Labor Unions and the Democratic Vote in the 2000 National Election

According to Oren M. Levin-Waldman in his working paper The Impact of Declining Union Membership on Voter Participation Among Democrats the topic "often missed in current literature on party identification and voter behavior is the influence of organized labor institutions." If there is a correlation between labor union membership and party identification, and then party identification and voter behavior what is the impact of union membership on the election of 2000. In this paper I will examine the relationship between labor union membership and the presidential vote in the national election of 2000, while controlling for the variable of party identification.

After a thorough analysis of data from many sources, including the National Election Studies (NES), I believe I will find that there is a high instance of union members who voted Democrat (Gore) over Republican (Bush) in the 2000 election. Specifically, my hypothesis is that Presidential vote is a function of union membership.

According to Taylor E. Dark in his book The Unions and the Democrats "the process of political bargaining between union leaders and politicians involves an exchange of resources that each side finds valuable." The state can offer the unions with governmental subsidiaries and beneficial policies; whereas politicians can benefit from the support of the vast union membership in general elections and in accomplishing their policy-making objectives. Because Democrats are willing to support domestic policy advocated by unionists, unions are willing to back democratic candidates in their campaigns and throughout their term of office; a perfect example of a symbiotic relationship.

Since the 1960s, the labor movement has exhibited the modern characteristics it is known for today. George Meany, American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) President, wrote President Lyndon B. Johnson a letter illustrating a political action that could "deepen the social and economic commitments of the Great Society" (Dark 47). Meany also advised Johnson that while he may be continually attacked for his Vietnam views, he could count on the support of labor if he saw to Meany's reforms. Shortly after, President Johnson responded with an answer showing his interest in the matters brought up by Meany.

Johnson's quick response to Meany and the AFL-CIO is partially due to the role that labor plays in the Democratic Party's presidential nominating process. Union involvement in this system was most certainly due to the rules adopted at the state level regulating the selection of delegates to the Democratic national convention. In a majority of the states, delegates were chosen at caucuses or conventions that were effectively dominated by party leaders. Delegates were selected on the basis of their commitment and service to the party, often before any candidates had actually entered the race. Therefore, delegates were obliged to the leaders who had chosen them, not to any individual Democratic voters or candidates in the race for nominations. In effect, the candidates then were interested in accumulating the support of a delegate majority at the convention that could reliably deliver the votes of their state's delegation.

Unions operated under this system under what was once described by former AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland as a "tacit, invisible but real arrangement." In which "the party leaders knew that, in the general election, they needed labor to draw some of the water and hew some of the wood. The leaders of the party wanted to win. They wouldn't nominate anyone who was too offensive to the trade union movement." Kirkland claims that "it was a collective bargaining relationship, in effect: the key people involved in the process would discuss with us the acceptability of various candidates...A relative handful of people exercised a profound influence on the process." Although union leaders could not necessarily ensure the nomination of their first choice, they knew that party leaders would listen to their concerns, anticipate their reactions, and avoid choosing a candidate they actively disliked. And in the few states where primaries were used to select delegates, union leaders could mobilize their local membership to vote for the favorite candidate of the union. Labors plan was a strategically safe mode of pursuit that would produce a satisfactory end.

President Johnson's support of the labor vote caused United Auto Workers (UAW) President Walter P. Reuther to express his genuine support for President Johnson, stating that "no one is more entitled to my vote than he is" (Dark 48). The statement was in reference to Johnson's profound dedication to domestic programs. These two statements reflect the similar views of labor and their express interest to continue to support a president who would work for their interests in the future.

"In important ways, the relationship between the unions and the Democrats in the mid-1960s approximated the model of centralized pluralism, with bargaining capacity relatively concentrated in both the labor movement and the political system" (Dark). Resultant was the both cooperative and productive relationship between top labor executives and the Johnson White House. The relationship was "cooperative in the sense that common legislative and political goals were identified, and appropriate strategies and tactics coordinated; productive in the sense the many of these common goals were actually achieved, to the benefit of both the labor movement and the Democratic administration. In the postwar period, through a more centralized bargaining force and a lower internal opposition to the political strategy of unions, labor forged a strong relationship with the Democratic Party. As successful as this relationship was, there were limits on the cooperation between the two organizations. The fragmentation within each institution was too great, and "neither labor nor the party was well prepared to confront the crises-both economical and political-that would grip the political system in the decade ahead" (Dark 75).

