference to Karl Popper, is the thesis contradicted by basis existential statements. (Hubner, p.32) Also, if we utilize Carnap's criteria for counterfactual evidence, then Kuhn's critique of paradigms must be weighed against other critiques of paradigms. The question then becomes, do other such critiques of scientific reasoning exist, what are they, and how useful are they? The answer is yes, other critiques of scientific reasoning do exist, but as a historical refutation of positivism has repeatedly demonstrated, logical reasoning in all critiques can often be aimed at itself for a consequent ontological self refutation. (Habermas p.72) This makes critiques using logical-positivism critical but also leads to a zero-sum gain as Karl Popper would agree. Moreover, all scientific theories use logical-positivism symbolically at least for the purpose of acquiring probabilities that are rendered 'usable' evidence in terms of underlying logical reasoning and/or rationalism. Thus, since Kuhn uses logical reasoning, it is as refutable as any other critique using logical reasoning, where the amount the critique is refutable, is directly related to the reliance made on logic. For example, if theory x uses one-tenth metaphysics and nine-tenths symbolic logic that is itself only based on a ninety percent probability of accuracy of sensory perceptions, then the theory is refutable in terms of logical argumentation to a maximum of ninety percent and a minimum of eighty-one percent. However, even if the refutation itself succeeds outright, i.e. absolutely, then the whole argument is still salvageable through the uncertainty of its metaphysical element, of which both metaphysical and rational arguments can be used for critique. In other words, if external criteria are not defensible through observation, then they are defensible through faith and/or logic; thus, a theological argument is assumed if not applied to a scientific paradigm. Thus, Kuhn's critique itself is at least logically refutable, through the same logic that makes (much) logic hypothetical.

Third, Kuhn's argument is verifiable in so far as it discusses scientific paradigms that deal with putative physical reality and not spiritual unknowns. Essentially, Kuhn's thesis is verifiable for the same reason it is testable, thereby linking verifiability with testability. Yet this too contains the same inherent logical circularity that pervades the logical positivism mentioned above. Nevertheless, testability is an aspect of verifiability just as falsification is also. Such testability often employs the use of probability and/or cause and effect relationships. But this is argumentation for the rationality of science more than it is for use against Kuhn's argument. However, both Kuhn and science rely on probability. "We often do say that on the basis of definite evidence a theory has some "degree of probability". Thus, "a familiar use of this phrase permits us to say that, because of the accumulated evidence obtained since 1900, the quantum theory of energy is more probable today than it was sixty-six years ago."(Danto and MorgenBesser, p.255) So, provided that 'some degree of probability' is possible, Kuhn's argument is probable to some extent and consequently testable, at least logically. That is to say, Popper is incorrect in stating that theories have a probability of zero based on the notion that only bi-polar arguments i.e. affirmation and refutation of x is one-hundred percent probable, because this falsely falsifies the hypothesis x. Moreover, Popper fallaciously uses the bi-polar evidence argument using a straw man fallacy to falsify the finite evidence probability theory because the smallest amount of un-disconfirmed evidence leaves open the possibility of a one percent probability of a theory's hypothesis i.e. Popper creates a new argument of probability and disconfirms that instead of the original argument of probability used by Carnapp.

So, some things considered, Kuhn's argument is subject to its own critique as the subject-object relationship between critique and paradigms can just as easily be turned from paradigm to critique of paradigm. Moreover, since the argument takes on a sociological tint, it must also be considered in terms of sociological arguments (that themselves ultimately use logic) in addition to the logico-scientific approach. Also, Kuhn's argument is also subject to empiricist limits, falsification and probability.

PART C- THE IMPACT OF KUHN'S PARADIGM THESIS ON RATIONAL SCIENCE

Thus emerge the questions of what is the best approach to solving anomalies? the question of reality? and the question of what is truthful in methodology? Kuhn's thesis itself raises several similar questions about paradigms and their usage, and Kuhn's thesis itself brings questions about rational science, where rational science is understood to mean empirical science that utilizes rationalism at the theoretical and empirical levels. But first, it is necessary to know more about what ultimate paradigm(s) all paradigms rest on i.e. what do existing paradigms use as their epistemological basis. The above discussion shows that a variety of methodologies can be used in determining truth-claims. These methods again include logic, testability, falsifiability, probability, verifiability and metaphysics. Kuhn explains that recurring events yield, recurring results and consequently recurring expectations, (T.Kuhn p.306) thus the events are symbolized and become law through 'correspondence rules'. Moreover, correspondence rules are synonymous with 'cause and effect' because they are based on historical probability. Furthermore, it has been displayed that the probability used in Kuhn's argument is only accurate to a certain extent within a putatively infinite range. This has a direct correlation with science using the correspondence rules because when rational science uses probability, it is consequently limited in respect to the limitations of probability.

Second, if Kuhn's argument is empirical, i.e. subject to the same imagination of experience presently assumed in the quantum paradox, then the argument is limited in the area of deduction (in terms of the induction that is empirical) i.e. Kuhn possibly interprets the induction used in paradigms deductively because the paradigms are not certain to represent anything real. (Harre p.55) Even taken another way, Kuhn's thesis as well as rational science, would also yield the same empirical problem i.e. an inductional analysis of inductional paradigms is also subject to empiricist limitations at some point. Moreover, the use of word empiricism here refers to the extending of logical truths to include complex statements as opposed to basic truths i.e. in arriving at logic based theories using experience, even empiricism assumes aspects of external reality beyond simple a-posteriori 'scientific' experience. Thus, since both Kuhn and rational science employ extended empiricism, they are both limited beyond the truths of rationalism.

Also, what are the criteria for measuring scientific rationality? If metaphysics is out of the question, then rationality is not from the Bible, Koran or Torah; and if logical-positivism is not absolute beyond basic statements or simple a-priori truths, then rational science does not rest on conceptual matrixes that employ a-priori and a-posteriori logical schema's. Thus, rational science in respect to Kuhn's critique is not completely analytic. Furthermore, if psychological theory is correct in stating the mind has not actually been proven to exist, then rational science cannot completely be determined by anything having to do with the mind. Moreover, psychological argument makes use of the same problems of methodology to falsify the mind. Furthermore, if essence is not observable and transposable/mappable on to reality, then rational science is as dead as the word can create concepts of non-being in one's imagination (which is a part of the mind), therefore, rational science is worse than dead, it doesn't even exist! But that is Popper's argument, and is not entirely non-fallacious. However, this itself is also not confirmed absolutely. Hence, it has become evident through reference to Kuhn's critique, its methodology, and methodologies that it discusses, that science consists of something in the area of analytic-continental science, where speculation is unavoidable at least for the time being. However, this analysis has included little reference to metaphysics and speculation itself, which in its own right has the same claim to epistemology as more empirical methods of analysis.

So, we have Thomas Kuhn's critique on paradigm shifts, the strength of his argument and the implications of Kuhn's argument on rational science. Moreover, given both the strength and weaknesses of Kuhn's argument in terms of the following paradigms of cause and effect rules, logic, analytic-philosophy, continental philosophy, probability, methodology, and falsifiability, then rational science is significantly reducible to a mass-certified appeal to the most probable, and useful correlation between perception and external reality. (Lehrer and Wagner p.19) Furthermore, Kuhn's paradigm on paradigms does include the problem of consensus that arises precisely from the same limitations apparent in all the paradigms. Consequently Kuhn has managed to peer behind his own argument for a sound reflection on science that evidently results in the anomaly of speculation. The speculative anomaly itself is a realm of knowledge that also requires a paradigm, as without paradigms there is nothing but theoretical anarchy, which in turn requires a paradigm.

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