'Legitimation in Advanced Capitalism'

Part three of Legitimation Crisis emphasizes what Habermas believes to be the central aspects of legitimation. These characteristics include reference to many thinker's contributions to the concept of legitimation. Moreover, all of the following notions are discussed in terms of legitimation:faith, nihilism, compromise, contract, worldviews, interpretation, anthropology, contingency, norms, consensus, alienation, and justification. Furthermore, through discussing these topics, Habermas becomes able to generate an understanding of 'complexity and democracy', its characteristics, and its legitimation.

In the last chapter, Habermas concludes that much legitimation in complex society is defined in terms of an administrative theoretical rationality which becomes eccentric and does not permit the possibility of appeal. That is appeal without revolutionary motivations. This however, can also be described as the maturing of an infrastructure that clearly understands its ideals, norms and consequent legitimation. In other words, is not possible to conceive of an eccentric system as a mere developed system that has isolated a few precious ideals for the purpose of political resolution? In other words, a system in flux is bound to be open to appeal, whereas a system that has identified itself will inevitably be more reluctant to change, unless the self-identification itself includes appeal. Furthermore, is it not the case that advanced capitalism is still open to appeal, and not open to appeal in terms of being open to appeal?

Habermas begins part three of Legitimation Crisis with discussion about legitimation in terms of its underlying norms and values which are both motivators for legitimation and represented by essential norms of 'rational' speech. Moreover, such norms hold validating ability for legitimacy. "The basis of legitimacy reveals 'the ultimate grounds of the 'validity' of a domination...and by fixing in a system of observed norms, the asymmetrical distribution of legitimate chances, to satisfy needs." (Habermas p.96) Habermas refers to Max Weber to expand and argue for this concept of legitimation. In this reference, Habermas illuminates the legitimating factor or 'norm' of legality. That is, legal systems operation includes a strong belief in procedures and conceptions that both "absorb uncertainty", and "suffice as legitimizing premises of decision". However, Habermas argues against this to support the claim that advanced capitalism is alienation and eccentric. Such opposition include the notions that legality does not contain meaning and that formal procedure synonymous with legality can create and maintain "material claims to justice." "From a systematic point of view as well, the assumption of basic material norms capable of being justified leads to difficulty that certain normative contents must be theoretically singled out." (p.100)

In chapters two and three, Habermas discusses the ability to support normative-validity claims in terms of legitimacy. Chapter two focuses on the use of reason in sentences, and the ability of that reason and consensus in regard to that reason to generate legitimacy. Habermas distinguishes analytic and decisionist aspects of sentences. The former, like empiricism "employ practical sentences either to express the attitudes and needs of the speaker or to bring about or to manipulate behavioral dispositions in the hearer." (p.102) Decisionist ideas however, believe that sentences are formed from a non-experiential/empirical criteria; rather, they are based on 'decisions'.

Furthermore, Habermas refers to 'imperativist construction' in which thought orientated and non-thought orientated concerns are distinguished. However, the idea of contract is considered by Habermas to be fundamental in the justification of sentences that represent norms. That is, mutual empirical needs are represented by concurrence and recognition of norm-sentences. Moreover, since these sentences are not propositional, but volitional, they are empirical rather than cognitive. In other words, Jim wants a beer (propositional), but has no money; so he decides (volitional) that he needs a job to acquire the funds necessary to purchase the beer. The decision to 'need' a job, is the contract between Jim and social consensus. Furthermore, the motivation behind the norm of needing a job is possibly a wide spread desire for beer or other consumable products. This motive too, is empirical, but 'rational'. "The normative-validity claim is itself cognitive (propositonal) in the sense of the supposition...that it could be discursively redeemed- that is, grounded in consensus of the participants through argumentation." (p.105) Thus, here the legitimacy comes from consensus about various propositional contents, i.e. the 'need' for beer.