Much literature has been written on the series of reforms approved by the Democratic Party's Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, later known as the McGovern-Fraser Commission, transformed the dynamics of political bargaining. The most influential reform on the union representation was one which specified in 1972 delegates would have to be selected either through primary elections or in caucuses or conventions open to all party members. This meant that "labor leaders could no longer sustain their tradition role as power brokers, bargaining with a discrete set of elite actors ... and now they would have to ensure that their members actually participated in crucial primaries or caucuses; ... [now,] the members could vote for a different candidate in primaries or caucuses [than the one supported by the top leadership of the unions]" (Dark 84).

The early 70s saw a slow in the economy, but union members bucked the trends and continued to better the wages, security, and working conditions of the membership. The Teamsters General President, Frank Fitzsimmons, engineered an alliance with the Nixon White House that put him in a position to safeguard the interests of working men and women during the wage and price controls of the early '70s.

With the landslide election of Ronald Reagan, the labor movement's fortunes changed. Starting with his busting of the air traffic controllers union in 1981, Reagan waged a wholesale assault on labor unions. With each year, big business lobbyists eroded labor law and took the teeth out of its enforcement. The labor movement began a steady downward spiral that led many to start writing unions' premature obituaries.

After such a rough period in the 80s, labor in the 90s started to show some tenacity. in 1997 the AFL-CIO defeated legislation giving the president the ability to "Fast Track" trade legislation without assured protection of workers' rights and the environment. In the late 90s as well, labor unions started to show a renewed growth and optimism and are working towards that goal ever more. For example, in 1999, the union movement organized the largest program for grassroots electoral politics ever.

Labor unions know how to get out the vote. Leigh Strope of The Associated Press agrees stating, "labor unions ... are bombarding their members with thousands of phone calls, visits, fliers and mailings about issues that range from corporate greed to their own Social Security in an effort to get them to turn out for Democrats on Nov. 5." The website of the AFL-CIO gives insight into the AFL-CIO's political program:

The AFL-CIO and affiliate unions mobilize union members at the grassroots level. We encourage union members to register to vote. We also research working families' concerns about current issues, and put together information showing where candidates for all levels of elected office stand on those issues. Through networks of volunteers and activists, we get the word out to union members in every part of the country. The AFL-CIO also offers training for union members who want to become more involved in political life by running for office themselves.

As reported by the ALF-CIO, union members made a significant impact at the polls in 2000. "Voters from union households represented 26 percent of the vote overall, according to the polls, and were represented in even higher proportions in key battleground states. For instance, 43 percent of all voters in Michigan were members of union households" (Difference).

Union members were key contributors to the narrow Gore-Lieberman win of the popular vote. Union members voted for Gore-Lieberman 63 percent of the time over the Bush-Cheney ticket at 32 percent, according to polling of union members on election night by Peter D. Hart Research Associates.

"The results capped the most massive mobilization of working family voters ever. From the first union volunteers who rallied voters for Iowa's January caucuses to the last AFL-CIO Labor 2000 volunteers making Election Day get-out-the-vote phone calls, working families mobilized the biggest 'People-Powered' election campaign to date" (Difference). The AFL-CIO estimated that nearly 100,000 union members volunteered their time to advocate candidates who would actively and passionately support a Working Families Agenda.

According to a chart on the AFL-CIO website union volunteer activists have:

Registered 2.3 million new union household voters,
Made 8 million phone calls to union households,
Distributed more than 14 million leaflets at union worksites,
E-mailed some 60,000 E-VOTE cards urging people to vote,
Supported 901 union members running for office, and
Ordered 3.5 million leaflets through the AFL-CIO website.

Through the Labor 2000 campaign, working families' unions have:

Mobilized more than 100,000 union volunteers to get out the vote from Miami to Seattle, from San Diego to Boston and from Austin to Detroit,
Trained more than 1,000 Labor 2000 coordinators for worksites, local unions, central labor councils and state federations, and
Sent more than 12 million pieces of literature to union households from the national AFL-CIO alone (Difference).

The numerous unions out there (national unions, central labor councils and state federations) also endorse candidates running for office, offering reasons why they believe those candidates would do the best job for working families. However, no one can tell a union member how to vote-specifically that's each individual's decision.

Stated eloquently, the problem I am attempting to solve is whether or not labor union members generally voted Democrat (Gore) over Republican (Bush) in the 2000 Presidential elections. Hypothetically, I believe that it is quite accurate to predict that an overwhelming majoring of the labor union membership voted Democrat (Gore).

The independent variable in this experiment will be union membership within the household, the dependent variable is whether the members voted Democrat (Gore) or Republican (Bush) in the 2000 Presidential election, while controlling for party identification. It is fairly obvious that most household's containing a union member would vote Democrat (Gore). The Democratic Party's platform focusing on domestic policy is a central reason; it would allow them to find more security in their jobs.

I am controlling for party identification because it is a rather significant issue to this experiment. Unless union members are all Democrats and their political affiliation is entirely Democrat, then they are at risk of being placed in a category which would not suit them. A union member could possibly be Republican supporter, and may have voted Republican (Bush) in the 2000 Presidential election. They also may be a Democrat, but could have voted Republican (Bush) in 2000. Party identification will allow us to more accurately predict the majority views in the 2000 Presidential election.

The general causal model of my study is that party identification would be additive to each household union member's decision to vote for a Democratic candidate (Gore). The effect would be direct as the influence to vote for the Democratic candidate would be more intense if the voter was a registered Democrat. in contrast, if the household union member were a registered Republican they would have a more difficult time in deciding to vote for a Democratic candidate.

Relatively, my working hypothesis is that many labor union members are strictly Democrat and would identify themselves as such. Though, some may feel a split on some issues that may hit more closer to home which may cause them to split their ticket, they would most likely vote for a Democrat (Gore for President) in the 2000 national elections. Party Identification is a valid control variable, as many union members would rely heavily on their Party Identification when divided between two candidates.

The research design used was an ex post facto correlation design. The independent variable, union membership, can be defined by whether or not a union member is living in a household surveyed by the NES for their 2000 election survey. The dependent variable, who will R vote for president, is whether or not, if R were to vote, for which party/candidate would he/she vote.

The group sampled for this was a portion of the voting-age population selected by households. The sample was split by mode and selection procedure: 801 Pre respondents were selected by Random Digit Dial (RDD) sampling and interviewed by phone; 1006 Pre Respondents were selected using probability area sampling and interviewed in person. (694 Post reinterviews were in person and 862 Post reinterviews were by phone.).

The analysis performed contains an amount of error that needs to be considered. First, 19.4 percent of cases in the cross-tabulation between "Anyone in HH belong to union * Who will R vote for President" in the 2000 NES survey were missing the data necessary for this analysis. This reduces the sample size from 1,807 respondents to 1,457 respondents. Second, 1.8 percent of cases in the cross-tabulation between "Anyone in HH belong to union * Party ID summary" in the 2000 NES survey were missing the data necessary for this analysis. This reduces that sample size from 1.807 to 1,774. However, it should be noted that this is still an adequate sample from which to begin analysis.

The information used in the analysis was taken from the 2000 NES survey, which is conducted biannually, by the Center for Political Studies of the Institute for Social Research. The 2000 National Election Study entailed both a pre-election interview and a post-election re-interview. A freshly drawn cross section of the electorate was taken to yield 1807 cases. The 65 minute pre election survey went into the field September 5th, nine weeks before Election Day. The 65 minute post election study, unique to the time series in that no president elect was named for several days, went into the field the day after the election, November 8th, and remained in the field until December 18th.