Chapter three is concerned with political aspects of norms and additional legitimating notions. "Insofar as norms express generalizable interests, they are based on a rational consensus...Insofar as norms do not regulate generalizable interests, they are based on force/normative power." (p.111) Moreover, force or normative power can become threatening to Democracy and/or advanced capitalism and complex society if the "freedom guaranteeing principle/force" is removed. Furthermore, if two consensus' assert their volitional norms, then two forces exist. For example, regional population x lobbies for a decrease in the price of lemons and an increase in their production, whereas regional population y lobbies for an increase in the price of lemons and a decrease in their production. According to Habermas, a possible result of the conflict is compromise, which is a legitimating force. Moreover, if the two consensus' agree to decrease the price, and increase the price of lemons, only if melons are increased in price and decreased in production, then a compromise has been reached. If norms are to be recognized as legitimized, they must be contrasted to 'generalizable' interests (non-legitimated) and hypothetical norm systems. "A social theory critical of ideology can identify the normative power built into the institutional system only if is starts from the model of suppression of generalizable interests and compares normative structures existing at a given time with the hypothetical state of a system of norms formed." (p.113) Moreover, since it is non-cognitive volitions that are legitimated and not cognitive propositions, then critique of existing norm-systems must also be empirical. In other words, if Jim's lobby group wants to deregulate the production of beer, then it must interpret that the existing norms of beer production are distasteful. Habermas refers to Claus Offe to offer several other legitimating forces of norms; they include anthropological 'totality of unfulfilled needs, observable existing and pre-existing (infra)structural features, conventionally (pragmatically) introduced goals, constitutional law (claim and reality), law/procedural limitation, counter factual claims to limitations and comparative procedures.

Chapters four and five of part three of Legitimation Crisis, focus on the actual, rather than possible legitimation of complex society. Moreover, Habermas believes that actual relations to truth in terms of legitimation lack meaning and are therefore quasi-human. Furthermore, Habermas refers to nomization and interpretive systems to amplify this claim. In nomization, "Men are congenitally compelled to impose a meaningful order upon reality...the ultimate danger of such separation however, is meaninglessness" (p.118) therefore construction brings meaning, and meaning is quasi-human. In interpretive world-views, "the fundamental function is the avoidance of chaos...such as dangers of socialization, sickness and death...of which the 'meaning' promised is ambivalent" (p.119) Habermas also explains that norms must be contingent/not necessarily true, because not even scientific norms have not succeeded in understanding the epistemological obstacle. Thus, since motives are not easily systematized due to problems with meaning, reason and legitimation, the corresponding norms are often not a perfect match. Habermas believed the result to be a 'disconnecting of the formation of motives from norms...in the bourgeois consciousness. This 'self-defeating' consciousness leads to 'retrograde democracy' in which "an elite theory of domination emerges as the realistic, scientific antidote (to the lack of understanding) natural-law idealism." (p.123) Moreover, this leads to 'civic privatism'.'dialectic of enlightenment' or general acquisition of norms that "admit of truth."

Moreover, fundamental norms in complex society become more receptive to 'steering problems', and less receptive to non-systematized motives. Moreover, the conflict avoidance becomes creating norms that deal with "problems that have resulted from growing autonomy" Moreover, "life-world or individual needs become separate from normative structures", "system becomes a separated identity from self identity", and the steering orientated normative structure develops a linguistic universality. "Reproduction of highly complex societies leaves no choice but that of anchoring the required reflexivity of society in an administrative system shielded from parties and the public, instead of in a democratically organized public domain." (p.134) Habermas attempts to offer solutions to this administrative problem such as 'participatory' planning, limitations, balancing of social-scientific theory with evolution and will-forming discourse. In other words, an equal amount of regulation is necessary to maintain that a system does not exceed itself in terms of separation of life-world and system.

This paper has summarized part three of Habermas's Legitimation Crisis. Although much more is mentioned in the section itself, the theme is that legitimation in complex society has shifted from a balanced mix between life-world and system to system steering alone. The result is civic privatism, alienation and eccentric administration. Nevertheless, why is this a problem, if the original ideals inherent to a complex system include an acceptance of complexity? If this were not the case, why were the drastic changes in the pioneering British industrial revolution never stopped? Surely, the will to not stagnate must be taken into account.