The study population for the 2000 Pre- and Post-Election Study is defined to include all United States citizens of voting age on or before the 2000 Election Day. Eligible citizens must have resided in housing units in the forty-eight coterminous states. This definition excludes persons living in Alaska or Hawaii and requires eligible persons to have been both a United States citizen and eighteen years of age on or before the 7th of November 2000.

The NES is a lengthy questionnaire regarding a wide variety of information concerning demographics and social issues. The content for the 2000 Election Study reflects its double duty, both as the traditional presidential election year time-series data collection and as a mode study. Experts in testing and the social sciences carefully design the questions on the survey to accurately examine respondents' attributes. (Data to interpret responses to the 2000 NES survey can be found in the Appendix).

I employed the cross-tabulation method to identify any relationship between the variables. I utilized Cramer's V to determine the strength of the relationship and its approximate significance to determine the significance of that relationship.

Completion of the analysis has revealed my hypothesis to be correct. There is a positive correlation between a union membership household and the support for a Democratic President (Gore). The variable was applied separately to both the dependent and control variables. It is important to note the number of responses that were possible for each variable. When the independent variable and the dependent variable were cross-tabulated with the control variable layered, the resultant responses centered around the Democrat and Republican candidates, with the other Party's candidates sometimes resulting in only a few to no cases per cell. When all variables were applied, the result was 48 possible cells for the analysis of the dependent variable. The statistical significance in only two instances out of eight below the mark of 0.05 is not enough to assume that there is a relationship between a household affiliated with union membership and voter behavior in the 2000 Presidential election.

When all variables were applied, approximately 90.9 percent of the cells, which contained responses of yes to union membership, held less than 30 cases. However, of the 213 union-yes respondents, 128 responded they would vote Democrat (Gore), 69 for Republican (Bush), and 16 for all other options. However, while controlling for party identification (Table 1).

Two instances of a Cramer's V with a significance level under 0.05 were found, and they display relationships of 0.011 (Weak Democrat) and 0.007 (Independent-Republican). There were three other instances near 0.05; they were 0.159 (Independent-Independent), 0.075 (Strong Republican) and 0.112 (Other/Minority Party/Refuses to Say). Then there is the third group of which are extremely insignificant. This group contains 0.390 (Strong Democrat), 0.973 (Independent-Democrat) and 0.730 (Weak Republican) (Table 2).

It was expected that a union member, no matter their political affiliation, would be more apt to vote for Democrat (Gore), in the 2000 Presidential election. and in all actuality, it looks like it on the first chart, however Cramer's V does not wholly support my theory. However, if you were to raise the standard from 0.05, to three times that, you have a little more lee way and a possibility of acceptance.

Analysis proved the hypothesis that a union member would be more likely to vote Democrat (Gore) in the Presidential election of 2000, regardless of party identification , to be incorrect. A strong correlation was found between the independent variable (household union membership) and the dependent variable (Presidential vote), when controlling for party identification.

Cross-tabulation was used to view the results of the NES 2000 survey and Cramer's V was used for the statistical analysis. Union membership was defined as whether a union member was living in the household and support for a Democratic President was analyzed for the member's likelihood to vote for Gore in the 2000 election. The major problem of this analysis was the uncertainty of the voter's true response concerning for whom they had voted for President in the 2000 elections, because their vote is confidential and they may have considered the question as not the business of the NES.

When all variables were applied, there was a concentration of union-yes responses surrounding the Democratic candidate (Gore) and the Republican candidate (Bush). Having seen the results, a good revision to this analysis might be to poll only 'union-yes' households, and study those responses.

A Short History of American Labor. University of Wisconsin-Stout AFL-CIO, adapted from AFL-CIO American Federationist (March 1981). 04 May 2003. < http://www.uwstout.edu/socsci/tyson/laborhis.htm >.

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Dark, Taylor E. The Unions and the Democrats: An Enduring Alliance. Cornell University Press; Ithaca, NY. 1999.

The Union Difference: 26 Percent of Voters Are from Union Households. American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations. 27 Apr 2003. < http://www.aflcio.org/issuespolitics/politics/election.cfm >.

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